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Abstract
A computational valuation model is developed to predict discrepancies be-
tween choices and valuations in economic experiments. The model is based on
Boundedly Rational Expected Utility Theory (Navarro-Martinez et al., 2017) and
predicts average certainty equivalents for monetary lotteries that are higher than
choices would imply from the same set of underlying preferences. Thereby, the
model predicts the preference reversal phenomenon (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968).
The model predicts that a choice between a lottery and a sure payo↵ can
influence a subsequent money valuation of the choice’s strength of preference. This
monetary strength of preference (MSoP), can be positively a↵ected by spill-over
e↵ects from the choice process and also by consistency-seeking behaviour towards
information about the choice. This can explain observations by Butler et al. (2014a)
that participants systematically state MSoP values that are too high relative to their
choices. Model simulations show how this model di↵ers from existing computational
valuation models. When adapted to predict MSoP values, these instead predict a
negative MSoP mismatch.
These predictions are tested in a laboratory experiment, which finds a posi-
tive MSoP mismatch but only when MSoP values stem from upward adjustments to
a sure amount. When sure amounts are adjusted downwards, a negative MSoP mis-
match occurs instead. Neither the novel model nor existing theory can explain this
two-fold pattern. Controlling for the delay between choices and MSoP valuations
also rules out the possibility of spill-over e↵ects.
Participants also value lotteries too high relative to their choice behaviour.
Contrary to theory, a reaction time analysis shows that individually-longer reaction
times do not reduce discrepancies between valuations and choice data. Preference
reversals do not become less frequent when participants deliberate for longer.
Altogether, these results show novel and yet unexplained phenomena in valu-
ation behaviour but also highlight how theory needs to be adapted to explain these.
xii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Economic theory largely describes behaviour by assuming that people behave in a
“rational” way. This implies that people can be described as decision makers who
behave according to a clearly defined set of preferences. Actions that are inconsistent
with these overarching determinants of behaviour are mistakes that are random or
disappear with experience. A core component of these preferences is an attitude
towards risk. Economic theory assumes that people di↵er in their tolerance to risk
and that they trade o↵ between options while taking the associated risk into account.
As any model, this simplifies the description of behaviour. But the question
is if it is not too simple. Starmer (2000) summarises an abundance of behavioural
regularities that are inconsistent with classic economic theory. Participants in eco-
nomic experiments violate key assumptions of economic theory across a range of
choice tasks and their choices correlate with aspects that are not considered by eco-
nomic theory. They also vary in their behaviour across repetitions of the same choice
problems. New theoretical approaches addressed this with the concept of “bounded
rationality”, where individuals are assumed to be constrained in their ability to
make optimal decisions. This led to the development of models that also incor-
porated e↵ects on decision confidence, task di culty, and the extent of individual
deliberation in choices (Busemeyer and Johnson, 2004).
But participants also act inconsistently across elicitation procedures with
well-documented discrepancies between choices and equivalence judgements, e.g.
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valuation tasks. There is only limited research from the perspective of bounded
rationality towards this and some predictions from theory have not yet been tested.
This thesis reviews existing research in chapter 2 and simulates existing
boundedly rational valuation models in chapter 3 to provide a picture of current
predictions from existing theory.
Chapter 4 develops a new approach towards modelling such choice-matching
discrepancies. Boundedly Rational Expected Utility Theory (Navarro-Martinez et
al., 2017) is extended to also capture valuations and generate predictions for phe-
nomena that are not yet addressed by theory. This includes the quantification of
strength of preference judgements in money units and how they can be a↵ected by
previous choices. Choices are modelled by a sequential sampling model, which accu-
mulates mental evidence in the form of certainty equivalents. These are generated
by a random distribution according to parameters of a random preference model
(Loomes and Sugden, 1995). This mental evidence is also accumulated for a valua-
tion process, which can be a↵ected both by mental evidence from previous choices as
well as choice displays of past choices. The model thereby not only captures existing
behavioural regularities but also predicts e↵ects that have not yet been tested.
Chapter 5 reports an experiment that is set up to benchmark di↵erent elic-
itation procedures against each other and to test predictions of relevant models.
The experiment replicates previously observed e↵ects and finds novel phenomena
which cannot be explained by current theory. Binary choices, valuations, as well as
valuations through adjustments of sure payo↵s are elicited on a within-individual
basis. This allows us to test to what extent the relevant models do predict e↵ects
of choice-matching discrepancies in the right direction and how di↵erent elicitation
methods can generate conflicting measurements of preference.
Chapter 6 further tests for the validity of model properties: A reaction
time analysis shows that the frequency of mismatches between direct valuations
and choices does not decrease for individually-longer deliberation times of partici-
pants. This challenges an assumption from bounded rationality that decision makers
approach optimal solutions with more deliberation. Specifically, all the sequential
2
sampling models discussed in this thesis predict that individually-longer delibera-
tion times coincide with a lower rate of mismatches. This is because they all assume
that with longer deliberation time, elicited valuations converge onto the prediction
of a “core model”, which results in the same certainty equivalent that can be derived
from choices. Evidence that this convergence does not exist suggests that valuation
tasks cannot be described by such a sequential sampling process. Chapter 7 provides
a conclusion and discusses opportunities for future research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter provides the motivation for the research questions of this thesis. Sec-
tion 2.1 explains why discrepancies between choice data and matching data poses a
challenge for economic theory and section 2.2 shows how the same applies to elici-
tations of strength of preference in choices. The following sections then explain how
economic theory has developed models that address these discrepancies (section 2.3),
probabilistic decision behaviour in economic experiments (section 2.4), and how the
concept of bounded rationality can be applied to explain to behavioural regularities
in choices (section 2.5.1) and valuations (section 2.5.2). Section 2.6 discusses the
current state of the literature and identifies opportunities for the research in this
thesis.
2.1 Choice-Matching Discrepancies
Tversky, Sattath and Slovic (1988) review several examples where participants’ pref-
erences in economic experiments systematically depend on the elicitation method.
They categorise elicitation through choice and through matching. Choices are
elicited by picking a preferred option out of two or more o↵ered alternatives, compa-
rable to a judgement that identifies the best option. E.g., whether a 25% chance of
winning £50 is more attractive than receiving £10 with certainty. Matching means
that participants set a value to be equally as attractive as an o↵ered alternative
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to them. This is comparable to an equivalence judgement where the attractiveness
of an alternative is quantified. E.g., a valuation: What money amount is equally
as attractive as a 25% chance of winning £50? Or probability matching: Which
probability of winning £50 (in percent), is equally as attractive as receiving £10
with certainty?
Across a variety of experimental tasks, Tversky et al. (1988) show how
elicited preferences can be inconsistent across procedures. I.e., participants system-
atically choose options that contradict their matched values. This is not just due to
random variance of elicited preferences but instead caused by the type of procedure.
One of the examples given is developed by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968;
1971; 1983) in the form of the preference reversal phenomenon. Slovic and Lichten-
stein (1968) first generated evidence of this through the following experiment: Par-
ticipants were o↵ered to choose between lotteries with varying monetary outcomes
as well as varying outcome probabilities. Outcomes were in the form of “winning”
with positive payo↵s and “losing” with negative payo↵s. In another treatment, par-
ticipants were asked for bidding prices for these lotteries. Whereas choices between
lotteries were primarily influenced by the probabilities of a winning or losing pay-
o↵, bidding prices for the same lotteries were primarily influenced by the payo↵
amounts. Using this phenomenon, Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) presented choice
pairs of low-risk low-outcome lotteries, called P-Bets, and high-risk high-outcome
lotteries, called $-Bets, to participants. They then also asked participants for bid-
ding prices for these lotteries. For a number of pairs, participants consistently chose
the low-risk lottery over the high-risk lottery while also stating higher bidding prices
for the high-risk lottery.
In a follow-up of this experiment, Grether and Plott (1979) controlled for
a number of criticisms of the experimental method and incentivised participants.
In two separate treatments, participants chose between various P-Bets and $-Bets.
They were then asked either for their selling prices of money or “the exact dollar
amount such that you are indi↵erent between the bet and the amount of money”
for both lotteries. 56% of participants chose P-Bets more frequently than $-Bets but
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also more frequently stated lower selling prices for P-Bets than for $-Bets, thereby
reversing their elicited preference. Only 11% showed a reversal in the opposite
direction. Therefore, participants consistently reversed their preference from prefer-
ring the P-Bet in choices to preferring the $-Bet in selling prices. This shows that
participants systematically chose in a matter that was inconsistent with their valu-
ation. This implies that at least one of the elicitation procedures failed to identify
a common underlying preference.
This thesis will investigate choice-matching discrepancies that consider pref-
erence reversals between data from binary choices and valuations through a certainty
equivalent (CE). A CE is provided when participants are asked for a money amount
that they perceive to be equally as attractive as playing out a lottery. Also, this
thesis only considers elicited preferences towards monetary lotteries and sure pay-
o↵s that are immediate. E.g., “intertemporal” preference reversals as observed by
Tversky et al. (1990) as well as observed reversals in “probability equivalents” by
Hershey and Schoemaker (1985) would go beyond the scope of this thesis. In ad-
dition, repeated lottery choices and valuations with feedback about outcomes from
playing out lotteries are not considered either. E.g., interesting results have been
generated by Cox and Grether (1996), who found that repeated lottery valuations in
an auction with feedback reduced the number of classic preference reversals. With
more repetitions, $-Bet valuations decrease and result in more consistent preference
relations. But in a comparable experiment, Braga et al. (2009) find that this is
caused by participants experiencing losses. Some participants with loss experience
even reduced prices to an extent that results in preference reversals in the opposite
direction. Also, participants who merely observe losses of others do not show the
same reduction. This suggests that learning in this context does not eliminate the
preference reversal and is interrelated with experience as opposed to straightfor-
ward learning from displayed information. Although this appears worthy of further
investigation, incorporating feedback e↵ects is beyond the scope of this thesis.
A preference reversal will be referred to as the phenomenon of a DM or par-
ticipant choosing a monetary lottery A over another lottery B while independently
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valuing B higher than A on di↵erent occasions. Therefore, the preference reversal is
a special case within choice-matching discrepancies in general. If this occurs system-
atically, the individual reverses her preference relationship from choices compared
to the preference from valuations.
In a review of Grether and Plott’s (1979) and subsequent studies, Tversky et
al. (1990) concluded that elicited preference was not independent of the procedure
but instead context-dependent. Therefore, di↵erent preference relationships can
be elicited with di↵erent procedures from the same participants: Choices result
in a higher preference for P-Bets and valuations result in a higher preference for
$-Bets. In a further literature survey, Seidl (2002) narrowed down explanations
of this procedure invariance to three possible causes1: 1) The elicitation mode of
valuations, 2) intransitive preferences, and 3) over- and under-pricing of lotteries.
Elicitation Mode of Valuations
Elicitation mode means that participants in preference reversal experiments might
not respond with their true valuations. To understand this, it is necessary to un-
derstand the valuation procedure. Note that the preference reversal is a mismatch
between choices and valuations. In the experiments discussed by Seidl (2002), lotter-
ies were valued either by the participants’ willingness to pay for playing the lottery
(WTP), willingness to accept a selling price for the right to play the lottery (WTA),
or the certainty equivalent (CE). According to classic economic theory, di↵erences
between all of these should be negligible if no transaction costs exist and income
e↵ects are negligible (Horowitz and McConnell, 2002). But Seidl (2002) lists a num-
ber of examples where WTP values were significantly smaller than WTA values,
with CE values in between (also see Horowitz, 2002, for a review of WTA/WTP
studies). If the regularity of too high WTA values is stronger for the $-Bet, $-Bets
might be valued higher than P-Bets not because of participants’ preferences but
only because of the tendency to elicit too high WTA values. The same applies to
1Seidl (2002) also elaborates on research concerning intertemporal preference reversals. These
will not be discussed because this thesis only considers the classic preference reversal with immediate
payo↵s.
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eliciting possibly lower WTP values for the P-Bet.
Testing for this in an experiment, Casey (1991) produced preference reversals
in the opposite direction. But this only occurred for WTP valuations of bets with
especially large expected values where the bidding process could lead to a loss for
participants. The classic preference reversal remained even for WTP valuations of
the P-Bet when any of these conditions was not met.
In addition, Karni and Safra (1987) and Segal (1988) proposed that par-
ticipants in experiments might not be properly incentivised to report their actual
WTA, WTP, or CE. All experiments used the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM)
elicitation scheme (Becker et al., 1964). Participants that do not follow all decision
rules of classic economic theory might then over- or underreport their valuations
(see Seidl, 2002, for a detailed explanation). But Tversky et al. (1990) showed that
the results also hold when using an ordinal payo↵ scheme, where participants are
informed that their lottery valuations are only used to order their preference. If a
lottery would be played out based on their valuation, the lottery with the highest
assigned value would be played out. Therefore, the problem of misincentivisation
disappeared but the preference reversal phenomenon remained.
Intransitive Preferences
As part of developing a novel economic theory for choices under risk (regret theory,
described in section 2.3), Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Loomes et al. (1989)
propose that participants’s preferences might not be entirely transitive. E.g., while
the P-Bet would be preferred over the $-Bet (P   $) and the $-Bet over some sure
amount ($   C), these two preference elicitations need not imply a preference for
the P-Bet over the sure amount. So these two preference elicitations do not mean
that the P-Bet is also preferred over the sure amount (P   C does not follow). The
same sure amount C might be preferred over the P-Bet (C   P ). And because a
preference through valuation is elicited in a preference reversal experiment, higher
$-Bet CEs than P-Bet CEs (CE$ > CEP ) do not imply that the $-Bet is preferred
over the P-Bet ($   P does not follow).
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Loomes et al. (1989) do find evidence for intransitivity in an experiment
where participants choose over a range of the described P  / C  /  $ choice tasks.
But in a di↵erent experimental design, Tversky et al. (1990) find that only 10% of
observed preference reversals can be explained by this type of intransitivity. They
attribute the remaining 90% of preference reversals to over- and underpricing, which
is explained in the following paragraph.
Over- and Underpricing
In their experiment, Tversky et al. (1990) find patterns within preference reversals
with the same approach of using a sure amount C, where CE$ > C > CEP . First,
they identified preference reversals where P   $ and CE$ > C > CEP were elicited
from participants. In a second step, they identified the preference relations between
$, P , and C:
• In 10% of cases, they observed a pattern of intransitivity
where $   C and C   P .
• In 65.5% of cases, they observed overpricing of the $-Bet
where C   P and C   $.
• In 6.1% of cases, they observed underpricing of the P-Bet
where P   C and $   C.
• In the remaining 18.4% of cases, they observed both overpricing of the $-Bet
as well as underpricing of the P-Bet where P   C and C   $.
This provides evidence for the over- and underpricing explanation (see sections 2.3
and 2.5 for theories that predict this). But Loomes and Pogrebna (2016) improve
upon this method and infer specific sure amounts CP and C$ per participant and lot-
tery, for which participants are indi↵erent between the lottery and the sure amount
(CP ⇠ P and C$ ⇠ $). When eliciting CEs from these participants, it turns out
that most participants report CEs that are higher than the specific sure amounts
for both lotteries (CEP > CP and CE$ > C$). Therefore, both lotteries are over-
valued by participants. Their experiment still replicates the preference reversal.
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And the asymmetry observed by Grether and Plott of more participants choos-
ing the P-Bet but valuing the S-Bet higher than vice versa also remains. But it
shows that this occurs because the $-Bet is overvalued even more than the P-Bet (
|CE$   C$| > |CEP   CP | so that CE$ > CEP > CP > C$).
Since mis-pricing cannot occur in a choice task, overvaluation still seems to
be a result of procedure invariance. But it still remains unclear if this overvaluation
regularly occurs for all valuations. Schkade and Johnson (1989) find some evidence
that mis-pricing can be influenced in an experiment where participants adjust pre-
set starting values to arrive at a valuation for the P-Bet and the $-Bet. When a
starting value was especially high, lottery valuations ended up higher as well and
vice versa for low starting values. Using this, Schkade and Johnson (1989) were able
to modulate the rate of preference reversals up from 70% (for a low P-Bet starting
value and a high $-Bet starting value) down to 34% (for a high P-Bet starting value
and a low $-Bet starting value). See sections 2.3 and 2.5 for theories that incorporate
such anchoring e↵ects to explain over- and underpricing.
In conclusion, choice-matching discrepancies in the form of the preference
reversal cannot be easily explained by a misincentivisation in the valuation process.
Intransitive preferences seem to be unable to fully explain observations of follow-up
experiments. But overpricing of lotteries in the valuation parts of the experiments
can explain the preference reversal, although it is unclear how this is caused. The im-
plication for a model that captures these characteristics is that procedure-invariance
is expressed through di↵erent ways of eliciting preferences in choice and valuation
tasks. Sections 2.3 and 2.5 give an overview of theoretical work in that regard.
2.2 Strength of Preference
2.2.1 Eliciting Strength of Preference
The preference reversal is an example of procedure-invariance that provokes the
question if other behavioural regularities can also interfere with the identification of
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preferences. Comparing CE values of di↵erent lotteries can quantify the di↵erence
in preference between the lotteries. But choices only provide an ordinal preference in
that instance without quantifying how strong this preference was. At worst, a choice
in an experiment was made by a participant who actually was indi↵erent between
options. This choice then carries the same weight in an analysis as all other choices
by the participant. Also eliciting the strength of preference (SoP) would inform
which preference relations were more di cult to discern for the participant.
Butler et al. (2014b) developed a simple measure of the strength of preference
where participant first choose between lotteries A and B and afterwards report
the strength of their preference. This is done by moving a slider on a scale that
lists A and B at either end (see figure 2.1). The closer the slider is to the chosen
option, the stronger the preference is. When the slider moved along the scale, slider
positions were also accompanied with a text underneath that read “You think A
(B) is BETTER” (depending on the slider being closer to A or B). Depending
on the slider position the description would change from “SLIGHTLY better” to
“BETTER”, “MUCH better” up to “VERY MUCH better”.
Figure 2.1: From Butler et al. (2014b): The ‘strength of preference’ instrument
Butler et al. (2014b) document that SoP responses vary across the entire
range of the scale and that higher SoP values coincide with higher di↵erences in
the expected values of the lottery options. This occurs not only at the level of
the participant but also across participants, which shows that SoP elicitation can
be informative of a participant’s momentary preference in the context of a choice.
Especially, it might show how SoP values might di↵er when participants do not
make the same lottery choices across repetitions of the same choice problem. Still,
Butler et al. (2014b) especially note two issues with their instrument: 1) A lack of
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incentivisation and 2) limited comparability across participants. Issue 1) requires
research to only rely on intrinsic motivation of participants to accurately report
their SoP. Issue 2) makes it di cult to measure e↵ects of variations in SoP values.
One participant might regard the same point on the scale as “slightly better” while
another would judge it as “very much better”.
Butler et al. (2014a) addressed these issues by eliciting (among other mea-
surements) participants’ strength of preference in units of money. This monetary
strength of preference (MSoP) was measured in how much all payo↵s of the less pre-
ferred option would need to be increased in order to make the participant indi↵erent
between options. Thereby, units of money made the MSoP more comparable across
participants and the MSoP valuation task was also incentivised by using a BDM
mechanism. Figure 2.2 shows a task display after a choice for lottery A (£10 with
50% and £8 with 50%) over lottery B (£11 with 50% and £0 with 50%). Clicking
the “UP” button then increases both payo↵s of lottery B by £0.10 for the MSoP.
Within the task, participants could also subsequently reduce the MSoP down until
the rejected lottery was displayed again as a minimum.
Figure 2.2: From Butler et al. (2014a): The ‘monetary strength of preference’
instrument (after a choice for lottery A)
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Having a clearly quantified MSoP also allowed them to test if the measure
gives values that are consistent with the participant’s choices. Later in the same
session, participants were presented with binary choices between the option they had
chosen earlier and the previously-rejected option with some predetermined amount
added (e.g. £3) to both payo↵s. If this amount was less than the MSoP sum stated
for that pair, a participant should still have preferred the originally-chosen option
if she had the ability to accurately estimate her MSoP. After all, she stated earlier
that an improvement higher than this amount was required.
But instead, participants showed a tendency to reject the previously-chosen
option in favour of the “enhanced” alternative, even when the size of the added
amount was less than their previously-stated MSoP. This was taken as an indication
that participants systematically overestimated their MSoP.
An MSoP mismatch will be referred to as the tendency of DMs or a par-
ticipant to overstate their strength of preference in monetary units, their MSoP,
between risky options. A trivial and correct MSoP of £1 would be to prefer receiv-
ing a sure amount of £1 over a payo↵ of zero. Systematically reporting an MSoP
above £1 would constitute an MSoP mismatch. But the preference for a lottery over
another option depends on an participant’s attitude towards risk and, as with the
preference reversal, can be inconsistent with later actions.
As explained earlier, if participants are asked for a money amount that they
perceive to be equally as attractive as playing out a lottery, this provides a CE. If
an individual-specific CE can be assigned to any lottery, a participant acting consis-
tently will prefer the lottery with the higher CE out of two lotteries. Additionally,
the di↵erence in CEs quantifies the di↵erence in attractiveness to the participant.
This CE di↵erence is a strength of preference in monetary terms. Partici-
pants who only state their MSoP between two lotteries without stating the respec-
tive CEs still respond to something logically similar to a valuation task. Instead of
reporting two valuations of two options, they only report a single valuation di↵er-
ence between the options. Butler et al.’s (2014a) experiment shows that valuation
di↵erences in the form of MSoP values systematically mismatch with participants’
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in choices in the same experiment.
In conclusion, measuring SoP and MSoP provides additional data on measur-
ing preferences. But the MSoP mismatch calls into question if this data accurately
reflects a participant’s preferences. Although Butler et al.’s (2014a) experiment
did not allow to test for causes of this mismatch, there exists a body of research
on e↵ects that might explain this MSoP mismatch. The following section gives an
overview.
2.2.2 Choice-induced Changes in Reported Preference
Butler at el. (2014a) already put forward a number of reasons for the MSoP mis-
match. These can be assigned to three categories: 1) Attention to a subset of lot-
tery characteristics, 2) an endowment e↵ect, and 3) the reported preference being
changed by the preceding choice.
Attention to a Subset of Lottery characteristics
Consider the choice problem displayed in figure 2.2, where a participant has just
chosen a lottery paying either £10 or £8 with 50/50 probabilities. The rejected
option is a lottery paying £11 with a probability of 50%. The participant now
needs to add money to both payo↵s, £11 and £0, until both lotteries seem equally
attractive. Butler et al. (2014a) report that some participants in the experiment
mentioned that they might have paid more attention to improving the first payo↵,
£11+x in this example. As they pay less attention to the other payo↵ £0+x and
the probabilities of either payo↵, they would underestimate how the adjustment
increases the attractiveness of the rejected lottery. This could lead to eliciting too
high adjustments because participants underestimate how strong the improvement
actually is.
It is possible to circumvent this in an experiment with choices between a
lottery and a sure amount. If only a single sure amount needs to be improved,
participants only have one payo↵ and no probabilities to concentrate on. If the MSoP
mismatch disappears in this design, attention to a subset of lottery characteristics
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is likely to be a causal factor for the MSoP mismatch in Butler et al.’s (2014a)
experiment.
Endowment E↵ect
Having just made a choice for lottery A in figure 2.2’s example, it is also possible
that participants assume ownership of lottery A. This could lead to an endowment
e↵ect, as proposed by Thaler (1980) and Kahneman et al. (1990) (see Knetsch, 1989;
Morewedge, 2015, for an overview). Applied to this experiment, a participant would
feel ownership of the chosen lottery A and perceive the MSoP task to be similar to a
WTA elicitation for lottery A. Then, an endowment e↵ect would entail a participant
reporting a higher WTA than WTP for the lottery A. This is commonly known as
the WTP/WTA gap. It could imply that participants adjust lottery B so that it
is equally as attractive as their WTA for lottery A, with WTA>CE for lottery A.
From this follows a too high MSoP that mismatches with their later choices. This
hinges on the assumption that participants would report a MSoP between option A
and B that would result in a lower MSoP if they had not just chosen an option.
This could be tested in an experiment where participants would also be
prompted to reduce payo↵s of a chosen lottery as well as CE for lotteries. If the
patternWTP   Lottery  WTA emerges in choices for the respective lotteries, the
endowment e↵ect would be an explanation for the MSoP mismatch.
Post-decision Changes in Reported Preference
It would also be possible that the decision itself and not the MSoP procedure has
an influence on the reported value. Izuma and Murayama (2004) review a number
of experiments where participants show the tendency to rate or rank an option’s
attractiveness higher after having chosen it. Systematically over a variety of contexts
and elicitation methods, participants do show an increased preference for items or
options they had chosen if they were aware of their choice. E.g., Sheth (1970)
documented that housewives tended to rank personal care items higher after having
chosen them.
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It could be that participants trust their decision too much to represent their
own preference. That way, they report a higher preference consistent with that de-
cision because they overweigh the validity of the choice they just made. In a review,
Moore and Healy (2008), classify this as overconfidence in the form of “Overpreci-
sion”. Moore and Healy define this as economic agents underestimating the vari-
ance of their belief across repetitions of the same task. E.g., when participants are
prompted to give a confidence interval for the accuracy of their answers in a quiz,
they systematically report too narrow confidence intervals. Applied to an MSoP
task, this means that participants overestimate the “precision” of their belief. The
consequence is that participants trust a single decision in the form of a choice they
just made to be more precise of their average preference than it actually is. There-
fore, they do not attenuate particularly strong feelings of preference when reporting
their strength of preference.
In the case of judgement tasks with a subsequent elicitation of participants’
confidence in their decisions, Svenson et al. (2009) find that participants even
distort factual information in favour of supporting the chosen alternative. Therefore,
information search seems susceptible to a post-decision change as well.
So in the case of information search, overprecision does not explain this
phenomenon because participants distort objective facts instead of confidence in
their own judgement. But Festinger’s (1957) and Bem’s (1967) theories of cogni-
tive dissonance o↵er an explanation (for a review, see Greenwald and Ronis, 1978).
Cognitive dissonance means the mental state of participants when they consider
evidence which is dissonant with their behaviour. E.g., considering why an alter-
native was unattractive while being aware that they have chosen it. Participants
are assumed to dislike this state and therefore circumvent it by changing their atti-
tude towards the alternative or even by altogether avoiding information that causes
cognitive dissonance. Therefore, their information search might be a↵ected by mo-
tivated reasoning: their reasoning may rely on a biased set of cognitive processes
out of a motivation to arrive at the desired conclusion (Kunda, 1990; also see Jonas
et al., 2001). Instead of deliberating in a way that generates their actual preference,
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they deliberate in a way that supports their choice. If they had a momentary strong
preference for an option, this might result in a subsequently overstated strength of
preference after a choice.
Therefore in the Butler et al. (2014a) experiment, a post-decision change
in preference could both be explained by the choice process having influenced the
subsequent MSoP task (overprecision) as well as participants seeking an MSoP value
consistent with their choice (cognitive dissonance).
There is also an existing approach in the modelling of judgement that could
be applied to a post-decision change in reported preference: Two-stage dynamic
signal detection theory (Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010) provides a model how par-
ticipants’ deliberation during a judgement can influence a subsequent elicitation of
a confidence measurement (Navajas et al., 2016, put this into perspective in the
literature on eliciting confidence judgements).
The cognitive process is modelled as two consecutive stages: A choice stage
and a confidence elicitation stage. A decision maker (DM) deliberates during a
choice stage to come up with a judgement decision, based on a set of mental evidence
(this is modelled through a drift-di↵usion process, which is explained in more detail
in section 2.5). This set of mental evidence is then carried over to the second stage,
influencing the otherwise separate process for generating a confidence measure. That
way, a spill-over of evidence from the choice to the subsequent confidence elicitation
is possible.
Note that judgements, unlike preference elicitations, have correct and in-
correct answers. Preferences between lotteries cannot be considered “wrong” but
knowledge about the world can be, e.g. whether one of two displayed lines is longer
than the other. Assume a judgement with options A and B, where a DM correctly
chooses A for the majority of repetitions. Naturally, eliciting confidence into an A
choice can only happen after the DM decided on A in the first stage. Therefore, a
confidence elicitation into option A can only start o↵ with a set of evidence that
already led to choosing A. Since sets of evidence that would have led to choosing
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B are left out, this means that the average confidence elicitation towards option A
starts o↵ with a set of evidence that favours A more than a priori. The result is
overconfidence, where the DM reports a too high confidence level in the choice.
But since the second stage also adds a second set of evidence, it is neverthe-
less possible that some confidence elicitations are accurate or even revise a choice.
Chen and Risen (2010) also describe a way in which this could apply to prefer-
ences, if the judgement is comparable to a choice and the confidence measure is
comparable to an attractiveness rating. But while Pleskac and Busemeyer’s (2010)
approach can model overconfidence, it does not incorporate cognitive dissonance,
where information is avoided.
Butler et al.’s (2014a) experiment shows that participants systematically
quantify their MSoP in a way that is inconsistent with their choices on other occa-
sions. Even though the literature o↵ers several explanations for the MSoP mismatch,
e.g. spill-over e↵ects or motivated reasoning, it has not yet been tested which ex-
planation can account for this phenomenon.
2.3 Expected Utility Theory and Other Deterministic
Theories
So far, this literature review has mostly covered empirical literature that shows how
participants in economic experiments behave inconsistently. This and the next sec-
tions describe how economic theory has incorporated these and other behavioural
regularities to fit into models of decision making and valuation. To keep the fo-
cus on possible explanations for the preference reversal phenomenon and the MSoP
mismatch, this section will first concentrate on how classic economic theory is chal-
lenged by the preference reversal phenomenon and then concentrate on deterministic
theories that can predict violations of procedure invariance. The following sections
will then explain more advanced approaches.
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) still is the foundation of modelling prefer-
ences in most economic sub-disciplines. All economic agents, from consumers to
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corporations, are assumed to be rational and expedient DMs in a plan to maximise
their expected utility, given their initial position and knowledge of the world. For
any alternative that a DM faces, e.g. a monetary lottery, the DM can assign a set of
utilities correspondent to the states of the world in which they will happen. These
states and their resulting utilities are assigned probabilities of being realised. Utility
is usually derived from consumption of wealth and yields diminishing returns. This
makes DMs sensitive to risk, i.e., potential variations in wealth. DMs are assumed
to always want to consume more and to exhibit a certain level of risk aversion (or
in some cases risk seeking instead) (Starmer, 2000).
EUT behaviour can be predicted by functions over utility that follow the
standard axioms completeness, transitivity, continuity, and independence that safe-
guard the DM against “irrational” decisions (Savage, 1954; Luce and Suppes, 1965;
Starmer, 2000; Sugden, 2004; Karni, 2008). Completeness implies that a preference
exists for a DM between any two alternatives. Transitivity implies that preference
orderings are consistent, e.g. if A   B and B   C, then A   C. And since any
alternative is assigned a set of utilities with respective probabilities, this transitivity
should also hold across elicitation procedures. Continuity implies that for any three
alternatives A   B   C, a mix of alternatives pA + (1   p)C with p✏[0; 1] exists,
so that the DM is indi↵erent between B and the mix of alternatives. Independence
implies independence of common consequences, i.e. that preferences are not a↵ected
by the possibility of outcomes that will happen independently of a choice. So if a
DM prefers to choose lottery A over lottery B, the DM will also keep this preference
if, with some probability, an irrelevant third lottery C is played out instead of the
lottery from the choice (if A   B, then pA + (1   p)C   pB + (1   p)C for all
p✏(0; 1]).
This theory is not meant to be an entirely accurate reflection of human be-
haviour but instead creates a normative model, which individuals learn to follow on
average. Individuals that act in a way that is inconsistent with their preferences, will
keep themselves from maximising their expected utility. So individuals are assumed
to strive for behaviour that follows EUT predictions. So in theory, deviations from
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its predictions are either the result of a random error or insu cient learning. Out
of their interest for utility maximisation, individuals will correct them in the future.
But the theory does not explain why human behaviour systematically violate
EUT, which has been extensively shown in economic experiments. Starmer (2000)
summarises findings of replicable human biases that conflict with an EUT predic-
tion, notably violations of procedure invariance such as the preference reversal, but
also ambiguity and loss aversion, violations of description invariance, transitivity,
monotonicity, and independence. None of these can be accounted for by a simple
error term. If these behavioural regularities reflect actual preferences, this might
prove that humans behave “irrationally” and should learn to do better but con-
versely implies that a “rational” model cannot su ciently explain their behaviour.
Tversky et al. (1988) developed an approach that can also describe the pref-
erence reversal phenomenon with Contingent Weighting Theory, which rests on two
hypotheses on determinants of decisions: the prominence hypothesis and the com-
patibility hypothesis. Applied to the preference reversal, they treat the probability
and payo↵ values as attributes that a DM assesses for choices and valuations2. As
the P-Bet has an especially high winning probability and the $-Bet an especially
high winning amount, the most important attributes are probability for the P-Bet
and payo↵ for the $-Bet. Therefore, unlike in EUT, lotteries are compared not via
the product of their attributes. Instead, the preference is constructed with sensi-
tivity to the elicitation procedure and by assigning di↵erent levels of importance to
di↵erent attributes.
In this case, the prominence hypothesis postulates that choices depend more
on comparing the most prominent feature of lotteries. In the case of choice, the prob-
ability of winning is the primary attribute and the winning payo↵ is the secondary
attribute. Therefore, the P-Bet is chosen more whereas P-Bets are valued higher
than $-Bets on fewer occasions, resulting in the preference reversal phenomenon.
Continuing this logic, DMs exhibit more risk averse behaviour in choices than in
valuations because they place a higher importance on the probability of winning in
2Tversky et al. (1988) do not limit this to monetary lotteries but also discuss more general
decision problems.
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choices.
The compatibility hypothesis postulates that DMs base their decisions pri-
marily on lottery attributes that are “compatible” with the elicitation procedure.
Choices are more compatible with an accept/reject decision while valuations are
more compatible with estimating a money amount. Because of this, using the win-
ning probability as an “input component” is more compatible with choice as an
“output”. Conversely, the winning payo↵ as an “input component” is more compat-
ible with valuation as an “output”. Therefore, elicitations place a heavier weight on
winning probability for choices and on winning payo↵ for valuations. This then leads
to more preference relations in choices for the P-bet and fewer preference relations
in valuations for the P-bet.
An additional approach along the lines of the compatibility hypothesis is
Anchoring and Adjustment. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) proposed that a DM
starts o↵ a lottery valuation with a starting value, “an anchor”, which is then
adjusted downwards. This adjustment is insu cient in reaching a valuation, that
is equal to the DM’s CE in choices. Since the starting value is placed along the
range of the lottery (going from the losing payo↵ until the winning payo↵), this
range is larger for the $-Bet than for the P-Bet. If the starting value is placed
close to the top of the range, it leads to $-Bet starting values being larger than
P-Bet starting values. This di↵erence is then not entirely eliminated because the
adjustment process is incomplete. The result is that $-Bet valuations are frequently
higher than P-Bet valuations.
All of these approaches use failure of procedure invariance to explain the
preference reversal phenomenon, assuming that DMs construct their reported pref-
erences di↵erently in response to a choice or valuation task. Another approach relies
on a choice rule that is the same across procedures. Regret Theory, proposed by
Bell (1982), Fishburn (1982), and Loomes and Sugden (1982) in separate papers,
models choices via comparisons of the lotteries’ possible consequences. Any lottery’s
payo↵s have a utility that also depends on the payo↵ of the rejected lottery. DMs
anticipate this “regret” or “rejoice” in the possible states of the lottery. If a lottery
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wins in a particular state of the world, it might still lead to regret if the rejected
lottery wins more in that case (and vice versa with rejoice for avoided losses).
This can lead to series of choices that violate transitivity, which do occur
in experiments (Loomes et al., 1991;). And these violations of transitivity can also
explain the preference reversal without violating procedure invariance: For some
parameters, a DM prefers a P-Bet over a $-Bet in a direct comparison (P   $). It
is possible to violate transitivity by using a sure amount C, where P   $, $   C,
but also C   P . Therefore, the same DM is indi↵erent between the P-Bet and a
sure amount P ⇠ CEP < C as well as between the $-Bet and a higher sure amount
$ ⇠ CE$ > C. This produces intransitive preference relations P   $ ⇠ CE$ > C >
CEP ⇠ P   $, which result in the preference reversal phenomenon.
Sopher et al. (1993) criticise Loomes et al.’s (1991) method by suggesting
that participants’ detected violations of transitivity could just be random errors (see
next section). But before describing this argument, it is first necessary to distinguish
between participants’ “deliberate” preference reversals and those that result from
random errors instead.
Starmer (2000) and Seidl (2002) list a variety of models that can also account
for the preference reversal phenomenon. However, this section only serves to give
an intuition of the two most important deterministic approaches in predicting this
phenomenon: procedure invariance and intransitivity. But even if these approaches
perform well on a descriptive level, they do not incorporate that actual behaviour
is probabilistic. If it is unclear, to what extent decisions are inherently random,
a participant’s choice is not a reliable indicator of their preference. The following
section gives an overview how this a↵ects preference elicitations.
2.4 Probabilistic Preference Models
Mosteller and Nogee (1951) found that participants often show stochastic preferences
when choosing between lotteries and sure amounts. Participants faced a choice
between betting 5 U.S. cents on a lottery or keeping the 5 cents as a sure amount.
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The lottery had a 1/3 chance of losing 5 cents and a 2/3 chance of a winning payo↵ that
varied across trials. Participants would almost always choose the sure amount for
low winning payo↵s in repeated choices. But when the lottery’s winning payo↵ was
increased, participants gradually started to choose the lottery more often. Increasing
the winning payo↵ even further eventually led participants to always choose the
lottery as soon as its winning payo↵ was su ciently high.
This gradual increase prevents the identification of a clear cut-o↵ value that
the participant perceives to be equally as attractive as the lottery. But instead it
is possible to infer a stochastic indi↵erence point (SI point). For each lottery, a
theoretical lottery/sure amount pair will lead the participant to choose the lottery
50% of times, making the participant stochastically indi↵erent.
However, even when using a lottery and varying sure amounts, this SI point
is not entirely equivalent to a reported CE as it can only be inferred. CEs can be
directly elicited. Whereas an elicited CE is a response to a task, an SI point is a the-
oretical construct that can be used as a measure of preference. E.g., figure 2.3 shows
how this was inferred for an exemplary participant in Mosteller and Nogee’s (1951)
experiment. The participant chose the lottery most times over sure amounts of 10
cents or less but rejected the lottery for sure amounts of 11 cents or more. Therefore,
the SI point can be inferred to lie between 10 and 11 cents, where the participant is
stochastically indi↵erent between the lottery and the SI point. Also, the participant
does not have a deterministic transitive preference 11¢  Lottery   10¢. The par-
ticipant’s behaviour obeys weak stochastic transitivity (Block and Marschak, 1960),
meaning that preference relations are transitive but only hold with a probability
above 50% (if P [A   B] > 50% and P [B   C] > 50%, then P [A   C] > 50%).
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Figure 2.3: An exemplary subject’s repeated choice behaviour between a lottery
various sure amounts o↵ered. Source: Mosteller and Nogee (1951, figure 2)
This is a challenge for the deterministic theories described in the previous
section because weak stochastic transitivity cannot stem from errors that are entirely
random. The participant featured in figure 2.3 makes consistent choices between the
lottery and sure amounts far from the SI point. But these choices become more and
more random for sure amounts closer to the SI point. Note that in theory, the sure
amount at a DM’s SI point can also serve as a lottery CE. This is because the DM
is on average indi↵erent between the lottery and the sure amount at the SI point.
The remainder of this section will deal with models that capture probabilistic
behaviour and literature that relates probabilistic behaviour to the preference re-
versal. The modelling approaches that are described here are of the type commonly
called Luce’s choice rule, Fechner model, Tremble model, and Random Preference
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model.
Luce’s Choice Rule
Luce’s choice model is an early model that formalises probabilistic preferences by
relating them to choice probabilities (McFadden, 1973). Luce (1959) described the
likelihood of a DM’s lottery A choice through a “response strength”, which can be
equated to its expected utility U(A) when applied to EUT. In this case, a choice
probability for lottery A in a binary choice between lotteries A and B is equal to
its utility to the power of a subjective parameter   > 0 divided by the sum of all
utilities with the same exponent: P (A   B) = U(A) /(U(A)  +U(B) ). This way,
a curve as in Mosteller and Nogee’s figure (2.3) can be predicted. But this approach
can give some counterintuitive predictions, e.g. DMs often choosing a sure amount
of £11 over a sure amount of £10. See Blavatskyy (2011) for an adaption of the
model that addresses this.
Fechner Model
Hey and Orme (1994) use a Fechner-type model, where a DM computes the di↵erence
in utility between options and the resulting di↵erence is subject to a symmetric error
term ": The DM chooses lottery A if U(A)   U(B) + " > 0. That way, the error
term " can randomly “overturn” a preference relation3. This becomes more likely
for lotteries that are more similar in utility, also predicting increasingly probabilistic
choices closer to an SI point as in figure 2.3.
Tremble Model
Harless and Camerer (1994) develop a model that uses the “trembling hand” concept
from game theory (Selten, 1975). Optimal choices are perfectly identified through
EUT but randomly overturned with a fixed probability ⌧✏[0; 0.5]. That way, a
DM chooses lottery A with probability (1   ⌧) if U(A) > U(B), regardless of the
3If the utility di↵erence plus the error term " equals zero, a tie-breaker through a random choice
is used.
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di↵erence in utility. I.e., choices follow deterministic preferences but sometimes the
DM “pushes the wrong button” and does not act according to her actual preference.
Random Preferences
So far, all models assume that probabilistic behaviour comes from extraneous errors,
e.g. carelessness, fatigue, insu cient motivation, or calculation errors. Built on
previous work by Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1963), another approach by
Loomes and Sugden (1995), assumes that DMs do not possess a stable underlying
preference. The random preference model (RP model) assumes a utility function
where the risk aversion parameter randomly deviates across choices.
E.g. in a EUT approach, the utility of an 80% chance of winning £12 can
be computed with the utility function u(x) = x1 r with r as a fixed parameter for
the degree of risk aversion. Then, this lottery’s utility would equal 80% · (12)1 r
and could be compared with another lottery’s utility, always generating the same
preference relation. The RP model uses a utility function where, for each choice,
the degree of risk aversion r is independently drawn from the same given random
distribution. Thereby, the randomness that leads to probabilistic preferences is built
into the model without an error term4.
All of the models discussed in this section still are stochastically transitive.
So the questions remains how compatible noise explanations are with intransitivity
in explaining the preference reversal phenomenon. Sopher and Gigliotti (1993) used
a specification similar to the tremble model, where they assumed that a DM has
transitive C   P   $ preference relations (with C as some sure amount). But each
choice can be subject to an error with probability ⌧✏(0; 0.5). Then, recreating the
preference reversal experiment in theory, the majority of choices yield the correct
ordering C   P , P   $, C   $. Observing the choices C   P (correct), P   $
(correct), $   C (incorrect) can occur with one error. This erroneous preference
relationship is the non-transitive ordering that results in the preference reversal.
4The random preference model can also be combined with extraneous noise. E.g., as done by
Loomes et al. (2002), Loomes (2005), and Bhatia and Loomes (2017).
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But observing the choices P   C (incorrect), $   P (incorrect), C   $
(correct) only occurs with two errors. This is an erroneous non-transitive ordering
of a P-to-$ reversal, which is less likely to occur because it requires two errors instead
of only one. And this “reverse” reversal was much less observed in the preference
reversal experiment as well.
Sopher and Gigliotti then applied this logic to an experiment where they
estimated the probabilities of making mistakes on questions of the C, P , $ type.
They concluded that using when accounting for errors of the type described, a non-
transitive model did not provide a better fit for the data.
But except for the tremble model, all models’ choice probabilities for the
stochastically preferred option vary across choice problems. E.g., consider a lottery
with an SI point of £10 with a DM that is risk averse (or mostly risk averse in the
RP model). The DM will choose the lottery more often both for sure amounts £9
and £1 because both are below the SI point (still, not necessarily all of the times).
But like in the Mosteller and Nogee data, the DM will choose £1 over the lottery
fewer times than £9. If any sure amount choice below the SI point counts as an
“error” in an experiment, this means that each choice problem has its own error
rate.
Birnbaum and Gutierrez (2007) address this issue by identifying an individual-
specific error rate for each choice among a set of lotteries5. In their experimental
design, each of these choices is repeated to make an estimation of this error rate
possible and to infer if observations of non-transitivity are consistent or random.
Like Sopher and Gigliotti (1993), they concluded that stochastic transitivity was
not consistently violated in their experiment.
Bostic et al. (1990) studied whether the preference reversal phenomenon
also occurs when the preferences in choices is indirectly inferred from a participants’
binary choices. As a baseline, they replicated the preference reversal phenomenon
using binary choices between and direct CE elicitations of lotteries with P-Bet and
5Lotteries were taken from an experiment by Tversky (1969) to demonstrate intransitive pref-
erences. In a follow-up, four more lotteries were added to test for an interaction e↵ect between
winning probability and payo↵.
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$-Bet parameters similar to Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968).
In a second step, they used a di↵erent method to infer CEs of these lotter-
ies. Instead of a direct CE through valuation, they inferred each lottery’s CE from
choices between the lottery and various sure amounts. This was done by presenting
binary choices between the respective lottery and a sure payo↵, randomised to be
at either end of the lottery’s range. If participants chose the lottery (sure amount),
the sure amount was increased (decreased) in steps for a subsequent choice. When
choices did not change the lottery-sure amount preference, the step size was de-
creased until the step size was 2 U.S. cents. The last displayed sure amount was
then defined as the participant’s SI point, equal to a CE inferred from choices6.
They found that comparisons of these CEs in choices to CEs from direct
lottery valuations decreased the share of preference reversals but did not remove
the preference reversal phenomenon entirely. There was still a significant share of
participants with a higher P-Bet CE in choices who nevertheless stated a higher
$-Bet CE in valuations. Loomes and Pogrebna (2016) also replicated this result
when they inferred P-Bet and $-Bet SI points by observing repeated choices of
each lottery against a pre-determined set of sure amounts. Therefore, violations
of stochastic transitivity within choices cannot be entirely eliminated but they are
not the only force driving the preference reversal phenomenon either. Procedure
invariance also remains as an explanation.
Another modelling approach also assumes that elicited CEs can be proba-
bilistic. Following a proposed model by MacCrimmon and Smith (1986), Butler and
Loomes (2007) develop a model that uses the concept of imprecision in preferences
to predict the preference reversal phenomenon7. Consider an 80% chance of £12
P-Bet and a 25% chance of £50 $-Bet. A DM will be able to estimate their CE
for the lotteries to lie within these lotteries’ ranges. So DMs know that their CE is
within the range (£0; £12) for the P-Bet and (£0; £50) for the $-Bet. Butler and
Loomes (2007) also define an “imprecision interval”, a subset of that range, where a
6Specifically, Bostic et al. refer to this as a “choice indi↵erence point”.
7The model can also predict preference reversals in probability equivalents, which is not discussed
here.
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DM cannot be sure whether a sure amount is greater of smaller than their CE. E.g.,
with a CE of £9 for the P-Bet the DM would find £8 and £10 hardly distinguishable
in attractiveness from the P-Bet. But what if that imprecision interval is larger for
the $-Bet? Since the $-Bet has a smaller winning probability but a larger payo↵, the
DM might find it even harder to distinguish an amount from the $-Bet’s CE. E.g.,
with a CE of £8 for the $-Bet the DM could find £5 and £15 hard to distinguish.
Note that the P-Bet’s range ends at £12. And since the $-Bet has a larger range
than the P-Bet, there is more opportunity for imprecision to make $-Bet valuations
above £12 hard to distinguish. E.g., the extreme case of a £9 payo↵ with probability
100% would have the smallest possible interval of exactly £9.
So the $-Bet o↵ers “a lot of room” for high valuations while the P-Bet does
not. And imprecision can then lead to a spread of $-Bet valuations that encompasses
all P-Bet valuations. Since $-Bet valuations are likely to lie beyond the maximum
payo↵ of the P-Bet but are, like the P-Bet, bounded to be above zero, median $-
Bet valuations can be higher than median P-Bet valuations. This can replicate the
preference reversal without violations of stochastic transitivity in choices.
Butler and Loomes (2007) then estimated P-Bet and $-Bet imprecision in-
tervals for participants through incremental choices between the lotteries and sure
amounts, starting both at the upper and lower end of the lottery range (they also
elicited participants’ confidence in these choices). When comparing imprecision in-
tervals between the P-Bet and $-Bet, they found that the imprecision intervals were
able to explain the preference reversal phenomenon.
Collins and James (2015) further develop this approach by combining it with
Blavatskyy’s generalisation of Luce’s Choice Rule (briefly described in section 2.4).
Using this, the choice-matching discrepancies arising through CEs vs. probability
equivalents are explained by response mode as per Butler and Loomes (2007). And
probabilistic choices are explained through Blavatskyy’s (2012) stochastic choice
model. Then, the frequency of preference reversals can fit in with model predictions.
This shows how probabilistic models can o↵er a more realistic approach in
describing behaviour because they predict the innate randomness in choices (and
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valuations in case of Butler and Loomes, 2007). Section 3.2 in chapter 3 shows a
possible MSoP elicitation in the RP model’s case. But they do not predict the pref-
erence reversal phenomenon of the sort shown by Bostic et al. (1990). The following
section describes a new wave of models that use the concept of bounded rationality
and are applicable to the preference reversal. This field o↵ers new opportunities to
model the interplay between choices, valuations, and MSoP values and to also make
predictions about confidence in decisions and reaction times.
2.5 Bounded Rationality
The preference reversal phenomenon is only one among a breadth of behavioural
regularities challenging the EUT assumption that behaviour can be modelled en-
tirely through a well-defined set of stable preferences. Instead, participants might
be unable to choose according to an exact utility over all possible events, given
constraints in mental resources and time. But they could still decide in a way that
is “good enough” to justify their investment of these resources. This strategy was
defined as “Bounded Rationality” by Simon (1955) and reflects a key assumption
of a new generation of cognitive models where this governs a process of decision
making.
Concerning choice, this section will cover how two sequential sampling mod-
els, belonging to a subgroup of models that assume bounded rationality, can be used
to generate predictions of lottery valuations. There is a variety of other sequential
sampling models (for reviews see Busemeyer and Johnson, 2004; Ratcli↵ et al., 2001,
2016; Vlaev et al., 2011), such as the Competing Accumulator model (Usher and
McClelland, 2001), the ECHO model (Guo and Holyoak, 2002; Glo¨ckner, 2007), the
drift-di↵usion model with time-varying boundaries (Fudenberg et al., 2017), or the
Decision by Sampling model (Stewart et al., 2006). Other models use bounded ra-
tionality without a mental sampling process, for instance Decision from Experience
(Hertwig et al., 2004) where choices are based on previous learning, or Heuristic
Decision Making (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011) where DMs use simple choice
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rules.
But this thesis focusses on bounded rationality applications to lottery valua-
tion. So this section will only consider two choice models: 1) A sequential sampling
model that can already predict lottery valuations, Decision Field Theory (Buse-
meyer and Townsend, 1993), and 2) Boundedly Rational Expected Utility Theory
(Navarro-Martinez et al., 2017) because this choice model is adapted to predict val-
uations in chapter 4. The section on valuation models describes 1) Query Theory, a
qualitative sampling model that explains the WTA/WTP gap through task-specific
valuation processes 2) the Sequential Value Matching mechanism, a valuation model
based on Decision Field Theory, and 3) the Stochastic Pricing Model (Blavatskyy
and Ko¨hler, 2009b), a model with a boundedly rational valuation process relies on
the RP model for choices.
2.5.1 Sequential Sampling Models
Vickers et al. (1971) developed a model where a mental process accumulates samples
of “evidence”, a perceived magnitude which is subject to noise and highly correlated
to the actual magnitude of a stimulus, to determine which of two stimuli is stronger.
Throughout the process, the DM sequentially samples this evidence. As soon as
the level of accumulated evidence through these samples passes beyond a exogenous
threshold, the DM stops the process and decides in favour of the option that yielded
more evidence (see figure 2.4). The more often samples of evidence are accumulated,
the higher the likelihood of a correct choice becomes. This can be interpreted as
an unobserved confidence dimension of the judgement. This likelihood of a correct
choice, the choice’s accuracy, can be increased by a higher threshold when the DM
is willing to invest a lot of resources in order to increase the sample’s validity, or
decreased by a higher level of noise when it is hard to determine which objective
magnitude is higher.
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Figure 2.4: Vickers et al.’s (1971) sequential sampling process with an additional
inhibitory threshold to model a confidence level. Source Busemeyer and Townsend
(1993, figure 1)
(Note that the inhibitory threshold is crossed at sample 17, implying that a choice
towards the favoured option is triggered after sampling 17 times.)
Vickers et al. (1971) only apply this to objective measures, in their case a
time-recorded judgement of participants whether one of two visible blinking lamps
has a higher frequency. If this is extended to an economic context, participants
might decide inconsistently between options in repeated choice tasks as presented
by Mosteller and Nogee (1951). Not out of mental constraints in connecting proba-
bilities and payo↵s or a preference for randomisation, but because they do not know
with certainty which option is more attractive to them. Furthermore, since the pro-
cess of eliciting a preference cannot be considered to have a “correct” outcome, it is
impossible to detect a correct choice. Instead, only the propensity to choose in a par-
ticular choice problem can be inferred from observing participants’ behaviour. See
Busemeyer and Johnson (2004) and Ratcli↵ et al. (2016) for overviews of relevant
modelling approaches from the sequential sampling literature.
Reaction Times in Choices A fundamental assumption of sequential sampling is
that there is a speed-accuracy trade-o↵. The accuracy lies in the the DM identifying
a correct answer and the speed in how quickly the decision process is over. But
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how can this be measured in an experiment on preferences? Speed can be inferred
relatively easy by analysing if a given task is completed more quickly on an individual
level. But measuring accuracy is a more challenging problem because it is hard to
determine what “accurate” preferences are.
Mo↵att (2005) estimated the best fitting risk attitudes for each participant
in a binary choice experiment by Hey (2001) where reaction times were measured.
Using these risk attitudes, Mo↵att was able to predict “closeness to indi↵erence”
for the choice problems faced by each participant. I.e., how similar in attractiveness
the two options were, based on the participant’s risk aversion.
Mo↵att then analysed the e↵ect of closeness to indi↵erence on reaction time
in a random e↵ects regression. To improve the analysis, Mo↵att also measured
di↵erence in the lotteries’ parameters as a proxy for “objective” dissimilarity, the
number of outcomes in the lottery with fewer outcomes as measure of complexity,
the trial numbers of the choice in the order of choice tasks and all experimental tasks
as measures of task experience, and the logarithm of the expected payo↵ of the less
complex lottery to measure the strength of financial motivation. Altogether, Mo↵att
used a number of factors that would incentivise a participant to consider a lottery
choice more carefully, one of which was how close to indi↵erence the participant
was. Mo↵att finds a highly significant positive e↵ect of closeness to indi↵erence on
reaction times. This means that participants take longer, the closer to indi↵erence
they are between options. Mo↵att suggests that this time is used to allocate more
cognitive e↵ort to the task: If lotteries are hard to distinguish in their attractiveness,
the participant spends more time deliberating for the choice.
Similar results have been observed in participants’ choices for lotteries that
also involve non-monetary consequences (Diederich and Busemeyer, 1999; Diederich,
2003), and for non-monetary items with increasing attribute similarity (Bhatia and
Mullett, 2018). This shows that participants in a variety of choice experiments do
find it di cult to identify their own preferences and endogenously trade o↵ decision
speed against accuracy. But the problem remains how to organise this in a formal
model. And in a second step, how such a model could also predict choices and
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valuations that capture the preference reversal phenomenon.
Reaction Times in Valuations A speed-accuracy trade-o↵ might also be rele-
vant for valuations. Schkade and Johnson (1989) recorded reaction times for valua-
tion tasks of and direct choice tasks between P-Bet and $-Bet type lotteries. While
$-Bet valuations took longer than P-Bet valuations, valuations generally took longer
than choices.
But this cannot be easily interpreted as a valuation requiring more mental
evidence. It might be that a participant just takes longer to process the same amount
of mental evidence in a valuation task or that the execution of reporting a valuation
takes longer than a choice. Still, some findings can be inferred. If we assume that
the valuation process is the same for $-Bets and P-Bets and takes longer for the
$-Bet, it follows that participants need to deliberate longer to report a valuation
for a $-Bet. This can be detected through the marginal e↵ect of individually-longer
reaction times. If participants on average take the same amount of time to detect the
valuation task and to report their lottery valuation in the experiment, the remainder
of the variation in reaction times can be attributed to the mental valuation process.
Therefore, participants take longer to value $-Bet type lotteries because they
find it more di cult. Schkade and Johnson (1989) also found evidence of this because
the variance of $-Bet valuations was larger than for P-Bet valuations. But it is
unclear what e↵ect individually-longer deliberation times might have on repetitions
of valuations of the same lotteries.
Testing for Reaction Time E↵ects When accounting for individual and task-
specific e↵ects, any behaviour that is associated with a larger mental sample should
also occur when longer deliberation times occur. E.g., if (everything else equal) a DM
reports lower valuations for longer sampling times, this predicts that participants
should also on average report lower valuations when deliberating longer than usual
for the same lottery.
However, it is impossible to observe a participant’s actual deliberation time.
Any experimental procedure introduces noise and participants need additional time
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for understanding the task as well as executing their choice (for an overview of the
fundamentals of reaction time analysis, see Luce, 1986). At this point, it becomes
important to distinguish between deliberation time and reaction time. Deliberation
time is the unobservable amount of time that a participant needs to finish the mental
process of deciding something without yet executing the decision. Experiments can
only record indirect measures such as reaction time, the time in an experiment that
passes from presentation of the task until the task is confirmed to be completed by
the participant. Therefore, reaction time encompasses deliberation time and adds
another layer of experimental noise over the unobserved deliberation time (also
described as “non-decision time” by Ratcli↵e and Tuerlinckx, 2002).
But it is still possible to limit predictions of reaction times to marginal e↵ects.
A marginal e↵ect disregards the absolute value of a dependent variable and only
represents the statistical e↵ect of a one-unit change in the independent variable.
E.g., instead of associating predictions to a set of parameters and a specific reaction
time, we could limit the prediction to what happens for individually longer reaction
times. Then, a test of this prediction is possible without the need to exactly estimate
an unobservable factor such as deliberation time.
2.5.1.1 Decision Field Theory (DFT)
Busemeyer and Townsend (1993) use Vickers et al.’s (1971) accumulator model to de-
velop Decision Field Theory (DFT) in which the sequential sampling process stands
for a DM who statistically samples her own preference relationship in face of a binary
choice. Samples are the di↵erence in subjective expected utility between the options
and are subject to randomness as the DM is assumed to have fluctuating attention
between the events that determine the payo↵s. But the utility remains fixed and
therefore the source of noise lies in the attention switching process (unlike in any
of the probabilistic preference models in section 2.4). These “valence di↵erences”
between the subjective utilities of the two options are then repeatedly sampled in
infinitesimally numerous and small intervals, thereby resulting in a dynamic process.
At the start of the process, the accumulated di↵erences lie at zero. I.e., no
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option has any evidence in its favour. But then the valence di↵erences accumulate
and result in a level of overall evidence, until a threshold of su cient evidence is
reached. Then, the DM takes action and chooses the option that was favoured in
the process (similar to the perception task illustrated by figure 2.4). The threshold
implies a level of confidence that is “good enough” for the DM to stop sampling and
take a choice, given the mental constraints and the importance of the choice.
Since the DM’s attention does not consider the exact same lottery states
across repetitions, valence di↵erences fluctuate accordingly. And these valence dif-
ferences are greater for states of the world where underlying utility di↵erences are
greater, i.e. when payo↵s of a particular option are much higher. So, valence dif-
ferences are subject to randomness but on average accumulate evidence in favour
of the option with a higher underlying utility. Thereby, DFT predicts probabilistic
choices as observed by Mosteller and Nogee (1951).
The amount of sampling that a DM needs until the threshold is reached can
also generate predictions for reaction times. If the threshold is higher, the process
takes longer because the DM has a higher required confidence. But the process
can also take longer because valence di↵erences are smaller. This is the case when
options only have small di↵erences in underlying utility. Therefore, the DM needs to
sample for longer for options that are more similar in utility. This also predicts that
choices take individually-longer when participants are closer to indi↵erence between
options, as observed by Mo↵att (2005).
This process can also be refined to capture additional behavioural regular-
ities. The process can be subject to other cognitive influences, for instance the
starting point can be moved closer to either threshold to model a DM who is bi-
ased due to prior knowledge or past experience. But also the change rate of the
accumulated valence di↵erences can be altered over time to favour evidence early
or late in the process, resulting in primacy and recency e↵ects. In addition, a goal
gradient8 can hinder the speed of evidence accumulation in case of events that entail
8Initially used in the psychological approach-avoidance theory, the goal gradient reflects the
e↵ect that DMs perceive positive or negative utility of an event as higher the more committed they
are to an action (Epstein and Fenz, 1965). The goal gradient is used in DFT to have a stronger
36
losses. This results in loss aversion as it increases the probability of the accumu-
lated evidence reverting back to a choice with no or smaller losses. Diederich (1997)
extended DFT to also apply to multiple attributes where each accumulated sample
switches from considering one attribute to another, following a Markov process9.
Even reversals of choice preference between options as a result of time pressure are
possible (Busemeyer and Diederich, 2002), which has been consistently observed in
experiments (e.g. Edland and Svenson, 1993). Roe et al. (2001) further generalised
DFT to address multiple choice alternatives as well.
DFT still uses the classical economic concept of a fixed utility but can predict
probabilistic choices, while assuming that a DM can theoretically converge to her
true preference without noise in the limit. So inconsistencies in actual choices do not
reflect the DM’s innate preferences but instead the noise of a preference elicitation
process that can be reduced by investing more mental resources.
2.5.1.2 Boundedly Rational Expected Utility Theory (BREUT)
Navarro-Martinez et al. (2017) developed Boundedly Rational Expected Utility
Theory (BREUT), a sequential sampling model with the RP model as a source of
mental evidence. BREUT is explained in more detail in section 4.2, chapter 4, to
demonstrate how a valuation model can be built through adapting BREUT. So this
section only gives a short description to put it into context within the sequential
sampling literature.
BREUT features a DM who sequentially samples evidence from an RP model
to inform a choice between two alternatives. The RP model provides a CE for each
option based on the same degree of risk aversion, but this risk aversion is sampled
anew with each sampling step. The DM computes the CE di↵erence between the two
options for each of these steps. This evidence is accumulated by building a sample of
CE di↵erences between the two options through sequential steps. With each step,
the mean of all the CE di↵erences shows a temporary strength of preference for
e↵ect on perceived utility in case of a gain and a smaller e↵ect in case of a loss.
9More precisely, the special case of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process that is mean-reverting with
a long-term drift (Diederich, 1997).
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either option.
The question is now at which sampling step the DM should stop the process
and settle on an option. The DM trades o↵ the accuracy of the sample against the
speed of the decision. She prefers a larger sample as long as her required confidence
in the sample’s accuracy is not yet achieved. The decision rule for this is a simple
t-test, with the required confidence as the corresponding p-value. As soon as the
t-test shows that the mean of CE di↵erences is su ciently di↵erent from zero, the
DM stops the process and settles on the choice with the higher CE.
To model constraints in time and attention, the DM is also assumed to reduce
the required level of confidence with each step. So the longer the sampling process
takes, the more willing the DM is to take a choice that would be elicited through
the mean CE of all RP utility functions.
So like in DFT, BREUT uses a noisy source of mental evidence from which
the DM samples. BREUT uses an endogenous stopping rule and can thereby, like
DFT, predict reaction times with the sample size as a proxy. And while BREUT has
a measure of mental evidence that seems easy to extend to a valuation process, the
question remains what kind of valuation process would be best to explain a DM’s
behaviour.
2.5.2 Boundedly Rational Valuation models
To apply the same speed-accuracy trade-o↵ from boundedly rational choice models
to a lottery valuation task, it is necessary to adapt the DM’s process from com-
paring two or more lotteries to valuing a single lottery. Instead of answering the
question “which is better?”, the DM needs to answer “how good is it?”. Sequential
sampling models answer the first question through a process of comparison between
alternatives that stops as soon as the di↵erence is meaningful. But to answer the
second question, a valuation model will not only generate a single valuation and
update it in a process but also determine when to stop this process without another
value to compare it to.
The speed-accuracy trade-o↵ in a valuation process bears some resemblance
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to an exploration–exploitation dilemma10: The longer the process goes on, the more
the DM is rewarded with a more accurate valuation (assuming that a mis-valuation
entails negative consequences). But following the bounded rationality paradigm, the
process also causes opportunity costs and so the DM also needs to stop the process
as soon as the temporary valuation is “good enough”. So for a valuation model,
the DM needs to accumulate mental evidence for a lottery’s attractiveness and also
decide when to stop sampling because the accuracy of the accumulated evidence is
su cient.
Rothschild (1974) developed a model where a “rational” DM searches for a
minimum price from an unknown distribution with search costs. It features a DM
using Bayesian updating of priors over possible price distributions that she infers
from sampling prices. Thereby, the DM has a probability distribution of expected
prices to observe next. Based on the expected value of the next price sample and
the currently observed price, the DM can then assess if the expected price reduction
of sampling again is worth the investment of the search cost. This might be able to
be adapted to a search where a DM is not searching for the minimum price but for
the median price of a distribution. Then, the DM would trade o↵ inaccuracy in her
estimation against the cost of more sampling. But this process is computationally
intensive (Koulayev, 2013). Therefore, the assumption that a DM simultaneously
holds priors over probability distributions is hard to reconcile with assumptions of
a DM’s limited computational power.
Instead, two simpler approaches have been used in the bounded rationality
literature so far. First a “Full Sampling” approach, where a DM accumulates sam-
ples of mental evidence and stops at some point to summarise the mental evidence
into a final valuation. “Full Sampling” implies that a valuation is entirely built on
mental samples. This approach is used by Query Theory to explain the WTA/WTP
gap, described in section 2.5.2.1. Second, a “Choose and Adjust” approach, where a
DM starts o↵ with an initial sample of mental evidence for a valuation which is then
gradually adjusted towards a final valuation through an iterative choice process.
10For an overview of the exploration–exploitation dilemma in decision making, see Cohen et al.,
2007)
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“Choose and Adjust” implies that a valuation is built on a single mental sample
that is then iteratively adjusted based on a choice process. This approach is used by
the Sequential Value Matching Mechanism (Johnson and Busemeyer, 2005; section
2.5.2.2) and the Stochastic Pricing Model (Blavatskyy and Ko¨hler, 2009a, 2009b;
section 2.5.2.3).
2.5.2.1 Query Theory
Johnson et al. (2007) developed Query Theory to model a valuation process where
a participant is either asked for a WTA or WTP for an object, e.g. a co↵ee mug. It
is regularly observed in experiments that WTA values for objects are higher than
WTP values (Kahneman et al., 1990). Johnson et al. assume that the valuation
depends on a mental query process that 1) samples positive and negative aspects
about the object’s attractiveness from memory, such as the usefulness of a co↵ee
mug or the burden of holding on to it; and 2) samples similar evidence for receiv-
ing a specific money amount, such as being able to spend more or not getting the
object’s entire worth in money. They then explain the WTA/WTP gap through
the “query order” of that process and because the process stops before it is com-
plete. They assume that a WTA task triggers a query order, which first samples
value-enhancing evidence for the object’s attractiveness as well as value-decreasing
evidence for money attractiveness. This supports higher WTA values. Only later in
the process will mental evidence suggesting lower WTA values get sampled. But the
process stops before sampling all possible mental evidence, so some evidence that
supports lower WTA values is ignored. Therefore, WTA values are biased upwards.
The reverse query order then applies to a WTP task, resulting in lower WTP values
and the commonly observed WTA/WTP gap.
Testing this in a WTA/WTP experiment, Johnson et al. not only asked
participants for WTA and WTP values but also to list the aspect that they con-
sidered in their valuation. They found that both WTA and WTP values crucially
depended on the types of aspects listed first by participants, whether or not par-
ticipants actually owned the object at the time. Furthermore, this dynamic also
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occurred when participants were prompted to list either positive or negative aspects
first, also whether or not participants actually owned the object at the time. Based
on this evidence, Johnson et al. conclude that the query order of a mental valuation
process fundamentally explains the WTA/WTP gap.
However, Query Theory has not yet been applied to the preference reversal
phenomenon. If a DM’s CE is between WTA and WTP for a lottery, this CE value
can only be overvalued compared to the DM’s SI point if choices rely on yet another
query order. But Query Theory o↵ers an example where WTA/WTP valuation
behaviour can be explained entirely through a sampling process.
2.5.2.2 DFT and the Sequential Value Matching Mechanism
Johnson and Busemeyer (2005) develop a model for a DFT decision process for an
equivalence task, called the Sequential Value Matching mechanism (SVM mecha-
nism) . Note that DFT in its basic form (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1992; Buse-
meyer and Diederich, 2002) can already predict CEs through a partly similar match-
ing process but this theoretical process was altered to allow the process to behave
di↵erently for WTA, WTP, and CE valuations (as well as for probability equiva-
lents). This section will discuss the most advanced version, developed by Johnson
and Busemeyer (2005).
Initially, a DM starts o↵ with a potential “candidate value” as a poten-
tial amount for an equivalence task. This candidate value is sampled once from
a distribution over the lottery’s range and di↵ers according to the task type. All
distributions of potential candidate values take the shape of a bell curve. The distri-
bution’s mode for CE candidate values lies in the middle of the lottery’s range. But
the mode for WTA candidate values lies at the upper end of the lottery range while
it lies at the lower range for WTP candidate values. So the DM tends to start the
process with di↵erent candidate values, depending on the task type. After sampling
the candidate value, the DM then introspectively decides whether she prefers the
candidate value or the lottery in a straight choice.
This decision process is modelled through a DFT choice, but with three
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possible outcomes: 1) prefer lottery, 2) prefer candidate value, 3) indi↵erence. Unless
indi↵erence is an outcome of the comparison, the process carries on with further
steps.
In each subsequent step, the DM adjusts the candidate value by an exogenous
equal fraction of the lottery’s range; either downwards in case it is preferred over
the lottery or upwards in case of the other way around. Thereby, the candidate
value is approaching the value of the underlying utility of the lottery step by step.
DFT provides an exact theoretical value for this by assuming that the DM has a
fixed underlying utility function. The sure amount that has the same utility as the
lottery’s underlying utility is this theoretical value, equivalent to an underlying CE.
Since DFT choices on average prefer the option with the higher underlying
utility, choices will lead the adjustment process to weakly converge towards the
underlying CE with an equal utility as the lottery. Due to the probabilistic nature
of DFT decisions, the adjustment process can even reverse directions. But this
happens with a lower probability. This weak convergence towards the underlying
CE eventually stops as soon as a DFT choice concludes “indi↵erence”, i.e. that
the candidate value and the lottery are indistinguishable in their utility with the
required level of confidence. This models constraints in mental resources through a
“cost of deliberation time”, the comparison process is assumed to be stopped when
a comparison has taken too long and hits an upper limit to the deliberation time
for the comparison.
The initial distribution of candidate values as well as the pre-determined size
of the steps in CE elicitations have a crucial impact on the DM’s final valuation.
Initial candidate values for CEs are distributed with the mode halfway between the
maximum and minimum payo↵. Due to the process stopping without ever fully
reaching the underlying CE, this results in a bias towards the midpoint between
the minimum and maximum payo↵. Compared to an SI point of a risk-averse DM,
this initial distribution of starting values is biased upwards in case of low winning
probabilities.
Consider an SI point for the lottery and for simplicity, assume that a DM
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is risk-neutral. Therefore, the DM will prefer any lottery over its expected value
in 50% of choices and the lottery’s expected value is its SI point. However, in CE
elicitations governed by the SVM mechanism, lotteries that win with a probability
of less than 50% have an initial candidate that is on average above the lottery’s
expected value, which in this case also is the SI point. So they tend to be overvalued
compared to their SI point and expected value (and vice versa for lotteries with a
winning probability of more than 50%). Even despite the risk-neutral preferences
of the DM, this can lead to a preference reversal as the final valuation is biased to
the starting value of the SVM process. Thereby, riskier lotteries are overvalued and
safer lotteries are undervalued.
The step size is exogenously determined by dividing the range of the lottery’s
maximum and minimum payo↵s by a number that is the same for all types of
lotteries. On the one hand, this leads to larger steps for lotteries with a higher
variance, which might not allow the DM to “home in” with su cient accuracy on
their final valuation. On the other hand, if the step size is too low, the DM will need
a much higher number of steps to arrive at their final valuation, with an increasing
risk of stopping the process at a valuation much further from the SI point. Therefore,
choosing the optimal step size involves a trade-o↵ between predictions of speed and
accuracy of the SVM process.
2.5.2.3 The Stochastic Pricing Model
Blavatskyy and Ko¨hler (2009b) propose the stochastic pricing model (SP model):
A model of lottery valuation that features adjustment steps as a proxy for delib-
eration time but does not have a stopping rule linked to speed-accuracy trade-o↵s.
Since it was used to model participants’ behaviour under exogenous time pressure
(Blavatskyy and Ko¨hler, 2009a), this was not a problem. But it does pose a chal-
lenge in its comparison to the SVM mechanism and in the experimental context of
endogenous deliberation times.
Blavatskyy and Ko¨hler (2009b) assume that a DM draws evidence from a
random utility distribution of CEs when valuing a lottery. Comparable to the SVM
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mechanism, a starting value as the first Candidate CE is first drawn, but from a
uniform distribution over the lottery’s range.
The DM then compares the lottery to the starting value, using a random
utility function. If the lottery shows a higher utility, the preliminary CE is adjusted
upwards, or vice versa downwards. Then, a subsequent comparison is made between
the lottery and the updated candidate value. On average, the candidate value is
updated towards the value of the median underlying CE.
The process stops as soon as the preference relation “switches direction”, i.e.
as soon as the DM notices the candidate value becoming either “too high” (resp.
too low) if it was “too low” (resp. too high) before. When the process stops, the
DM settles on the mean of the last two candidate values as the final CE.
The variability in random preference relations causes this process to stop too
early for the CE to reflect the DM’s median underlying CE. Instead, like in the SVM
mechanism, final valuations are biased towards the starting value (when compared
to the mean CE of the underlying distribution of utility functions).
As with the SVM mechanism, this e↵ect is entirely controlled by the starting
value. Assume a DM who chooses between a lottery and a sure amount much lower
than the one at her SI point. This should lead the DM to start the valuation
process at that precise sure amount and state a subsequent MSoP with a negative
mismatch. I.e., unlike in Butler et al.’s (2014a) experiment, DMs logically imply
with their MSoP a sure amount that is too low for them to be equally as attractive as
the lottery on average. Vice versa, a “too high” sure amount would also introduce
a negative mismatch in MSoP by biasing the implied CE upwards towards the
starting value. If the downward adjustment process stops prematurely, the DM will
still underreport their MSoP and therefore imply a CE that is too high compared
to their SI point in choices.
44
2.6 Discussion
The current literature shows that the great majority of models fail to adequately de-
scribe both the preference reversal phenomenon and probabilistic choice behaviour.
In addition, the MSoP mismatch observed by Butler et al. (2015) provides yet
another behavioural regularity that cannot be explained by classic economic theory.
More sophisticated models of choice and valuation have been developed,
which capture both probabilistic preferences and the preference reversal phenomenon.
But these models, the SVM mechanism and the SP model, still leave some issues
unaddressed. The SVM mechanism and the SP model do not use a full sampling
process but instead a process where the DM samples once and then adjusts this
sample through iterated choices. Because of this design, the prediction of the pref-
erence reversal phenomenon is entirely driven by anchoring e↵ects from the initial
sample.
If applied to MSoP values, they predict a negative MSoP mismatch, not
the positive one observed by Butler et al. (2014a). Possibilities of e↵ects from
spill-over of mental evidence or consistency-seeking behaviour on MSoP mismatches
have neither been explored in theory nor been tested in an experiment. The same is
true for e↵ects of individual reaction times on MSoP values. Current research also
did not measure the size of MSoP mismatches and was only limited to detecting its
occurrence.
Based on these gaps in the literature, the rest of the thesis works towards
providing some answers to those issues. Chapter 3 simulates existing models and
explores ways in which they could predict MSoP values. Chapter 4 develops a novel
boundedly rational valuation model that uses a full sampling approach and makes
novel predictions for MSoP mismatches, possible spill-over e↵ects or consistency-
seeking behaviour, as well as reaction time e↵ects. Chapter 5 reports an experiment
that quantifies discrepancies between SI points, CE values, and MSoP mismatches
and thereby tests the di↵erent model predictions. Chapter 6 analyses whether longer
deliberation times reduce lottery overvaluation and the frequency of preference re-
versals in the experiment. Chapter 7 provides a conclusion to the results.
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Chapter 3
Existing Computational models
applicable to Valuation
3.1 Introduction
Classic economic theory assumes that individual preferences towards risk that de-
termine behaviour are largely consistent and stable across various contexts. But
as described in the previous chapter, observations of preference reversals as well
as probabilistic preferences challenge these assumptions. This chapter describes
simulations of existing models that are applicable to model probabilistic choices,
the preference reversal phenomenon, and MSoP mismatches. All models consider
choices and valuations of monetary lotteries without negative payo↵s.
The chapter considers choices between lotteries and sure amounts, lottery val-
uations, and direct choices between lotteries. Predictions about MSoP mismatches
are based on lottery vs. sure amount choices. These simulations provide a set of
predictions that are tested in an experiment in chapter 5 and can be compared to a
novel valuation model described in chapter 4.
The chapter starts with the baseline case of EUT and the RP model, and
shows how the RP model can also predict a positive MSoP mismatch. It then shows
how the SVM mechanism and the SP model o↵er more advanced approaches. As
both of these models have not yet been applied to an MSoP scenario, the chapter
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shows how they can be extended to predict possible MSoP mismatches. With this
approach, both the SVM mechanism and the SP model predict a negative MSoP
mismatch following choices between lotteries and sure amounts.
3.1.1 Variables
The models described in this chapter can predict the following variables that are
observable in an experiment.
Probabilistic Choices and SI Points Except for EUT, all models predict choice
probabilities between lotteries instead of strict preference relationships. So they
predict stochastic transitivity between choices in the Mosteller and Nogee setting
(1951), which results in an SI point. In this chapter, choice simulations are limited
to direct choices between the P-Bet and $-Bet and choices between the lotteries and
various sure amounts.
3.1.1.1 Preference Reversals
While EUT and the RP model use the same approach to predict choices and val-
uations, satisfying procedure invariance, the SVM mechanism and the SP model
assume di↵erent processes for choice and valuation. Therefore it is possible to
compare lottery valuations to direct choices and SI points in order to detect the
preference reversal phenomenon.
3.1.1.2 The MSoP Mismatch
In this chapter, the RP model, SVM mechanism, and SP model are adapted to
make MSoP valuations possible. All MSoP valuations are based on choice between
a lottery and a sure amount. This works by simulating a choice first and then
basing a valuation on that choice. E.g., in the RP model the same parameters for
the utility function of a choice are used for a subsequent MSoP valuation. In case of
the SVM mechanism and the SP model, the sure amount from the choice is used as
the starting value for the subsequent valuation process. Possible MSoP mismatches
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can then be identified by computing if MSoP values over- or undershoots the SI
point.
3.1.1.3 Reaction Times
The SVM mechanism and the SP model also feature a number of “steps” in the
process, which can be interpreted as a proxy for reaction times in an experiment
(see chapter 2, section 2.5.1). Reaction times provide another dimension for testable
predictions but also a challenge for existing models. If sequential sampling models
accurately predict individual choices and valuations but fail to predict corresponding
e↵ects on reaction times, this would be evidence that they fail to capture a funda-
mental aspect of a decision process. And even if the rest of the model predictions
are accurate, they would still fall short of their goal of explaining a decision process.
Marginal e↵ects o↵er a way to better explain decision making processes de-
spite experimental noise (see section 2.5.1 for an explanation). The crucial assump-
tion for this reasoning is that marginal increases in participants’ reaction times
coincide with marginal increases in deliberation times. But if this assumption is
true, reaction times o↵er an additional dimension to understand behaviour in ex-
periments.
3.1.2 Implications for Valuation Models
This chapter describes how models can deviate from classic economic theory to
predict probabilistic preferences, preference reversals, and marginal e↵ects of reac-
tion times. In addition, adapting these models to predict MSoP mismatches o↵ers
the opportunity to provide novel explanations for yet untested phenomena such as
spill-overs of mental evidence, consistency-seeking behaviour.
After a brief overview of traditional approaches in section 3.2, section 3 de-
scribes existing boundedly rational models that assume di↵erent decision processes
for choices and valuations while still relying on the same set of underlying prefer-
ences. A comparison of the existing models is given in section 3.5. This provides
the basis for developing a novel valuation model in the following chapter.
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3.2 Expected Utility and the Random Preference Model
3.2.1 Expected Utility Theory
To put the model simulations in this chapter into context, the EUT model and
the RP model are shown as baseline cases. The EUT model specifies a procedure-
invariant preference between the P-Bet and the $-Bet. We will use the utility func-
tion:
u(x) = x1 r where r = 0.185
on an 80% chance of winning £12 (expected value of £9.60) as a P-Bet and
a 25% chance of winning £50 (expected value of £12.50) as the $-Bet. This was
because Loomes and Pogrebna (2016) report a strong preference reversal e↵ect for
these parameters.
The risk aversion parameter r = 0.185 gives equal P-Bet and $-Bet CEs of
£9.13. Therefore, a choice between P-Bet and $-Bet always depends on a tie breaker,
in this case a 50/50 choice probability. And since these choices are consistent with
lottery CEs, a preference reversal does not occur.
Also, both lotteries CEs are their SI points. The lotteries are always chosen
over sure amounts below their SI point of £9.13 and always rejected for sure amounts
above it. Choices between the lottery and the SI point’s sure amount will also result
in a 50/50 choice probability. So a graph of choice probabilities between the lottery
and various sure amounts along the lines of Mosteller and Nogee (1951) will be a
step function.
Any MSoP task following a choice can be answered by the CE di↵erence
between the options. E.g., if the P-Bet is chosen over £1, the MSoP will be £9.13
- £1=£8.13. This MSoP exactly reaches the SI point, resulting in a zero MSoP
mismatch.
3.2.2 The Random Preference Model
This provides a comparison to the RP model (Loomes and Sugden, 1995), that can
use the same model for the same pair of bets. This is possible by making the risk
49
aversion parameter r stochastic:
u(x) = x1 r where r ⇠ (beta(3, 3) ·   + (↵   /2)) where ↵ = 0.185   = 1.0
Here, a beta distribution beta(3, 3) creates a random symmetrical bell-shaped
r distribution;   is equal to its range and ↵ determines where the midpoint of the
range lies. beta(3, 3) creates random values over [0; 1] with mean = median =
0.5. This distribution is then centred around ↵ with range  . This distribution is
identical to the one used for the novel valuation model described in chapter 4, so it
is useful to explain its properties in detail.
Choices: For each decision task, a DM then samples a single r parameter to
use in the utility function. This r parameter then gives a CE, e.g. for a choice
between the described P-Bet and $-Bet or for a CE elicitation. As the median of r
parameters equals median(r) = 0.185, half of the possible r values are either below
or above it. Since a lower r parameter results in lower risk aversion, this means that
the $-Bet is preferred for r parameters below the median, i.e. in half of the cases.
For the other half of cases with higher risk aversion, the $-Bet is rejected instead.
Therefore, the P-Bet is preferred over the $-Bet with a probability of 50%.
Choices between bets and sure amounts can be inferred from the distribution
of CE values from the lotteries, shown in figure 3.1. The P-Bet’s CE range is
[£5.95;£10.13] and the $-Bet’s CE range is [£0.64;£17.40]. This means that the P-
Bet is always preferred over £5.95 but never preferred over £10.13 (£0.64 and £17.40
for the $-Bet). Replicating Mosteller and Nogee’s observation, the probability of
choosing a lottery increases gradually from 0% at the lower bound of the range and
until it reaches 100% at the upper end of the range. The median CE of both bets
lies at £9.13. Therefore both bets will be preferred over £9.13 exactly 50% of times,
meaning that they have the same SI point at £9.13.
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Figure 3.1: RP Model: Underlying CE sample distributions
Valuations: Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of lottery CEs for the P-Bet and
the $-Bet (see section A.1 in the Appendix for an explanation why the CE distri-
butions are not symmetric). These are the same CEs that govern choice behaviour.
$-Bet CEs are more spread out because of the higher variance of the $-Bet. But
picking a P-Bet and a $-Bet CE at random leads to a probability of either CE being
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higher at exactly 50% because the medians of both distributions are equal. So the
RP model does not predict the preference reversal phenomenon. Although prefer-
ence reversals occur, the asymmetric e↵ect of a majority preference for the P-Bet
in choices to a majority preference for the $-Bet in valuations does not occur as
observed by Grether and Plott (1979).
Adjustments of Sure Amounts: To illustrate MSoP values that are elicited
after a choice, first consider a choice between a lottery and a sure amount at the
SI point. By definition, the lottery is chosen 50% of times. Assume an occasion
where the lottery is chosen based on a momentary r parameter. But based on that
momentary preference, what will the MSoP be? If the DM uses the same rparameter
for the MSoP elicitation, the MSoP value must equal the distance between the
lottery’s momentary CE and the sure amount because this is precisely what the
di↵erence in utility is worth in money to the DM. Also, the lottery CEmust be higher
than the SI point because the DM would have chosen the sure amount otherwise.
So it is possible to infer from the lottery choice that the lottery CE must be within a
subset of the CE distribution above the SI point. This is illustrated in figure 3.2 for
both lotteries. P-Bet choices result in a mean MSoP mismatch of £0.39 (sd=0.23).
$-Bet choices result in a far larger mean MSoP mismatch of £2.82 (sd=1.84) because
the $-Bet CE distribution is larger.
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Figure 3.2: RP Model: MSoP Values after Lottery Choices
This e↵ect goes into the opposite direction for sure amount choices. MSoP
values for sure amount choices must be based on CEs below the SI point and are
shown in figure 3.3. Here, P-Bet MSoPs overshoot the SI point with a mean of
£0.64 (sd=0.54) after sure amount choices. Again, the mean mismatch is larger at
£2.99 (sd=2.00) for the $-Bet.
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Figure 3.3: RP Model: MSoP Values after Lottery Choices
These predictions come from the assumption that a choice preference from
the RP model spills over to an MSoP task. But if an MSoP value is elicited later
after a choice between a lottery and sure amount, it is not sensible to assume that
the DM would use the RP parameter from the past choice again for the MSoP. So
if no spill-over e↵ect is present, or if the DM starts the MSoP task with a “fresh”
preference, DMs would report CEs from the distribution in figure 3.1. The result
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after a choice between a lottery and a sure amount at the SI point would be a
distribution of MSoP values that do not show an MSoP mismatch because half of
the corresponding CEs would be either above or below the SI point.
So the RP model with assumption of spill-over e↵ects can predict an MSoP
mismatch and probabilistic choice and valuation behaviour. But the RP model does
not predict the preference reversal phenomenon.
3.3 Johnson and Busemeyer (2005): The sequential Value
Matching Mechanism (SVM Mechanism)
Johnson and Busemeyers’ (2005) SVM mechanism, described in section 2.5.2.2 is
simulated in this section and adapted to predict MSoP values.
The SVM mechanism was developed for straight valuation tasks, but it can
also be adapted to model MSoP values (see section 3.3.4). Assume a choice task
where a P-Bet is preferred over £1 for sure, followed by a prompt for the DM’s
MSoP. We assume that a DM that comes up with an MSoP according to the SVM
mechanism will start o↵ the valuation by comparing the bet to the first candidate
value at hand, i.e. said sure amount £1. Thereby, it is possible to induce a valuation
process with a specific starting value. The choice of starting value thereby generates
MSoPs that logically imply valuations closer to it.
3.3.1 SVM Mechanism Simulation
Following the parameters chosen by Johnson and Busemeyer (2005), the SVM mech-
anism has been simulated 1,000 times per task with a DFT process (Busemeyer and
Townsend, 1993) based on the following utility function:
u(x) =
x1 r
1  r where r = 0.2
The candidate value distribution is a truncated normal distribution with
the mean at half of the lottery’s range and a standard deviation of 10% of the
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lottery range. Adjustment step size was 2% of the respective lottery range and the
confidence threshold=25 for the DFT choice function. As in the original paper, the
exit rate per sample unit (a proxy for seconds in deliberation time) was 2% and the
step size per valence sample was 0.1.
Again, an 80% chance of winning £12 (expected value of £9.60) was used as
a P-Bet and a 25% chance of winning £50 (expected value of £12.50) was used as
the $-Bet. The risk aversion parameter r = 0.2 implies a SI point at £9.10 for the
P-Bet and a SI point at £8.83 for the $-Bet.
3.3.2 Choices
The DFT model (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993) is the “core model” of the SVM
mechanism and predicts binary choices. Figure 3.4 shows the choice probabilities
of a DM choosing the respective lottery over various o↵ered sure amounts. For
the given parameters, DFT predicts a higher variability in choices for the $-Bet.
Note that although the $-Bet has a lower SI point than the P-Bet, it is still more
likely to be preferred over particularly high or low sure amounts than the P-Bet,
which is a property of the RP model as well. Also, the $-Bet is chosen over £0 in a
minority of simulations. This is because for parameters including those of Johnson
and Busemeyer’s (2005), DFT violates weak stochastic dominance for a minority of
occasions (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993). For a choice between P-Bet and $-Bet,
DFT predicts a 51% choice probability for the P-Bet.
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Figure 3.4: DFT: Lottery Choice Probabilities
Note: Sure amounts for SI points are marked by the solid red line
3.3.3 Direct Valuations
Valuations are assumed to be a standard CE elicitation as no candidate value for
the sure amount is displayed to the participant. Since the SVM process models a
convergence to a “true” CE value (in this case £9.10 for the P-Bet and £8.83 for
the $-Bet), candidate values will approach the sure amount at the SI with longer
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deliberation time.
However, this approach will take longer for the $-Bet, as most of its initial
candidate values are around £25, halfway along the $-Bet’s payo↵ range. Since the
average valuation process stops before reaching the SI point, the $-Bet ends up being
valued (mean=£18.67) higher than the P-Bet (mean=£6.67) in the vast majority
(99%) of cases. The step size of adjustment (£1.0) also causes the $-Bet valuations
to be more clustered on specific values and the overall range of $-Bet valuations is
higher than that of the P-Bet.
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Figure 3.5: SVM Mechanism: Lottery Valuations
Note: Sure amounts for SI points are marked by the solid red line
3.3.4 Adjustments of Sure Amounts: MSoP Values
The SVM mechanism was not developed to be applied to anchored valuations but
the nature of its adjustment process makes it possible to extend the SVM mechanism
to also predict MSoP values. To achieve this, we assume that a valuation which im-
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mediately follows a choice task is equal to a SVM mechanism with a pre-determined
starting value. By considering a possible sure amount, the DM uses this value as a
first candidate value and subsequently adjusts it to reach her final valuation. The
SVM mechanism predicts that the resulting CE is closer to the first displayed sure
amount than a direct valuation, similar to an anchoring e↵ect. By inducing these
candidate values through previous choices, on average the final CE of the lottery
can be determined to be either lower or higher than the SI point (assuming that
both lottery CEs are implied by the MSoP). Note that from this, a negative MSoP
mismatch follows for all sure amounts: As final valuations are biased towards the
starting value, they consistently fall between the starting value and the SI point.
Therefore, resulting MSoP values consistently are too small to reach the SI point.
This prediction of a negative MSoP mismatch is also tested in chapter 5
(section 5.4.2). Note that in the case of choices between lotteries, Butler et al.
(2014a) found a positive MSoP mismatch.
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Figure 3.6: SVM Mechanism: Lottery Valuations dependent on initially displayed
Sure Amount
Note: Sure amounts for SI points are marked by the solid red line
3.3.5 Deliberation Time and Valuations
Each generated valuation comes with a number of steps that were used in the deci-
sion making process. The minimum number of steps occur when a starting value is
sampled and the process ends after the first comparison. In that case, the simulation
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counts one adjustment step. With each subsequent adjustment the total number of
steps increases by one.
We can observe a marginal e↵ect of deliberation times on final valuations.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 give an overview of the results through violin plots of P-Bet and
$-Bet valuation distributions, minus the SI point and separated by sample sizes. As
described by Johnson and Busemeyer’s (2005) for P-Bet and $-Bet lottery types in
general, larger steps numbers correspond with smaller distances to the SI point. But
for all step numbers, median P-Bet valuations are below the SI point, while median
$-Bet valuations are above the SI point.
Median P-bet valuations minus the corresponding SI point increase with step
number (£-2.84 to £-0.91 from 1 step to 18 steps) as final valuations move upwards
to the SI point. The e↵ect for the $-Bet is stronger and in the opposite direction:
Median $-bet valuations minus the corresponding SI point decrease with step number
(£14.16 to £-0.16 from 1 step to 50 steps) as valuations move downwards towards
the SI point. P-bet valuations also have a median number of 3 steps, which is far
lower than for the $-Bet at a median number of 11 steps.
But in an experiment it is not known what underlying parameters determine
a participant’s valuation behaviour. Interpreting the marginal e↵ects of di↵erent
step numbers on valuations gives predictions for experiments that are easier to
test. Treating step number as a proxy for deliberation time, the SVM mechanism
predicts that participants with individually-longer deliberation times will report
lottery valuations that are closer to their SI point.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 illustrate this. For both lotteries, higher sample sizes
result in a convergence of the valuation towards the SI point. Larger sample sizes
reduce the distance between a valuation and the SI point.
This e↵ect is positive and weaker for the P-Bet but negative and stronger
for the $-Bet. In addition, $-Bet valuations take longer than P-Bet valuations for
the same participant. These marginal e↵ects are qualitative predictions that can be
measured by a yes/no approach at the individual level in an experiment (see section
4.5.4).
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3.4 Blavatskyy and Ko¨hler (2009a, 2009b): The model
of stochastic Pricing (SP model)
This section describes simulation results for the SP model, explained in section
2.5.2.3. It predicts a valuation process that resembles the SVM mechanism and
is also biased towards a starting value but uses an RP model as a choice function
instead. As with the SVM mechanism, the SP model can be adapted to predict
MSoP values (see section 3.4.4).
3.4.1 SP Simulation
Since Blavatskyy and Ko¨hler’s model of stochastic pricing does not cover straight
choices, a few additional assumptions need to be made for a simulation. Straight
choice tasks always deal with a binary choice. This is identical to a single step in the
SP model. Therefore, MSoP tasks are modelled as a valuation task with a specific
starting value.
Following Blavatskyy and Ko¨hler (2009b), we simulated each task 10,000
times to predict choices and valuations of DMs using the following random utility
function:
u(x) =
x1 r
1  r where r ⇠ norm(µ = 0.2; sd = 0.4)
Again, an 80% chance of winning £12 (expected value of £9.60) was used as
a P-Bet and a 25% chance of winning £50 (expected value of £12.50) was used as
the $-Bet. The parameters imply a SI point at £9.10 for the P-Bet and a SI point
at £8.83 for the $-Bet. Consequently, the P-Bet is preferred to the $-Bet in choices
(in 60% of cases). Both are above the respective lottery’s expected value because,
as in Blavatskyy and Ko¨hler (2009b), the individual mean risk aversion parameter
is risk-seeking1. As in the original simulation, the step size was set to 10% of the
respective lottery’s range.
1On the condition that any r   1 are eliminated.
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3.4.2 Choices
A straight choice task would be a special case of the SP model, a single random utility
preference relationship between the lottery and the sure amount. Both lotteries
show a gradually decreasing probability of choosing the lottery over increasing sure
amounts:
Figure 3.9: SP Model: Lottery Choice Probabilities
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3.4.3 Direct Valuations
The CE predictions of the SP model do predict a preference reversal from preferring
the P-Bet over the $-Bet in 60% of choices to valuing the $-Bet over the P-Bet in
53% of valuations. The mean P-Bet valuation was at £9.92 (med=£10.41). The
mean $-Bet valuation was at £10.5 (med=£10.63) with a much larger variance
(var($) = 18 > 4 = var(P )). Higher mean $-Bet valuations were predicted despite
some $-Bet valuations at £0, in instances where a $-Bet was rejected by the SP
model in favour of £2.50 or less2. Note that the mean P-Bet valuation is below the
P-Bet’s SI point while the mean $-Bet valuation is above:
2If a $-Bet candidate value at or below £2.50 is rejected, the next candidate value will be at
or below £0. The SP model will always reject this next candidate value below £0 with certainty.
Then, the final valuation, equal to the mean of the last two candidate values, would be equal to a
number at or below £0. As the SP model rules out final valuations below £0, valuations in these
cases are set to £0.
A similar scenario occurs if a P-Bet candidate value is rejected in favour of £1.20 or less.
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Figure 3.10: SP Model: Histogram of Lottery Valuations
Note: y-axes have di↵erent lengths
Note: Sure amounts for SI points are marked by the solid red line
3.4.4 Adjustments of Sure Amounts: MSoP Values
Similar to the SVM mechanism, the SP model was not built to predict MSoP values
but can be altered to do so. Choices over a sure amount provide the initial candidate
value and also determine the direction of adjustment. E.g. choosing a sure amount
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of £10 over the $-Bet will result in a final valuation below £10. Choosing initial
candidate values entirely controls the preference reversal. Even without incorporat-
ing the direction of adjustment, the final valuation is biased towards the initial sure
amount (and more so for the $-Bet). Again, this implies a negative MSoP mismatch.
This e↵ect direction is the same as for the SVM mechanism (section 3.3.4).
Mean valuations are only higher for the $-Bet when its starting values are
above the $-Bet SI point and also P-Bet starting values are below the P-Bet SI
point. Otherwise, the preference reversal disappears (see figure 3.11).
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Figure 3.11: SP Model: Lottery Valuations dependent on initially displayed Sure
Amount
Note: Sure amounts for SI points are marked by the solid red line
Note: Below: Mean Steps
3.4.5 Deliberation Time and Valuations
Similar to the SVM mechanism, the SP model predicts a number of steps along with
valuations, which can also be understood as a proxy for deliberation time. But since
the models stops at the first change in adjustment direction, the earliest a process
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can stop is at two steps. Step numbers range from two to ten steps for both lotteries
(see figures 3.12 and 3.13: the median number of steps is 4, both for the P-Bet and
the $-Bet). The P-Bet requires a mean step number (mean=4.13) that is only 14%
smaller than for the $-Bet (mean=4.77)3.
Note that Blavatskyy and Ko¨hler (2009b) do not use this model to predict
endogenous deliberation times. Instead, they used the model to predict the path
of convergence of candidate values towards a final valuation. And they do find
that valuations converge onto a final value at least weakly in the majority of cases.
Therefore in a strict sense, the SP model does predict step numbers, but these step
numbers cannot be used as a proxy for deliberation times.
Still, this simulation can give a prediction for the marginal e↵ects of longer
or shorter deliberation times. From minimum to maximum step number, P-Bet
valuations increase from £0.46 below the SI point to £1.30 above it while $-Bet
valuations show a decrease from £1.29 above the SI point to £0.56 below it. Applied
to deliberation times, this predicts the marginal e↵ect that P-Bet valuations are
higher for individually-longer deliberation times whereas $-Bet valuations are lower.
3Despite this small di↵erence, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reports a highly significant di↵erence
in distributions (D=0.1231, p<0.0001). This could o↵er a testable prediction for an experiment.
But even without any additional experimental noise, a t-test would require 160 participants to
report a di↵erence in means with an expected p-value of 5%. Therefore, the predicted di↵erence in
step number cannot be extended to a prediction of a di↵erence in deliberation times between the
P-Bet and the $-Bet with these parameters. However, other parameters are possible that would
give predictions where it is easier to distinguish between P-Bet and $-Bet deliberation times. But
to simplify the comparison to the model description in the original paper, parameters are left
unchanged.
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3.5 Comparison of existing Models
3.5.1 Di↵erences
The SVM mechanism and the SP model use di↵erent probabilistic decision models
as a “model core” to predict comparisons between a lottery and its candidate values
that are necessary for the adjustments in the valuation process. The SP model
uses a RP model that provides a strict preference for each comparison. The SVM
mechanism uses DFT instead, which can also provide an indi↵erence response for a
comparison.
This di↵erence also leads to di↵erent stopping rules. While the SVM mech-
anism stops as soon as a comparison yields an indi↵erence response, the SP model
stops the process as soon as a comparison switches the direction of the necessary
adjustment.
The distribution of potential starting values is also slightly di↵erent across
the models, although its average e↵ect is the same. The SP model assumes a uni-
form distribution of starting values along the lottery’s range. The SVM mechanism
assumes a unimodal distribution over the same range with its centre halfway be-
tween the lottery’s minimum and maximum payo↵. But in both cases, this leads
the average starting value to lie below the SI point for low-variance lotteries and
above it for high-variance lotteries.
3.5.2 Similarities
The two existing models both use a probabilistic decision model as a “core” to
predict the comparisons that are necessary for the adjustments in the valuation
process. In both cases, this “core” represents a “true” underlying preference that
would also be elicited through the valuation process if it would go on indefinitely.
Comparisons between valuations based on infinite sampling would then reflect the
average preference in choices.
Both models use a single mental sample of a starting value that is crucial
in the process because final valuations are biased towards it. This starting value is
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compared to the lottery via the core model and on average adjusted towards the SI
point. But on average, the process stops before the candidate value reaches the SI
point. Therefore, average valuations are predicted to lie between the starting value
and the SI point. Since both models assume that starting values are below the SI
point for the P-Bet and above the SI point for the $-Bet, this predicts the preference
reversal. The SI point is higher for the P-Bet than for the $-Bet, causing an average
preference in choices for the P-Bet. But valuations show the opposite pattern with
average valuations that are higher for the $-Bet than for the P-Bet. Therefore,
the $-Bet is overvalued relative to the SI point while the P-Bet is undervalued.
Note that this is consistent with Tversky et al.’s (1990) conclusion about over-
and undervaluing in the preference reversal phenomenon. However, Loomes and
Pogrebna (2016) instead found an overvaluation of both P-Bets and $-Bets when
inferring SI point estimates.
Since valuations are biased towards the starting value, both models predict a
negative MSoP mismatch after lottery vs. sure amount choices in our specification.
Therefore, these models predict that Butler et al.’s (2014a) positive MSoP mismatch
will not be replicated following choices between lotteries and sure amounts. This
applies both to positive adjustments of sure amounts (MSoP tasks after lottery
choices over sure amounts) and negative adjustments (resp. sure amount choices).
Furthermore, as the models are limited to a single sample combined with
iterative choice as information gathering mechanism, they do not incorporate over-
confidence or cognitive dissonance e↵ects, which would have an impact on the ac-
cumulation of mental evidence.
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Chapter 4
A novel Model of Boundedly
Rational Valuation
4.1 Introduction
This chapter develops a novel model of sequential sampling to predict valuation
behaviour in experiments featuring monetary lotteries. It can be linked to an existing
choice model and makes novel predictions for how choices can influence subsequent
valuations. In addition, the model also incorporates spill-over (section 4.4.1) and
consistency-seeking e↵ects (section 4.4.2) as additional factors that might be able
to predict yet untested phenomena in experiments.
Unlike the SP model and the SVM mechanism described in the previous
chapter, the valuation process is entirely based on sequentially sampling mental
evidence from the same distribution that is used for choice predictions. The starting
value for a valuation process is also not exogenously generated but drawn from the
distribution of mental evidence. In addition, the process stops endogenously based
on the accumulated mental evidence.
Connected to BREUT as the choice model, the valuation model uses the same
distribution of mental evidence in the form of CE values. It predicts weak e↵ects
in line with the preference reversal phenomenon, despite obeying weak stochastic
transitivity in choices. This is the result of an overvaluation of both P-Bet and
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$-Bet with a stronger e↵ect for the $-Bet. This is a di↵erence to the models de-
scribed in chapter 3, which is in line with the result from Loomes and Pogrebna
(2016). The model predicts a positive MSoP mismatch after choices, which is inde-
pendently possible in two ways: via spill-over e↵ects from choices onto valuations
and consistency-seeking e↵ects resulting from choice displays.
At this stage, the model is built to predict decision behaviour over sure
amounts and lotteries with positive payo↵s and known winning probabilities. All
choices are between two alternatives and MSoP values consider a single lottery
against a sure amount. This model is simulated in section 4.3.3 and compared to
existing models in section 4.5. Section 4.6 discusses its predictions and contribution.
4.2 Navarro-Martinez et al. (2017): Boundedly Ratio-
nal Expected Utility Theory (BREUT)
Navarro-Martinez et al. (2017) follow a sequential sampling approach for Boundedly
Rational Expected Utility Theory (BREUT), a choice model where a DM accumu-
lates evidence on her preference through samples of CE di↵erences between options.
These CE di↵erences are generated by an RP model, resulting in probabilistic pref-
erences in choices.
BREUT has three components:
1) An RP model as source of mental evidence: This is provided by sampling
from a distribution of CRRA EUT functions1 with randomness in their parameters,
so no “true” underlying preference as in DFT exists. Each sample returns a von
Neumann-Morgenstern function with a random risk aversion parameter. This func-
tion then provides a CE for each option at hand. The DM samples her preference
relation in the form of the CE di↵erence  CEk between options according to the
sampled function at step k.
2) With the CE di↵erence as a benchmark for the strength of preference, an
additional sample is generated at each step and each time  CEk is averaged. This
1CRRA := constant relative risk aversion
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“accumulates evidence” in favour of one option or the other at each step k.
3) With each sampling step, a stopping rule is checked to determine if the
amount of evidence in the form of CE di↵erences is su cient to justify a choice
for the option with the higher mean CE. A DM stops sampling and chooses the
option as soon as a preference for an option is distinguishable enough from zero,
given a su cient level of confidence. This is done at each step k by a t-test: if the
test-statistic is above a confidence threshold, the process stops at the final step K.
To check for this, the t-test statistic of the sample means is computed:
TK =
mean( CE1, .., CEK)
std.dev.( CE1, .., CEK)/
p
K
And the absolute of the test statistic is compared to the cumulative distri-
bution function of the t-distribution (with (k   1) degrees of freedom). If the test
statistic exceeds the confidence level, the process stops at K:
FK 1[|TK |]   confidenceK () stop atK
To model constraints in time and attention, the necessary confidence level
confidencek decreases by an individual-specific rate d 2 [0; 1] throughout the pro-
cess. So the longer the sampling process takes, the more willing the DM is to take
a choice that might not reflect a preference that would be elicited on average.
Confidence is reduced each time the stopping rule is checked, so the ear-
liest opportunity to check the stopping rule is at sample size 2. This results in
confidencek = 1  d(k   1) with confidence decreasing in sample size k.
4.3 Extending BREUT to Valuation
4.3.1 Direct Valuations
BREUT already involves a component that gathers evidence usable for a valuation.
Since the model accumulates CE di↵erences, these are easily convertible to be used
for the valuation of a single option.
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So a BREUT valuation process could leave the generation of possible CEs
unchanged (component 1) and instead use a di↵erent evidence accumulation mech-
anism (component 2) as well as an adapted stopping rule (component 3).
Component 1: Underlying Distribution of Preferences
CE values for a single lottery with positive payo↵s can be generated by the same RP
Model that is used for BREUT choices. Similarly to BREUT, this would generate
an underlying distribution of CE values for a lottery. While the distribution of EUT
functions does not change, any lottery will result in its own unique distribution of
corresponding CE values (depending on its payo↵s and their probabilities).
That way, the valuation process relies on the same distribution of underlying
CEs as the choice process for each specific lottery. And the DM also samples CE
from this distribution for a lottery valuation. Therefore, a stable underlying CE
distribution is an unchanging characteristic of the DM.
Component 2: Accumulation of Evidence
With each sampling step k, the sample would include an additional CE value as
mental evidence for the lottery’s valuation to the DM. A straightforward way to
accumulate this mental evidence is the updated mean of the CE sample. So at each
sampling step, the mean of the sample is equal to the DM’s candidate value for a
final valuation.
Component 3: Stopping Rule
Finding an appropriate stopping rule is more di cult. The DM is assumed to
“satisfice” and stop the process as soon as the valuation is precise enough, given her
required level of confidence. But unlike in BREUT choices, there is no other option
with which CE values can be compared to judge their precision. So the stopping
rule can only rely on the CE sample of a single lottery.
The coe cient of variation is a frequently used simple indicator for the ac-
curacy of a sample that performs well in describing behaviour (Weber et al., 2004)
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and can simply by estimated by using: std.dev.(sample)/mean(sample). The coe cient
of variation also becomes smaller the larger a sample becomes. Throughout the
sampling process a sample’s variance decreases and thereby reduces the coe cient
of variation, serving as a proxy for a reduction in imprecision.
This characteristic of the coe cient of variation can be used for a stopping
rule. We assume that at each step k, the DM estimates the coe cient of variation
from the CE sample as a measure of the likelihood that an additional CE value will
change the sample mean, i.e. measuring imprecision. If the estimated coe cient of
variation is high, it is more likely that the estimation is inaccurate and requires more
sampling. If not, an additional CE value is less likely to change the sample mean
because the estimation might already be precise. It follows that a higher coe cient
of variation is an indicator that an estimation is imprecise.
Therefore, higher coe cients of variation correspond to lower levels of con-
fidence in the estimation. If at step k the coe cient of variation is too high for
the DM to be confident enough in the estimation’s accuracy, the DM will carry on
sampling with the next step (k+1). But if the DM accepts this level of imprecision,
she will stop the process at this step.
So as soon as this coe cient of variation is small enough, the DM will stop
the valuation process subject to the level of imprecision she will accept at the final
step K. This can be expressed by the following rule:
std.dev.(CE1, .., CEK)
mean(CE1, .., CEK)
 accepted imprecisionK () stop atK
Similar to BREUT in choice, we assume that the required level of confidence
will decrease over time, thereby increasing the level of accepted imprecision. In order
to compute a candidate CE mean as a candidate value, the DM will sample two CE
values and decrease the confidence level confidencek. For parsimony, this happens
at the same individual-specific rate d as in choices. A level of total confidence
corresponds to an allowed coe cient of variation of zero, i.e. the process can only
stop if the standard deviation is zero. But with each additional step in the process,
80
the accepted level of imprecision increases from this lower bound. Note that the
model does not have a finite parameter value for d that leads the DM to always
accept the first sample mean as final valuation (such a specification is possible for
BREUT choices). In addition, the lower bound can theoretically be any number,
even below zero. But to keep the model simple, a lower bound of zero is used as an
implicit parameter.
The d parameter results in accepted imprecisionk = d(k   1) increasing in
sample size k and thereby accepting a higher coe cient of variation to stop the
process as sampling goes on. This serves as a measure of impatience. This also
corresponds to impatience in choices where the same value for d is used. As the
process goes on for longer, the DM will accept more and more noisy samples as
su ciently accurate for the valuation (other things being equal, as increasingly
large samples also become less noisy throughout the process). For higher values of
d, DMs become more impatient more quickly throughout the process.
Adding these two extensions to BREUT is su cient to generate valuations.
The remainder of this section will describe how lottery characteristics and model
parameters influence predictions. Section 4.4 will show how the valuation model
can allow for choices and valuations to be combined to model MSoP elicitations.
The Impact of Variance on the Stopping Rule
Note that the coe cient of variation shows a higher sensitivity to positive deviations
than to negative deviations. E.g. the set {8, 10} has a higher coe cient of variation
than the set {10, 12} even though both samples have the same variance2. Still, it is
a relative measure, so this mismatch is the same for the scaled up sets {80, 100} and
{100, 120}. So everything else being equal, a random sample with a higher mean is
more likely to trigger the stopping rule than a random sample with a lower mean.
Because of the inherent randomness in the BREUT valuation process, some
of the CE sample means will be lower and some will be higher the underlying
distribution’s mean CE. But the higher CE sample means result in lower coe cients
2CV ({8; 10}) ⇡ 1.4/9 ⇡ 0.16 > 0.13 = 1.4/11 ⇡ CV ({10; 12})
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of variation. The stopping rule tends to end the process for lower coe cients of
variation and is therefore more likely to end it for a CE sample with a higher mean.
So the stopping rule is more likely to settle on higher valuation samples as a final
valuation.
So with respect to the mean of the underlying distribution, the sampling
process for a valuation will stop earlier if CE sample means are higher. Similarly,
the process will go on for longer if CE sample means are smaller. Thereby, CE
samples with lower means are more likely to be selected for additional sampling. On
average, they then increase their sample mean again as the sample mean regresses
back to the underlying mean.
Lotteries that are riskier will have a higher variance in CE values. The trivial
case of a low-risk lottery is a sure amount. Assume the mean risk-averse RP model
u(x) = x1 r with r 2 [ 0.3; 0.7]. A certain payo↵ of £10 will always generate a CE
of £10. A 50% chance of £20 has the same expected value but will generate CEs
from £1.98 to £11.733. Even more extreme, CEs for a 25% chance of £40 with the
same expected value range from £0.39 to £13.77. So riskier lotteries have a higher
variance in their CE distribution and thereby generate CE samples with means that
are more likely to be further from the mean of the underlying distribution.
Because of this, riskier lotteries more frequently create situations where the
stopping rule settles on especially high valuations. Also, they will be overvalued
more strongly relative to the underlying mean of their CE distribution because CE
samples are further from it on average. The driving force for this e↵ect is the
coe cient of variation as the basis for the stopping rule. Therefore, the reliance
of the stopping rule on the coe cient of variation causes riskier lotteries to be
valued higher than the underlying CE distribution’s mean more frequently and more
strongly than safer lotteries.
3With a majority of CEs below £10 because the majority of r parameters are above zero and
therefore risk-averse.
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4.3.2 Variables used and computed by the Model
The valuation model uses the same parameters that apply to BREUT for both
choices and valuations. Choice probabilities are identical to BREUT but the val-
uation model extends predictions to also cover valuations. In addition, section 4.4
will explain how this can also apply to MSoP valuations. Furthermore, section 4.4.2
also shows how e↵ects from consistency-seeking behaviour can be added in the form
of a restriction on the CE distribution.
4.3.2.1 Input Variables
Both BREUT choices and valuations are computed from independent random draws
of CE values for the lotteries considered. These are generated by the same underlying
distribution of CE values that are generated by a distribution of CRRA utility
functions. An additional individual-specific parameter is the measure of a change in
confidence d. This parameter is identical for choices and valuations, but is treated
di↵erently according to either a choice or a valuation procedure.
4.3.2.2 Output Variables
BREUT Choices
The core model is BREUT, which already generates binary choice probabilities,
either between lotteries or between lotteries and sure amounts. But in its adaption
for the valuation model, BREUT choices also generate a sample of CE values that
can be used in a subsequent valuation. In addition, BREUT choices allow us to
compute an SI point for each lottery.
Valuations
The model generates a distribution of valuations, CEK , equal to the means of each
final CE sample the valuation is based on.
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Valuation Sample Sizes
Each generated valuation’s CE sample has a specific sample size K at which the
process stopped. Sample size can also be interpreted as a measure of deliberation
time for a valuation task. The higher the sample size, the longer a participant would
have needed to complete the task, ceteris paribus.
Directly related to the sample size, the confidence threshold can also be
computed. d(k   1) shows how small the coe cient of variation of the CE sample
needed to be in order for the valuation process to stop.
4.3.3 Model Simulation: Choices and Valuations
BREUT was simulated 10,000 times for each decision problem with the following
core function for generating CE samples:
u(x) = x1 r where r ⇠ (beta(3, 3) ·   + (↵   /2)) where ↵ = 0.185   = 1.0
The decrease in confidence per step was set to d = 0.1. These parameters
are identical to the ones used by Navarro-Martinez et al. (2017) except for ↵. The
parameter ↵ was set to 0.185 instead of 0.35 as it will give an equal choice probability
between the P-Bet and $-Bet, which better illustrates the properties of the model.
As in the last chapter, an 80% chance of winning £12 was used as a P-Bet and a
25% chance of winning £50 was used as the $-Bet. These lotteries were also used in
the experiment reported in chapter 5, which tests model predictions.
The beta distribution beta(3, 3) creates the shape of the r distribution;   is
equal to its range and ↵ determines where the midpoint of the range lies. beta(3, 3)
creates a symmetrical bell curve over [0; 1] with mean = median = 0.5. ↵ then
re-centres this distribution around the mean ↵ and   adjusts its range to equal  .
All CE values are generated from the same r distribution, regardless of the
lottery type. Therefore, DMs are assumed to have a stable underlying distribution
of risk aversion parameters. Note that this symmetric r distribution results in an
asymmetric distribution of corresponding CE values (see figure 4.1). As (1   r)
84
is in the exponent of the utility function u(x) = x1 r, linear changes in r result in
non-linear changes of the corresponding CE values. See section A.1 in the Appendix
for an overview.
An 80% chance of winning £12 (expected value of £9.60) was used as the
P-Bet and a 25% chance of winning £50 (expected value of £12.50) was used as
the $-Bet. Note that all possible values for r generate CE values that are strictly
greater than zero and that the variance of CE values is higher for the $-Bet, as
shown in figure 4.1. While the underlying r distribution for P-Bet and $-Bet CEs is
identical, the transformation of a risk parameter into a CE causes the resulting CE
distribution to be di↵erent across the lotteries in range, mean, and shape.
The resulting coe cients of variation that are estimated at di↵erent step sizes
are illustrated by a simulation of 1.000 coe cients per sample size in figure 4.2. This
figure shows the average coe cient of variation at a particular step, separately for
the P-Bet and the $-Bet. Note that the coe cient of variation at each step is also
dependent on previous steps. A CE sample is carried over into an additional step and
increased by another CE only if the coe cient of variation was above the confidence
threshold at the previous step. Samples with lower coe cients of variation lead to
early stopping in the process while higher coe cients of variation lead the process
to keep sampling for longer.
Figure 4.2 illustrates how this a↵ects mean coe cients of variations at dif-
ferent steps. The figure shows average coe cients of variation at each step k, with
whiskers denoting 5% and 95% quantiles (meaning that 95% of observations fall
within the whisker range). The dotted line shows the confidence threshold at step
k. Note that steps for k > 3 are based on the CE samples with a coe cient of
variation that was above the confidence threshold at the previous step. If it was
not, the process would have stopped at the previous step. E.g. at step k = 3, all
samples had a coe cient of variation above d = 0.1 at the previous step k = 2.
Also, the valuation process stops for all samples that have a coe cient of variation
below the threshold, i.e. the dotted line at the respective step.
So because of the stopping rule, only CE samples with a su ciently high
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coe cient of variation are carried on to a subsequent step. Also, if most of the
coe cients of variation are below the confidence threshold, only a minority will get
carried over to the next step. This selection due to the stopping rule only leaves
samples with higher and higher coe cients of variation to remain in the process for
later steps. This also explains why higher sample sizes are possible for the $-Bet:
the coe cients of variation are higher, so the process can carry on for longer.
Figure 4.1: BREUT: Underlying CE sample distributions
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Figure 4.2: BREUT: Mean Coe cients of Variation generated per Step by the
BREUT Valuation Process
Note: Whiskers indicate 5% to 95% quantiles.
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4.3.3.1 Choices
The parameters lead to a 50% BREUT choice probability between P-Bet and $-Bet.
Also, the P-Bet’s and the $-Bet’s SI points both lie at £9.004. BREUT predicts a
steeper decrease in choice probabilities near the SI point for the P-Bet than for the
$-Bet. See figure 4.3 for mean choice probabilities against various sure amounts.
Navarro-Martinez et al.’s (2017) parameters cause a choice probabilities that result
in a curve are far closer to a deterministic step function for the P-Bet than for the
$-Bet.
Altering the ↵,  and d parameters changes average preferences in choices be-
tween lotteries and sure amounts, as summarised by Navarro-Martinez et al. (2017)
and will be explained later in the description of comparative statics. Navarro-
Martinez et al. (2017) describe the impact of parameters in more detail and also
for di↵erent binary choice problems. But this simulation is limited to their e↵ect on
valuations and preference reversals and therefore excludes this description.
4Note that the SI point is not necessarily equal to the mean or median of the underlying CE
distributions. Navarro-Martinez et al. (2017) describe that for d = 0.5, the SI point is always equal
to the median of the CE distribution. As d approaches zero, the lottery’s SI point moves from the
underlying median CE to the underlying mean CE.
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Figure 4.3: BREUT: Lottery Choice Probabilities over increasing Sure Amounts
(£0.20 increments)
4.3.3.2 Valuations
See the following table 4.1 for an overview of key model predictions. “% P   $”
lists the percentage of choices in which BREUT chose the P-Bet over the $-Bet
and “% CEPK > CE$K” lists the percentage of P-Bet valuations that were higher
than $-Bet valuations. BREUT generates a 50% choice probability in favour of the
P-Bet, and BREUT’s valuation model values the P-Bet higher than the $-Bet only
in 46% of cases. Still, this underpredicts the strong e↵ects of the preference reversal
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phenomenon, e.g. as as observed by Grether and Plott (1979).
Table 4.1: Results for parameters ↵ = 0.185,   = 1.00, d = 10%, beta(3, 3)
P-Bet
%P   $ %CEPK>CE$K CEK var(CEK) K %CEK>Core CEs %CEK>SI Point
50% 46% 9.03 0.19 2.18 56% 54%
$-Bet
%P   $ %CEPK>CE$K CEK var(CEK) K %CEK>Core CEs %CEK>SI Point
50% 46% 9.29 3.58 4.50 53% 58%
“CEK” shows the mean valuation and “var(CEK)” the variance of valua-
tions for the respective lottery. The mean P-Bet valuation is £9.03 and the mean
$-Bet valuation is £9.29. $-Bet valuations show a larger variance of 3.58 compared
to P-Bet valuations (0.19) and have the median above the P-Bet’s median valuation.
Because of this, the $-Bet is valued higher than the P-Bet in 54% of the cases, which
constitutes a preference reversal because of the $-Bet is chosen equally often as the
P-Bet (“%P   $”=50%).
“% CEK > Core CEs” lists the share of valuations that were higher than
the mean of the underlying CE distribution. While the average P-Bet valuation
surpasses the mean of its underlying CE distribution by less than 1%, the average
$-Bet valuation surpasses it by 3%. Accordingly, average $-Bet valuations are higher
than average P-Bet valuations but only to a small extent. And because choices are
based on the same underlying CE distribution, it follows that the predicted e↵ect
strength of the preference reversal phenomenon is weak as well. Nevertheless, this
demonstrates an interesting case where procedure variance is violated despite both
procedures being built on the same set of underlying transitive EUT functions.
Although not all predictions in table 4.1 will be observable in an experiment,
it illustrates an important property of the valuation model. As explained in section
4.3.1, this is the result of the stopping rule favouring valuations above the mean
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of the underlying distribution. The higher the variance relative to the mean of a
lottery’s underlying CE distribution, the higher the extent of this e↵ect.
This can be illustrated by the following example: Consider a sure amount
of £10. Also consider that any valuation above the mean of the underlying CE
distribution is an “overvaluation”. Now all CEs for a sure amount of £10 will equal
£10, therefore a CE sample of a sure amount has zero variance and no overvaluation
occurs. Relative to the mean of its underlying CE distribution, the P-Bet has a
higher variance and on average results in an overvaluation. The $-Bet has the highest
variance (relative to the mean of its underlying distribution) and also the highest
average extent of overvaluation. Therefore the variance of a lottery is the main driver
to its overvaluation (compared to the mean of the underlying CE distribution).
“CEK > SI Point” shows the share of lottery valuations that are higher
than the lottery’s SI point. Both lotteries are more frequently overvalued relative
to their SI point. This implies that the DM overvalues lotteries relative to their SI
points as well. But the $-Bet (58%) more so than the P-Bet (54%).
The average sample size “K” used for a lottery valuation is 2.18 for the P-Bet
and 4.50 for the $-Bet. Figure 4.5 shows histograms for the sample sizes for both
lotteries. While most P-Bet valuations have a sample size of 2, most $-Bet valuations
have a sample size of 5. A larger sample size will lead to a more exact estimation
of the mean of the underlying CE distribution (see section 4.3.3.3 for a discussion
of the marginal e↵ects of di↵erent sample sizes). Nevertheless, the average $-Bet
valuation is more frequently overvalued relative to the SI point. This overvaluation
of $-Bets leads to a higher average $-Bet preference in valuations when comparing
it to choices.
For a histogram of the lottery valuations, see figure 4.4 . Compared to the
underlying distribution of CEs in figure 4.1, the distribution of final valuations is
more narrow, because it averages from this CE distribution.
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Figure 4.4: BREUT: Lottery Valuations
Figure 4.5: BREUT: Lottery Sample Sizes
Preference Reversals
The model systematically predicts valuations that are above the SI points of the
lotteries. This e↵ect is stronger for the high-variance $-Bet, even though $-Bet
valuations have a larger average sample size.
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When sampling unusually high CEs, the valuation process stops earlier than
on average, increasing the likelihood of prematurely generating a final valuation
above the mean of the underlying distribution of CEs. This is because the stopping
rule is more likely to be triggered for a sample with a higher mean, given the same
variance (see section 4.3.1, “Component 3”). Vice versa, sampling unusually low
CEs leads the process to go on for longer, which weakens the e↵ect of the low
CEs on the entire sample mean. This introduces an overvaluation e↵ect in lottery
valuations.
This e↵ect increases in the variance of the CE distribution as this causes
more frequent and more extreme instances of especially high or low CE sample
means. The $-Bet has a larger variance in payo↵s than the P-Bet, which generates a
larger variance in the $-Bet’s underlying CE distribution. Despite the larger average
sample size of its valuations, this leads the $-Bet to be overvalued more (relative to
its SI point as well as the underlying CE distribution) than the P-Bet. Therefore,
parameters exist where the valuation model predicts $-Bet valuations above P-Bet
valuations more frequently than the BREUT core model chooses the $-Bet over the
P-Bet. Figure 4.6 illustrates this mechanism with a flowchart.
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Figure 4.6: Flowchart to illustrate how the BREUT Valuation Model predicts the
Preference Reversal Phenomenon
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Comparative Statics: Risk Aversion ↵
Table 4.2 shows the e↵ects of altering the median risk aversion parameter ↵ on
predictions. As ↵ increases, the average preference for the less risky P-Bet over the
$-Bet increases as well. Still, the extent of overvaluation compared to lottery’s SI
point is more frequent for the $-Bet for the majority of parameters used (as evident
through the % CEK>SI Point ratios). Also, $-Bet valuations require larger sample
sizes and show a higher variance for all parameters used.
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Comparative Statics: Risk Aversion Parameter Range  
Table 4.3 shows predictions for di↵erent   values. Increasing   widens the range of
the r and CE distributions. This is equivalent to increasing noise in the valuation
process. This results in larger sample sizes that are needed for valuations and a
higher variance in valuations (again, both of these are always larger for the $-Bet).
The size of the preference reversal, the di↵erence between “% P   $” and “%
CEP > CE$” is also larger for higher   values.
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Comparative Statics: Confidence Level Reduction Rate d
Table 4.4 shows how di↵erent values for d influence predictions. As d determines
the required level of confidence for each step, it is a proxy for the “impatience” of
the DM both in the valuation and in the choice process. Especially high d values
result in the lowest sample sizes and the highest variance in valuations. Especially
low d values, signifying a particularly high level of required confidence and therefore
a more patient DM, result in higher sample sizes and less variance in valuations.
But the extent of preference reversals, the di↵erence between “% P   $” and
“% CEP > CE$”, is not strictly increasing in d. As d increases, more and more
valuation processes hit the stopping rule with the first sample of two CE values.
For especially high values of d, the stopping rule is more likely to stop the
process for any coe cient of variation. As a result, valuations are more likely to be
the result of a “truly random” sample of two CE values because the process is always
stopped at k = 2. Valuations are therefore more varied but also not likely to be
stopped early if they are higher. Only when the stopping rule prolongs the process
for lower valuation samples, does it cause a bias (note that this dynamic is di↵erent
for MSoP values, explained in section 4.4.1). If the stopping rule distinguishes
between CE samples, it means that valuation samples above the SI point result in
more final valuations, increasing the number of overvaluations.
But conversely, especially low values of d also weaken the preference reversal
because they increase the average CE sample size for all valuations. The higher
sample sizes are, the weaker the overvaluation of the $-Bet becomes, resulting in
fewer preference reversals. So the e↵ect of higher sample sizes outweighs the e↵ect
of the stopping rule.
As the sample size K can also be interpreted as a proxy for reaction times,
altering the d parameter also illustrates changes in reaction times. For higher d
values, the DM samples quickly and should therefore also react quickly with an
imprecise valuation. Conversely, a DM with a low d takes longer but then reports
CEs with a lower variance across repetitions.
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4.3.3.3 Deliberation Time and Valuations
See figures 4.7 and 4.8 for violin plots of final P-Bet and $-Bet valuation distribu-
tions, separated by sample sizes. Final valuations are generated from parameters of
the baseline case (↵ = 0.185,   = 1.00, d = 0.1, beta(3, 3)). Plotted is the lottery
overvaluation. I.e., the lottery valuation minus the SI point of the respective lottery.
Note that absolute sample sizes might not be comparable between choice and
valuation tasks. The BREUT choice process uses di↵erent operations to compare
CEs and has a di↵erent stopping rule. The same might apply to participants in an
experimental context, where mental processes for choices as well as executions for
choices might be quicker than for valuations.
Experimental evidence considering this will be explored in chapter 6. An
experimental test of this would be to measure if individually-longer deliberation
times for the same lotteries do have a negative e↵ect on valuations. In an experiment,
this would mean that average valuations are above the participant’s SI point but
less so for individually-longer deliberation times.
E.g., a participant would not only be quicker in comparing between options
but also quicker in selecting a preferred option than in reporting a valuation. So
while sample sizes might be a good proxy for reaction times in an experiment, a
given sample size within a choice task might correspond to a di↵erent reaction time
than for a valuation task. But it makes sense to compare reaction times within
valuation tasks only. Three dimensions stand out and can be explained by the
model characteristics:
1) The larger the sample, the smaller the valuation of a lottery. For the
smallest sample size, the majority of P-Bet valuations is above the SI point. But
for the largest sample size, the majority of P-Bet valuations is below it. The same
applies to the $-Bet. So the shorter the deliberation time of a lottery valuation, the
greater the likelihood that the lottery is overvalued. This is because the stopping rule
is biased to stop for CE sample means that are above the underlying distribution’s
mean (see section 4.3.1). Therefore, above-mean CE samples are likely to be stopped
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and reported early. Below-mean CE samples are likely to carry on, stopping late in
the sampling process. And since fewer valuations are below the SI point, this results
in an average overvaluation of the lottery compared to the SI point.
In addition, this e↵ect is stronger for the $-Bet. Therefore, early $-Bet
valuations are more likely to lie above early P-Bet valuations. For later valuations,
the reverse applies with more P-Bet valuations above $-Bet valuations.
2) The di↵erence between valuations and SI points is initially positive
and eventually becomes negative with increasing sample size. This also
follows from the stopping rule. Since below-SI CE samples carry on sampling for
longer, samples that initially have a low sample mean carry on and eventually result
in higher sample sizes. While below-SI samples trigger a later finish, the correspond-
ing above-SI samples trigger an earlier finish. This leads to a divergence in sample
size between valuations that are biased upwards and those that are biased down-
wards (compared to the mean of the underlying CE distribution). For repeated
valuations of the same lottery, valuations that are stopped earlier have a smaller
sample, so their upward bias is stronger than the downward bias of valuations that
stop later. This is because the bias is weakened by a larger sample size. So valu-
ations that stop later have a larger sample size, resulting in a smaller (downward)
bias.
3) P-Bet valuations are based on smaller samples than $-Bet valuations.
The mean P-Bet sample size of 2.19 is less than half as big as the mean $-Bet
sample size of 4.24. This fits in well with existing data, where valuations of safer
lotteries typically take less time than valuations of riskier lotteries (e.g. Schkade
and Johnson, 1989). Given that $-Bet sample sizes are higher, it is surprising to see
that median $-Bet valuations are nevertheless higher than median P-Bet valuations
(see subsection 4.3.3.2).
The explanation for this is that overvaluation not only depends on the sample
size. The size of an initial overvaluation is also determined by the underlying CE
distribution for the lottery. The $-Bet has an underlying CE distribution that has
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a larger range than that of the P-Bet (see start of section 4.3.3). So despite being
curbed by larger sample sizes, $-Bet valuations show such a strong overvaluation that
they are nevertheless higher than P-Bet valuations. Thereby, the model captures
both the observation of stronger overvaluations for $-Bets than for P-Bets relative
to SI points (Loomes and Pogrebna, 2016) as well as the e↵ect that valuations take
longer for $-Bets than for P-Bets (Schkade and Johnson, 1989).
103
F
ig
u
re
4.
7:
B
R
E
U
T
V
al
u
at
io
n
M
od
el
P
-B
et
:
L
ot
te
ry
V
al
u
at
io
n
s,
th
ei
r
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
N
u
m
b
er
of
S
te
p
s,
an
d
th
ei
r
fr
eq
u
en
ci
es
N
ot
e:
M
ed
ia
n
va
lu
es
ar
e
m
ar
ke
d
by
h
or
iz
on
ta
l
li
n
es
104
F
ig
u
re
4.
8:
B
R
E
U
T
V
al
u
at
io
n
M
od
el
$-
B
et
:
L
ot
te
ry
V
al
u
at
io
n
s,
th
ei
r
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
N
u
m
b
er
of
S
te
p
s,
an
d
th
ei
r
fr
eq
u
en
ci
es
N
ot
e:
M
ed
ia
n
va
lu
es
ar
e
m
ar
ke
d
by
h
or
iz
on
ta
l
li
n
es
105
4.3.3.4 Issues with Predictions
While the BREUT valuation model predicts the preference reversal phenomenon,
Grether and Plott (1979) reported a stronger e↵ect. In their example, the majority
of participants both choose the P-bet over the $-Bet while also valuing the $-Bet
higher. Table 4.2 illustrates the impact of changing ↵ on the mismatch between the
preference in choices for the P-Bet versus the preference for it in valuations (which
equals “% P   $” minus “% CEPK > CE$K”). All displayed ↵ parameters that
predict a majority of P-Bet choices result in only a small mismatch in line with a
preference reversal from the P-Bet to the $-Bet. Therefore, the model underpredicts
the preference reversal phenomenon for that data set.
The BREUT valuation model can predict a preference reversal but at the
cost of limiting the variability of choices. The parameters result in a relatively low
choice variability for the P-Bet (as shown in figure 4.3). If variability in choices is
increased by choosing a larger variance for the distribution of r parameters, the size
of the preference reversal e↵ect weakens. This keeps the e↵ect size of the preference
reversal small. Nevertheless, it consistently shows a preference reversal from a P-Bet
preference in choices to an increased $-Bet preference in valuations.
4.4 Extending BREUT to model MSoP Values
Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 in the literature review already discussed the MSoP mis-
match and choice-induced changes in preference. This section will now explore two
applications of the BREUT valuation model to capture an MSoP elicitation process:
Spill-over e↵ects and consistency-seeking behaviour.
4.4.1 Spill-Over E↵ects of Mental Evidence from Choice to MSoP
Elicitation
4.4.1.1 Applicable Theoretical Work
MSoP values can be regarded as a strength of preference that is quantified to provide
a CE. And since the strength of a preference is closely related to a participants’
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confidence in their preferences, this resembles Moore and Healy’s (2008) definition
of “overprecision”, i.e. an overestimation of the precision of one’s own beliefs.
Overprecision could be interpreted to explain an MSoP mismatch from a
mental sampling perspective (see section 2.5.1 for an overview of applicable mental
sampling models). In Butler et al.’s (2014a) observation of an MSoP mismatch,
participants state a strength of preference that is too high to match with their
average preference in choices. If participants base their decision making and the
resulting monetary strength of preference response on a sampling process of mental
evidence, this MSoP overstatement could result out of overprecision.
If such a participant made a choice in favour of an option A over some other
option B, it would have sampled evidence in favour of choice A. This evidence
would imply some strength of preference greater than zero for option A, even if
this participant is on average indi↵erent between the two options. But this will
be true for all samples of mental evidence that lead the participant to choose A.
Because if the sample had not favoured A, the participant would have chosen option
B instead. Therefore, all evidence samples favour the option that has just been
chosen and will therefore value option A on average higher when compared to any
underlying distribution of mental evidence.
If someone were fully aware of the fact that their preferences are probabilistic,
they would need to take this into account when estimating their MSoP. But partici-
pants in experiments might be restricted in their access to mental evidence. If their
construction of an MSoP valuation is subject to limited access to or awareness of
mental evidence in support of a di↵erent choice, they would be limited to using the
mental evidence from the previous choice. And basing their MSoP on that choice
could give a too high valuation of option A. Therefore, an MSoP more consistent
with their underlying average preferences would need to be smaller than implied by
the sample. But if they are subject to overconfidence in the form of overprecision,
they might just base their MSoP on their mental sample as it is5. Note that the
5Dubra (2004) discusses a comparable case with microeconomic agents that have a prior set
of beliefs and search for wage o↵ers. Dubra defines agents with a prior of higher wages than the
underlying distribution as “optimistic” and models overconfidence by assuming that these agents
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simpler RP model can also explain the MSoP mismatch in this way. Section 3.2
covers this in more detail, while the next section applies this logic to the BREUT
valuation model.
The result is that a participants treat their mental evidence base as unbiased
from their underlying preferences even though it is not. Mental evidence from the
previous choice “spills over” into the subsequent valuation process. It excludes at
least enough mental evidence to make them choose the option for which they will
estimate their MSoP. Therefore, their MSoP is contingent on the choice they just
made and leads them to be overconfident in favour of the chosen option: This spill-
over of mental evidence could then lead to the too high MSoP values observed by
Butler et al. (2014a).
4.4.1.2 Modelling Spill-Over E↵ects
In our specification, BREUT already generates a sample of CEs for both options
during a binary choice. We can connect a BREUT choice to a BREUT valuation by
assuming that the mental sample of CE values is still present if a choice is imme-
diately followed by an MSoP elicitation. The CE values from the choice will then
already be incorporated in the mental sample before the valuation process for the
MSoP starts. These CE values will then influence the sample mean. This bears
some resemblance to a model of confidence judgements developed by Pleskac and
Busemeyer (2010). In their model, DMs use mental evidence that they generated
during a judgement for a subsequent estimation of their confidence in their judge-
ment. Applied to the BREUT valuation model, this logic would imply that DMs
might use their mental evidence from a choice task for a subsequent valuation.
Consider a participant that makes a choice between a lottery and a sure
amount at the SI point. If she chooses the lottery over the sure amount on a
particular occasion, her CE sample from the choice must imply a lottery valuation
higher than the sure amount. Therefore, the CE sample mean is higher than the SI
point. This is similar to the case in the RP model (see section 3.2.2), only that the
do not factor in the possibility that their prior set of beliefs might be too optimistic.
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preference is based on a CE sample instead of a single CE.
As mental evidence spills over into the subsequent MSoP process, the CE
sample from the choice is carried over into the CE sample for the MSoP valuation.
In the MSoP phase, a BREUT valuation process starts anew. It can happen that
with the first additional sample, the sampling process already stops at a threshold
d because the sample’s CV is already low enough. In this case, the spill-over e↵ect
would be comparable to the case in the RP model where just the CE that led to the
choice is reported (chapter 3, section 3.2). But if the sample’s coe cient of variation
is high enough, the DM will carry on with the valuation process.
So in the lottery choice case, the DM starts o↵ the MSoP valuation process
with a CE sample that has a sample mean above the SI point. Therefore, the CE
sample is biased upwards. As the BREUT DM does not adjust for the likelihood of
having a biased sample, this produces an overconfidence in the form of overprecision.
Thereby, a spill-over e↵ect emerges and leads to a positive MSoP mismatch.
If average MSoP values were consistent with choices, average MSoP values
would always imply a valuation equal to the sure amount at the SI point, regardless
of the preceding choice. This implies that consistent MSoP values at the SI point
should average to zero, regardless of the previous choice. But the spill-over of mental
evidence in the form of the CE sample prevents that. It biases the subsequent
valuation to support the choice that was just taken, not the average of choices.
4.4.2 Consistency-Seeking Behaviour in MSoP Elicitation
4.4.2.1 Applicable Theoretical Work
Another approach that could explain the MSoP mismatch is cognitive dissonance.
Bem’s (1967) self-perception theory formulates cognitive dissonance as the result of
an imperfect introspective process. This makes it applicable to bounded rationality
in order to predict behaviour in an economic experiment6. Bem postulates that “self-
descriptive attitude statements can be based on a participant’s observations of their
6More applicable than Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, which models cognitive
dissonance through an avoidance of dissonant attitudes without information search.
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own overt behaviour and the external stimulus conditions under which it occurs.”
(1967, p.185). Applied to Butler et al.’s (2014a) experiment, this would mean that
a participant’s “attitude” towards a lottery in the form of a CE is the result of 1)
past choices (that are remembered) and 2) the participant’s preference. This stands
in contrast to standard economic theory, which dictates that only subjective utility
governs individual behaviour.
Bem details how this can explain the phenomenon that participants rank
objects’ desirability higher after having chosen them vs. before having chosen them.
This bears the risk of confounding with endowment e↵ects that might have been
induced by having chosen an object. But cognitive dissonance can still exist in case
of participants choosing but not obtaining objects. Therefore it is reasonable to test
for its existence in valuation tasks.
Bem does not discuss any procedural details in a decision process and simply
assumes that any DM is an observer of her past selves while taking decisions. This
DM attributes certain attitudes to her past actions while mostly ignoring the deci-
sion process at the time of action. Applying this self-attribution to a process that
uses sequential sampling of mental evidence could mean that any evidence accumu-
lation is subject to motivated reasoning: evidence which is dissonant with previous
actions runs the risk of being discarded in the mental process. This would imply that
the available evidence for such a process is restricted in favour of “self-consistent”
evidence.
The simplest model of cognitive dissonance would assume that any accu-
mulated evidence inconsistent with known past actions is discarded by the DM.
However, other specifications are possible and applicable, e.g. only assuming a
propensity to ignore evidence or the option to override a previous decision in face
of overwhelming evidence. But if the decision making process is biased towards
using evidence that is self-consistent, it will result in more decisions that are self-
consistent as well because inconsistent mental evidence is ignored. The result are
decisions in favour of consistent actions over simple actions that reflect the under-
lying mental evidence without bias. I.e., DMs subject to cognitive dissonance will
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exhibit consistency-seeking behaviour.
This could also result in a positive MSoP mismatch if DMs just ignore any
evidence that speaks against their choice in an MSoP task. If a DM is subject to
such cognitive dissonance e↵ects and has chosen a lottery over £10, this DM will
ignore any mental evidence that suggests a lottery valuation below £10. Therefore,
the DM will act in a consistency-seeking way. The result is a valuation that relies on
a subset of especially high-valuing evidence that produces higher valuations because
of this cognitive dissonance. Symmetrically, choosing £10 over the lottery would
only consider evidence for a valuation below £10, resulting in a lower valuation.
4.4.2.2 Modelling Consistency-Seeking Behaviour
We assume that DMs do not remember past choices in their choice or valuation
process unless they were just reminded of it. We will use the most simple assumption
of consistency-seeking behaviour: DMs who face a display of a past choice will ignore
any mental evidence inconsistent with that choice.
Following Pleskac and Busemeyer’s (2010) evidence on post-decisional pro-
cessing of mental sampling, this “contrary” evidence could, however, be present in
working memory if a choice has just been taken. Pleskac and Busemeyer (2010) also
suggest that contrary mental information to a decision can be generated straight
after a choice. Therefore, we assume that dissonant information will not be ignored
in an MSoP task straight after a choice. The experiment reported in chapter 5 con-
siders such a task (section 5.2.2). As described in the previous section, this leads to
a biased mental evidence base. But if contrary mental evidence is carried over as
well, cognitive dissonance (in its strong form of ignoring any inconsistent evidence)
will not be present in these immediate MSoP tasks straight after a choice.
Therefore, we assume that cognitive dissonance e↵ects will only occur if a
choice display is immediately followed by an MSoP task, not the actual choice. The
experiment reported in chapter 5 also considers such a task (section 5.4). So MSoP
tasks after a choice display will be subject to cognitive dissonance while no spill-over
e↵ects are present.
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Assume that a BREUT DM faces a display of her past binary choice and a
prompt to state her MSoP. Using the BREUT valuation process, she will accumulate
a CE sample for the valuation of their MSoP but will not have access to the previous
sample that led to the choice. So all mental evidence will be new. If this DM
avoids all cognitively dissonant mental evidence, she will discard any information
that is dissonant with her decision. Her motivated reasoning only accumulates
evidence that suggests a positive MSoP consistent with her choice. Therefore, a
consistency-seeking accumulation process restricts the mental sample to only feature
self-consistent mental evidence.
Since evidence in the model is accumulated from mental CE samples of the
lottery, cognitive dissonance will rule out any CE values in conflict with a displayed
choice. Therefore, cognitive dissonance a↵ects the valuation process not by intro-
ducing a CE sample but by restricting the range of CE values that can be sampled.
As the process removes the motivation for DMs to act inconsistently with their past
choice, the result is consistency-seeking behaviour.
For instance, if a DM sees a choice display of having chosen a lottery over
£10, cognitive dissonance in the model will lead her to ignore any CE sample smaller
than £10. In an MSoP task based on that choice display, the DM will only sample
CE values at or above £10. Since the final valuation is equal to the CE sample
mean, this must result in a valuation above £10, always implying an MSoP above
£0. The DM’s MSoP values will result in a positive MSoP mismatch due to her
consistency-seeking behaviour.
4.4.3 Model Simulation: MSoP Values
BREUT was simulated with the same ↵,  and d parameters as in section 4.3.3, again
10,000 times for each decision problem with the same core function for generating
CE samples. In this section, MSoP tasks are simulated instead of a direct lottery
valuation. This is done for two settings:
First, for an MSoP task straight after a choice between a lottery and a sure
amount. I.e., the DM chooses an option and then reports a lottery valuation. This
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“immediate adjustment” is the setting for spill-over e↵ects.
Second, for the same MSoP task but when the DM only receives information
about her previous action in the choice. This “later adjustment” is the setting for
consistency-seeking behaviour.
Note that these two e↵ects could in theory both occur in the same setting.
In an MSoP task right after a choice, a DM could also be subject to both e↵ects.
Consistency-seeking e↵ects can also occur as an added e↵ect in immediate MSoP
tasks. But in this section, these two components are kept separate to make them
easier to understand. The following sections show how both e↵ects result in positive
MSoP mismatches. Spill-over e↵ects work through a↵ecting the CE sample before
the process starts. Consistency-seeking behaviour works by a↵ecting what CE values
are sampled during the valuation process. So the resulting e↵ects can just be added
on to each other in case of assuming that both occur in an immediate MSoP task.
4.4.3.1 Immediate Adjustment of a Sure Amount: MSoP Values and
Spill-Over E↵ects
Spill-over e↵ects in the BREUT valuation model follow the same logic as the RP
model, described in section 3.2. As explained in section 4.4.1, if average BREUT
MSoP values were consistent with BREUT choices, they would result in valua-
tions that are equal to the sure amount at the SI point (note that valuation =
sure amount +MSoP ). Comparing the di↵erence between valuations and the SI
point dependent on the previous choice shows how a spill-over of mental evidence
influences MSoP mismatches. Simulated choices are between the lottery and the
sure amount at the SI point. In case of lottery choices, the lottery CE sample in-
corporated into the MSoP valuation process is above the SI point. And in case of
sure amount choices, it is below the SI point.
Observing MSoP mismatches at the SI point allows us to separate between
the e↵ects of these two types of mental evidence spill-overs. In the lottery choice
case, the CE sample is above the SI point and the valuation will be biased upwards.
In the opposite case of a sure amount choice, it will be biased downwards.
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To observe the di↵erence, we need to identify MSoP mismatches in the valu-
ations contingent on choices between each lottery and their SI point’s sure amount
at £9.00. The average di↵erence between the valuation and the SI point will be the
remaining mismatch.
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show histograms of P-Bet and $-Bet MSoP mismatches
after choices at the SI point. There is a positive MSoP mismatch for P-Bet and
$-Bet valuations that follow choices at the SI point. If valuations were equal to the
amount that the DM chooses over the lottery 50% of times, their di↵erence to the
SI point would be zero on average. Instead, the average valuation is too high, it
“overshoots” the SI point for the P-Bet (by £0.25) and the $-Bet (by £0.98).
The same figures also show valuations that overshoot the SI point when they
follow sure amount choices. But now they systematically overshoot the SI point in
the other direction, resulting in valuations below the SI point both for the P-Bet
(by £0.36) and the $-Bet (by £0.85).
Figure 4.9: BREUT: MSoP Mismatches of Valuations following Choices at the P-
Bet’s SI Point
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Figure 4.10: BREUT: MSoP Mismatches of Valuations following Choices at the
$-Bet’s SI Point
Deliberation Time and Immediate MSoP Values
An MSoP valuation is treated by the model similarly to a regular valuation, only
with a CE sample that already exists. Since the DM samples from an unbiased
CE distribution, the valuation model predicts that the size of the MSoP mismatch
decreases in deliberation time. Even if it is initially skewed, any increasing mental
CE sample eventually approaches the mean of the underlying CE distribution. So
the valuation model starts o↵ with a CE sample with a positive MSoP mismatch
and this mismatch decreases in deliberation time.
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show violin plots of MSoP mismatches, separated by
lottery type, choice type and sample size. This illustrates the marginal e↵ects of
longer deliberation times on the MSoP mismatch. For larger sample sizes, the
valuation regresses to the mean and the respective MSoP value decreases. For both
lotteries, DMs sometimes stop the process right at the start because the valuation
sample’s coe cient of variation is already su ciently low. But this rate is much
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higher for the P-Bet (at 85%) than for the $-Bet (at 3%).
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4.4.3.2 Later Adjustment of a Sure Amount: MSoP Values and Consistency-
Seeking Behaviour
MSoP valuations that depend on a choice display, only display information that
the choice occurred in the past. So the DM is not aware of any mental evidence
that led to the choice. But despite starting this immediate adjustment task without
prior mental evidence, the sampling process is now subject to consistency-seeking
behaviour. Any mental evidence that is inconsistent with the displayed choice will
be ignored. So for valuations subject to consistency-seeking behaviour, we assume
that DMs start their valuation process without any prior mental evidence but with
a restricted distribution of CE values to sample from.
I.e., knowing that she chose the lottery over a sure amount at the SI point,
the DM only considers lottery CEs above the SI point. Vice versa, all potential
lottery CEs will be below the SI point if she chose the sure amount at the SI point
over the lottery. Similarly to spill-over e↵ects, this leads the valuations to overshoot
the SI point,. This results in a positive MSoP mismatch both for positive as well as
negative adjustments. But since no prior CE is incorporated, the BREUT valuation
process does not start o↵ with a biased CE sample. Instead, the BREUT valuation
process values the lottery within the restricted CE distribution.
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 show violin plots of MSoP mismatches, separated by
lottery type, choice type, and sample size. Because of the restriction of potential
CE values to a plausible range, all resulting valuations overshoot the SI point and
result in a positive MSoP mismatch. Compared to spill-over e↵ects, this predicts a
larger average MSoP mismatch both contingent on lottery choices (P-Bet: £0.45;
$-Bet: £2.85) and on sure amount choices (P-Bet £0.60; $-Bet: £2.74).
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Figure 4.13: BREUT: MSoP Mismatches of Valuations with Cognitive Dissonance
due to Choices at the P-Bet’s SI Point
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Figure 4.14: BREUT: MSoP Mismatches of Valuations with Cognitive Dissonance
due to Choices at the $-Bet’s SI Point
Deliberation Time and Later MSoP Values
For consistency-seeking behaviour, BREUT follows the same dynamics over deliber-
ation times as in the direct valuation case, only that the underlying CE distribution
is truncated. Similar to a valuation process, the DM stops the process earlier for
higher valuations and stops later for lower valuations. And as the DM has no ac-
cess to any previous CE samples, she needs to start o↵ the valuation process with
sampling 2 CE values in order to be able to use the stopping rule.
Figures 4.15 and 4.16 show histograms of P-Bet and $-Bet MSoP mismatches
dependent on displays of choices between the lottery and the sure amount at the
SI point. In all cases, valuations decrease in sample size. But this has a partly
di↵erent e↵ect on the mismatch than in the case of spill-over e↵ects. For positive
adjustments following lottery choices, the MSoP mismatch decreases in sample size
(similar to spill-over e↵ects).
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But for negative adjustments following sure amount choices, the MSoP mis-
match increases in sample size. This is because a valuation process subject to
consistency-seeking behaviour is equivalent to a direct valuation, only that it occurs
within a restricted range. Section 4.3.3.3 already showed that larger samples result
in lower valuations. Since this valuation process only samples from the minimum
CE up to the CE at the SI point, any decrease in valuation will move the average
valuation further from the SI point. Thereby, a greater sample size results in aver-
age MSoPs that become bigger as they are based on valuations further below the SI
point.
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4.5 Comparison to existing Boundedly Rational Valua-
tion Models
4.5.1 Similarities
Choices
All models use a core model that predicts probabilistic choices. While the models
use di↵erent methods for these predictions, they all use parameters where the P-Bet
is stochastically preferred over the $-Bet in choices to predict a preference reversal.
All core models are stochastically transitive while explaining a problem of stochastic
intransitivity.
Valuations
In all models, the processes that use the core models are di↵erent for choices and
valuations. This results in preferences that can be intransitive across these two
elicitation methods. The SP model and the SVM mechanism achieve this by assum-
ing that valuations are made through an iterative choice process while the BREUT
valuation model assumes that valuations are made through sequential sampling of
CE values.
All boundedly rational valuation models discussed in this and the previous
chapter feature a valuation process that converges towards an underlying value until
the stopping rule ends the process. This underlying value also represents a prefer-
ence in choices, and is equal or lower for the $-Bet than for the P-Bet (given the
parameters that predict a preference reversal). But for each model, the valuation
process is built in a way that initial valuations correspond to a preference reversal
early in the process. Early in the process, $-Bet valuations are often higher than
P-Bet valuations. Only if the stopping rule triggers these candidate values to be
reported early enough in the process, will the DM report valuations that are still
higher for the $-Bet than for the P-Bet. But the longer sampling goes on during
the process, the higher the probability that P-Bet valuations become higher than
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$-Bet valuations. Then, a DM will not report valuations that constitute a preference
reversal.
4.5.2 Di↵erences
Valuations
Unlike the existing models, the novel valuation model uses a “full sampling” process
to predict valuations. Instead of adjusting a single CE sample, the model’s DM
continually samples from an underlying distribution of mental evidence.
Also, the novel model predicts that both types of lotteries are overvalued
when compared to their SI points. The preference reversal is predicted because the
size of the overvaluation is larger for the $-Bet than for the P-Bet.
In addition, the sampling approach does not predict that the size of the
adjustment influences the length of the sampling period. Candidate values are
assumed to be continually updated to equal the mean of the CE sample and not to
be changed in steps along the lottery’s range. Therefore, valuing a lottery that was
chosen over £0 for sure does not take longer than valuing a lottery that was chosen
over the sure amount at the SI point. The existing models predict that the size of
the final MSoP corresponds to the duration of the valuation process.
MSoP E↵ects: Spill-Over E↵ects and Consistency-Seeking Behaviour
The novel model also allows the sampling process to be contingent on spill-over ef-
fects and consistency-seeking behaviour (as described in section 4.4). A preference
can spill over from a choice to a subsequent valuation and a↵ect individual valua-
tions, predicting a positive MSoP mismatch. Cognitive dissonance can restrict the
mental evidence that the DM uses for the sampling process, causing consistency-
seeking behaviour. This also results in a positive mismatch. These MSoP mis-
matches are positive both for upward and downward adjustments.
The existing models do not predict a positive MSoP mismatch but a negative
one for both adjustment types. Furthermore, they predict that the starting value of
a valuation process entirely controls the preference reversal. $-Bets are valued higher
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than P-Bets because the starting value of their valuation process is higher. The new
model’s valuation process does not depend on any initially considered candidate
value but instead on prior choices of the DM.
4.5.3 Novel Aspects of the BREUT Valuation Model
The BREUT valuation model’s calculation logic works in a novel way that di↵ers
from the existing models and makes several di↵erent predictions. But as the model
assumes underlying parameters of individual preferences that cannot be measured
directly, these predictions are limited to be qualitative, i.e. they only predict the
direction and not the size of mismatches between choices and valuations.
Still, the predictions demonstrate that an underlying preference distribution
generated by classic “rational” EUT functions can produce several interesting pre-
dictions if assumed to be subject to a boundedly rational decision process.
The model’s novel aspects can be summarised in four categories:
1) Valuation Process
The novel model assumes a “full sampling” valuation process, where the valuation
entirely depends on a CE sample. I.e., a valuation sample is endogenously generated
from the same underlying distribution of CEs that is used for choices.
Despite using an identical CE distribution across procedures, the model pre-
dicts an overvaluation e↵ect compared to the lottery’s SI point. This e↵ect is
stronger for the $-Bet, which can lead to systematic preference reversals: $-Bets
can be placed higher than P-Bets in average valuations despite being preferred less
in choices.
2) Stopping Rule
Existing models already use endogenous stopping rules for valuation processes. A
choice between the valuation and the lottery at each step determines if the valuation
appears to be distinguishable in its subjective utility from the lottery.
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The BREUT valuation model also uses an endogenous stopping rule but it
incorporates information from the entire sample that is used for a valuation. This
stopping rule also allows a longer sampling phase for a lottery that has a larger
variance in underlying CEs.
3) Spill-Over of Mental Evidence
The model demonstrates a mechanism through which mental evidence on the strength
of preference in a choice can be carried over into a subsequent MSoP valuation pro-
cess. The same CE sample that determined the choice is used in building a subse-
quent valuation, quantifying how much one option is preferred over another through
an MSoP valuation.
4) Restriction of Mental Evidence
The model can incorporate cognitive dissonance e↵ects into the valuation process
by restricting the distribution of underlying CE values. As a result, the DM reports
MSoP valuations that show a bias towards being consistent with a specific prior
choice instead of the underlying mean of all prior choices.
4.5.4 Testable Di↵erences to Existing Models
The BREUT valuation model makes several predictions that have a di↵erent direc-
tion than those of existing models. This section details the three main predictions of
the BREUT valuation model that are novel and unique. In short, the model predicts
average lottery valuations above the respective SI points, and a positive MSoP mis-
match but only predicts a weak e↵ect size for the preference reversal phenomenon.
Therefore, before assessing the exact model fit, it is more sensible to test which
models are better at predicting behaviour at a qualitative level. This then gives an
intuition in what ways the model contributes to improving theoretical foundations
for predicting choice-matching discrepancies.
The di↵erences in qualitative predictions are summarised in table 4.5 along
with the RP model as a benchmark for conventional economic theory. If these
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predictions are confirmed in a controlled experiment, then the BREUT valuation
model can be judged to be more accurate in predicting e↵ect directions in the tasks
described throughout this chapter. If not, it is sensible to check in what respect
existing models perform better to decide if any of the models can adequately describe
behaviour in these tasks.
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4.5.4.1 Preference Reversals and SI Points
All models were developed to predict the classic preference reversal, so its pre-
diction does not serve as a distinguishing measure. But they di↵er in how they
predict it in relation to SI points. BREUT valuations of all lotteries are biased
upwards relative to their SI points. But this bias is not the same size for all
lotteries. Valuations of riskier lotteries are overvalued more than those of safer
lotteries. This bias can be become so large that on average the following applies
SI($) < SI(P ) < valuation(P ) < valuation($)7. This constitutes a preference
reversal because the P-Bet is preferred in choices while the $-Bet is preferred in
valuations.
The SP model and SVM mechanism predict that the preference reversal is
generated by undervaluing the P-Bet while overvaluing the $-Bet in relation to their
SI points. These models therefore predict that a median P-Bet valuation will be
below the P-Bet’s SI point and a median $-Bet valuation will be above the $-Bet’s
SI point. But the BREUT valuation model predicts that both lotteries’ median
valuations will be above their respective SI points.
The experiment reported in chapter 5 tests for this by estimating partici-
pants’ SI points as well as eliciting their valuations of the P-Bet and the $-Bet. As
all models do predict the preference reversal, the criterion to determine the supe-
rior model is to estimate the relation between SI points and median valuations at
the individual level. If lotteries are consistently valued higher than their SI points,
existing models are rejected in favour of the BREUT valuation model.
4.5.4.2 MSoP Mismatch
Considering the MSoP Mismatch, it is even simpler to distinguish between predic-
tions of the “Choose and Adjust” models and the BREUT valuation model. These
predictions will cover the simple case of choice and MSoP tasks between a lottery
(P-Bet or $-Bet) and a sure amount. After a choice between the two options, the
7Note that BREUT choices are stochastically transitive. So on average SI($) < SI(P )() $  
P .
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DM adjusts the sure amount through a valuation process until it is equally as at-
tractive as the lottery. The mean di↵erence between the self-consistent MSoP (the
adjustment necessary to make the sure amount equal to the lottery’s SI point) and
the actual MSoP will be defined as an MSoP mismatch.
“Choose and Adjust” models predict that an average MSoP mismatch is
always negative. In contrast, the BREUT valuation model predicts that the MSoP
mismatch is always positive (see subsections 4.4.3.1 and 4.4.3.2). But this mismatch
can be positive for two di↵erent reasons.
First, a spill-over e↵ect from an immediately previous choice between a lot-
tery and a sure amount can influence a subsequent valuation of a lottery in that
choice (comparable to the MSoP setting designed by Butler et al., 2014). In this
case, the mental evidence supporting the choice is also used in the subsequent val-
uation. This evidence must have supported the choice, otherwise the MSoP task
would apply into the other adjustment direction. Therefore, spill-over evidence will
always have a positive e↵ect on the mental sample for an MSoP task.
Second, information about previously having made such a choice can also in-
fluence a subsequent BREUT valuation process (“Choose and Adjust” models do not
apply to this scenario). Consistency-seeking behaviour can restrict the generation of
mental evidence. In that case, mental evidence that is inconsistent with the previous
choice is ignored in the sampling process. Therefore, consistency-seeking behaviour
has a positive e↵ect on MSoP values as “unsupportive” evidence is ignored. This
feature is a potential “add-on” to the model.
The experiment in chapter 5 can determine if this add-on improves predic-
tions. An experimental setting can distinguish between the two MSoP cases by
altering the delay between choice and subsequent MSoP. If an MSoP task follows
right after the respective choice, mental evidence can still be present in a partic-
ipant’s working memory and both spill-over e↵ects as well as consistency-seeking
behaviour are possible. If not, only consistency-seeking behaviour is possible. Since
the e↵ects add on to each other, the BREUT valuation model predicts that MSoP
values are positively biased, and more so in case of MSoP tasks right after the choice.
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The “Choose and Adjust” models therefore predict that an MSoP mismatch
is always negative while the BREUT valuation model predicts that an MSoP mis-
match is always positive. Therefore, the criterion to determine the superior model
is to estimate the average MSoP mismatch. If it is consistently positive, existing
models are rejected in favour of the BREUT valuation model.
There is also an additional opportunity to test the BREUT valuation model
prediction that spill-over e↵ects increase the MSoP mismatch when an MSoP task
follows right after a choice. To determine if the BREUT valuation component of
consistency-seeking behaviour improves predictions, the di↵erence in mismatches
between MSoP tasks right after the choice and MSoP tasks delayed after the choice
need to be estimated. If MSoP mismatches are always positive but higher right after
the choice, incorporating consistency-seeking behaviour into the BREUT valuation
model does lead to better predictions.
4.5.4.3 Overvaluation and Marginal E↵ects of Reaction Times
Few experiments investigated di↵erences between valuations and SI points and it
has not been tested if this is subject to marginal e↵ects of longer deliberation times.
This is especially interesting because all simulated specifications of boundedly ratio-
nal valuation models predict that longer deliberation times reduce the discrepancy
between valuation and SI point.
While “Choose and Adjust” models predict that valuations start o↵ too
low for P-Bets and too high for $-Bets, the BREUT valuation model predicts that
average valuations start o↵ too high for both lotteries. Everything else equal, average
P-Bet valuations in “Choose and Adjust” models then increase with deliberation
time while $-Bet valuations decrease. The BREUT valuation model instead predicts
that lottery valuations of both P-Bets and $-Bets decrease in longer deliberation
times.
But all models do predict that the discrepancy between valuations and SI
points decreases for longer deliberation times. Not only does the extent of over- and
undervaluation decrease, the likelihood of a P-Bet valuation below a $-Bet valuation
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also decreases for longer deliberation times.
Chapter 6 deals with this, using additional reaction time data from the ex-
periment in chapter 5. Even though deliberation times are not directly observable
in experiments, reaction times are (see the section 2.5.1 on reaction times in chap-
ter 2 for a distinction). A necessary assumption to apply this to reaction times in
experiments is that longer deliberation times do lead to longer reaction times in
experiments (when controlling for individual- and task-specific e↵ects). Chapter 6
investigates such reaction time e↵ects for direct valuations.
4.6 Contribution and Discussion
Existing boundedly rational valuation models can predict the classical preference
reversal through an iterative adjustment process of a single mental sample of a
valuation (Johnson and Busemeyer, 2005; Blavatskyy and Ko¨hler, 2009b). But this
process rules out the possibility of mental evidence being influenced by spill-over
e↵ects from a previous evidence-gathering phase or consistency-seeking behaviour.
These models also do not predict the tendency of participants in experiments to
overreport their strength of preference in monetary units (MSoP) as described by
Butler et al. (2014a).
This chapter presented a model of valuation that uses a novel sampling ap-
proach to addresses these weaknesses. The model assumes that DMs sequentially
sample from an underlying distribution of CE values for a valuation. As they stop
accumulating CE samples as soon as the coe cient of variance falls below a thresh-
old of confidence for them, they tend to stop the process earlier for higher valuation
samples. This results in final valuations that are higher than the mean of the under-
lying CE distribution. DMs use the same CE distribution in a sequential sampling
process for choices, as described by the BREUT model (Navarro-Martinez et al.,
2017). Despite using transitive EUT functions for the generation of CE samples,
they overvalue high-variance lotteries more than low-variance lotteries compared to
the lotteries SI points. Thereby, the model predicts a preference reversal even though
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DMs rely on the same underlying distribution of EUT functions to generate mental
evidence for both lottery types. So despite stochastic transitivity in choices and
the same underlying “rational” distribution of mental evidence, the model predicts
violations of procedure invariance.
In addition, the model can incorporate a spill-over of mental evidence from a
choice to a subsequent valuation. This spill-over e↵ect leads to a positive MSoP mis-
match. In this case, longer reaction times are predicted to coincide with decreasing
MSoP mismatches.
Through an extension, the model can also predict cognitive dissonance ef-
fects in the form of consistency-seeking behaviour, where a DM disregards mental
evidence that is dissonant with their previous choice. This consistency-seeking be-
haviour also leads to a positive MSoP mismatch.
Compared to the model developed in chapter 4, existing boundedly rational
valuation models make several fundamentally di↵erent predictions. Existing models
do not predict an overvaluation of all lottery types compared to their SI points,
instead they predict overvaluations of high-variance lotteries and undervaluations of
low-variance lotteries. Existing models also predict negative MSoP mismatches for
positive and negative adjustments of a sure amount after a choice between a lottery
and a sure amount. This provides the case for a controlled experiment to test which
model’s predictions adequately capture behaviour in choice and valuation at the
participant level.
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Chapter 5
How Choice Preference relates
to di↵erent Methods of
Valuation: An Experiment
5.1 Introduction
A central prerequisite of classic economic theory is the estimation of individual
preferences towards risk that determine behaviour. However, elicited preferences are
only meaningful if they do not consistently contradict each other and thereby result
in a reversal of preferences. Classic economic theory assumes procedure invariance,
i.e. on average a participant’s preferences do not change dependent on context
and/or task type. Preference reversals and the MSoP mismatch are examples where
this is not the case. This chapter reports an experiment that tests qualitative
predictions from the models described in chapters 3 and 4. This is done by observing
binary choices, direct valuations, and MSoP valuations.
It is also unclear whether the MSoP mismatch originates from the choice
or the valuation aspect of the MSoP task. To test this, the experiment contrasts
choices, valuations, and mixes of both. First, choices, valuations, and their mixes
are constructed in a way that makes the elicited preferences comparable between
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tasks. Second, an MSoP task, a “mix” of choice and valuation, is contrasted with
a di↵erent version where participants need to estimate their preference given infor-
mation for one of their past choices. This eliminates the “choice part” of the task
while preserving the contingency of the valuation on a choice. What remains is the
valuation task as well as any e↵ect that the displayed information might have on the
participant’s behaviour. This potential e↵ect is assumed to be cognitive dissonance,
which results in consistency-seeking behaviour.
In addition, choices are designed in a way to test how a valuation might be
influenced by a particular sure amount on which it is contingent. E.g., an MSoP
task involving a lottery and a sure amount of £0 implies a lower bound that is
smaller than in an MSoP task between the same lottery and a sure amount of £5
as it leaves more “room” for di↵erent valuations. Vice versa for a sure amount that
is equal to the maximum payo↵ versus a sure amount lower than this maximum.
The experiment’s results replicate the preference reversal as well as a positive
mismatch in MSoP values for positive adjustments. However, participants do not
show a significant di↵erence in valuations between the MSoP task and its degenerate
version without a previous choice. This suggests that the MSoP mismatch stems
from consistency-seeking behaviour. However, the MSoP mismatch is negative for
negative adjustments. Altogether, these results are incompatible with existing the-
ory.
The chapter is organised as follows: After an explanation of the theoretical
background, a description of the experimental design follows in Section 5.2. Section
5.3 summarises the hypotheses that are tested, section 5.4 presents experimental
results, and Section 5.5 concludes with a discussion.
5.1.1 Theoretical Background
In order to understand the experimental procedure, it is helpful to first understand
the baseline case where all preference elicitations are consistent with each other. See
figure 5.1 for an illustration of P-Bet and $-Bet CE elicitations in three di↵erent
procedures: A) By inferring an SI point, B) through direct valuation, C) through
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an MSoP Task.
A) Shows a typical observation of choice probabilities between P-Bet/$-Bet
lotteries against di↵erent sure amounts. Following Mosteller and Nogee (1951), the
lottery choice probability decreases in choices against higher sure amounts. While
the lottery is always chosen over £0, at the SI point the lottery choice probability
is 50% for some sure amount.
B) Displays a consistent di↵erence in CE values: the P-Bet is valued higher
than the $-Bet. Valuations are possible along the lotteries’ ranges, with the $-Bet’s
range being larger (not to scale in the figure). In addition, the di↵erence in CEs
quantifies the di↵erence in attractiveness to the participant. The SI points from A)
suggest CE di↵erences in choices that reflect a preference for the P-Bet and this
di↵erence is also generated in the valuation procedure B).
C) Shows a hypothetical response of a DM who had chosen the lottery over a
sure amount x and was prompted for an MSoP. If her preferences would be consistent
across procedures, she would value the lottery in the MSoP task to equal the sure
amount at the SI point. Then, her MSoP added to x would equal the SI point’s
sure amount, with x+MSoP = SI. This CE di↵erence is a strength of preference
in monetary terms, the MSoP value.
In the figure, she states MSoP values consistent with procedure A) for both
lotteries. E.g., for the P-Bet her valuation reaches the SI point with xP +MSoP =
yP = SIP . If yP were consistently larger than her SIP , the DM’s MSoP values
would show a positive mismatch for the P-Bet. MSoP values are also consistent
with procedure B) as the P-Bet is again valued higher than the $-Bet.
Participants that only state their MSoP between two lotteries without stat-
ing the respective CEs, still respond to something logically similar to a valuation
task. Instead of reporting two valuations of two options, they only report a sin-
gle valuation di↵erence between the options. Therefore, any MSoP task is also a
preference elicitation procedure. Figure 5.1 constructs an example where di↵erent
procedures generate the same CE values.
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But the preference reversal as well as the MSoP mismatch show that this is
not always the case. Still, it is not clear where these inconsistencies stem from. The
question remains if eliciting a CE value in one procedure might a↵ect the elicited
CE value in another procedure. E.g., if a choice task (procedure A) is immediately
followed by an MSoP task (procedure C). While the MSoP mismatch might stem
from the valuation procedure alone, it is not possible to rule out its connection to a
previous choice as a causal factor.
Figure 5.1: Three di↵erent methods to elicit P-Bet/$-Bet Certainty Equivalents
(not to scale)
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5.1.1.1 Preference Reversals
Chapter 4 already gives the qualitative prediction of an inconsistency between
choices (procedure A) and valuations (procedure B). The BREUT valuation model
predicts that a majority of valuations is higher than the SI point of a lottery.
5.1.1.2 Spill-Over E↵ects
The BREUT valuation model predicts that incorporating mental evidence from a
choice phase into an MSoP valuation leads to a positive mismatch in the stated
MSoP. Even if the MSoP valuation is not entirely based on the pre-existing mental
evidence base, it is possible that it does cause a mismatch in an otherwise unbiased
valuation. In the example of procedure C) in figure 5.1, this means that the DM
will on average state a too high MSoP value that overshoots the SI point (xP +
MSoPMismatch = yMismatchP > SIP ).
Furthermore, this positive mismatch in MSoP values will go into both direc-
tions. If a participant finds a lottery less attractive than on average, a valuation
based on this mental evidence base will be biased towards a lower than average value.
This will be reflected in the MSoP, which now quantifies a downward adjustment
of the sure amount. So if the DM now adjusts downwards too much, the MSoP
value also shows a positive mismatch. In both cases, due to the spill-over of mental
evidence from choice to MSoP process, adjustments result in too high MSoP values
and overshoot the SI point. Butler et al.’s (2014a) experiment was only designed
to test for positive MSoP because it only allowed positive adjustments of a rejected
option. Therefore, it remains unclear if MSoPs overshooting the SI point result from
the valuation process, which overvalues lotteries’ valuations compared to their SI
points, or from spill-overs of mental evidence.
We assume that this spill-over e↵ect can only exist in MSoP tasks that occur
straight after a choice. So as soon as DMs are not aware of the choice process
anymore, they will not be able to access their mental evidence anymore. It follows
that the spill-over e↵ect will disappear as soon as the MSoP task is su ciently
delayed in time from the respective choice. However, participants might still be
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influenced; not by a spill-over of mental evidence but just by being aware that they
made a certain choice in the past.
5.1.1.3 Consistency-Seeking Behaviour
BREUT can also incorporate consistency-seeking behaviour into its predictions, also
predicting a positive MSoP mismatch. Unlike with spill-overs of mental evidence,
we cannot assume that an MSoP mismatch resulting from consistency-seeking be-
haviour disappears as soon as a participant is not aware of their choice anymore.
If a participant has forgotten their choice but then sees the display of an MSoP
task, she will be reminded of her past choice. The BREUT valuation model with
consistency-seeking behaviour predicts that she will take this choice at face value
and then base her reasoning on the fact that her preference supported that choice.
Therefore, consistency-seeking behaviour cannot be removed from MSoP tasks.
But it would be possible to compare MSoP tasks immediately after choices
to delayed MSoP tasks that are contingent on the same choices in the past. Thereby,
we can distinguish if the MSoP mismatch originates from the choice or the valuation
aspect of the MSoP task. An MSoP task using an immediate adjustment can be
compared with a version where the participant needs to estimate her preference given
one of her past choices in an MSoP task using a delayed adjustment. This rules out
an influence of the choice process on the MSoP valuation but keeps the influence of
the choice display. So there is only a valuation process influencing the MSoP task
along with the potential e↵ect of the choice display. This e↵ect is assumed to be
consistency-seeking behaviour. Section 5.3.3 explains how hypotheses distinguish
between consistency-seeking behaviour and spill-over e↵ects.
5.2 Experimental Design
The experiment used 4 di↵erent types of tasks that all generated information on a
participant’s CE, albeit through di↵erent procedures. In Task 1: the SI Task, CE
values were generated by presenting repeated tasks between a lottery and various
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sure amounts and inferring which theoretical sure amount would be preferred by the
participant in 50% of the repetitions. This provides individual-specific SI points.
In Task 2: the IA Task, participants were prompted right after a SI Task choice
to adjust the o↵ered sure amount with a slider until they found it to be equally as
attractive as the lottery, resulting in a CE. Task 3: the LA Task, instead featured
the display of one of the participant’s past choices between the lottery and a sure
amount, also prompting them to adjust the sure amount towards a CE that they
found to be equally as attractive as the lottery. In Task 4: theDV Task, participants
were presented with a standard valuation task where they had to select their CE for
the lottery on a slider.
The experiment was conducted using computers in the Behavioural Science
Laboratory at Warwick Business School, UK. 77 students from the SONA subject
pool of the University of Warwick completed the experiment. Three participants
showed non-compliance with the incentivisation procedure by stating a valuation
close to the possible maximum in almost all cases and their data was excluded (see
Appendix Section A.2 for exclusion criteria). This leaves data from 74 participants
for the analysis.
Including distractor tasks and attention checks, the experiment featured 300
tasks for each participant, divided into two parts. Both parts included an intro-
duction and were separated by a questionnaire comprised of the health&safety and
social dimension of the revised domain-specific risk taking scale by Blais and Weber
(2006). Task types were referred to in a colour-coded header to ensure that par-
ticipants were able to distinguish between task types. The respective colour was
randomly determined for each participant by the computer program that displayed
the tasks. Part 1 featured 204 trials with task types SI, DV , and IA while Part 2
featured 96 trials with task types SI, DV , and LA.
The task order was randomised but restricted by several conditions: I) SI
Task trials featuring the main lottery parameters (not distractors) were only dis-
played in Part 1; II) IA Task trials were only displayed in Part 1; III) LA Task trials
were only displayed in Part 2, as they were dependent on SI Task trials and to avoid
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confusion with IA Task; IV) To avoid awareness of past responses by participants,
any main lottery needed to be followed by at least two distractor lotteries before it
was featured again in a task.
Because of this, the trial order was not fully random but this served three pur-
poses: First, participants would not complete tasks with identical lotteries straight
after another, which might lead to interference in responses. Second, participants
were less prone to misunderstanding if displayed options in IA and LA Tasks were
from an immediately previous choice or a past choice. Third, LA Task choice dis-
plays were administered based on all the participant’s data on past choices, thereby
including all SI Task data from the main lotteries.
5.2.1 Task 1: CESI through Choices
The choice part of the experiment involved binary choices between a lottery and a
sure amount (see figure 5.2). Two monetary lotteries were used as P-Bet and $-
Bet1: a 80% chance of winning £12 and a 25% chance of winning £50, respectively.
Participants chose between playing out the P-Bet and a number of di↵erent sure
amounts with equal parts either only facing even {0; 2; 4; ...; 10} or odd {0; 3; 5; ...; 11}
numbers (but both times including zero). Similarly, the $-Bet was displayed along
the same sure amounts.
A binary choice between the P-Bet and the $-Bet was also added to allow an
estimate of the participant’s preference in direct choices between the two. All trials
but the single choices against £0 were repeated 5 times, thereby generating data
on 57 binary choices for each participant. From this data, an SI point is inferred
at which each specific participant would show a 50% probability between choosing
the lottery and the sure amount. This sure amount need not be featured in actual
choices but might also lie between two sure amounts, e.g. £6.5 for the P-Bet. This
is the CE elicited through the SI Point, CESI .
CESI can be inferred by logistic regression or by counting the absolute num-
ber of lottery choices as a proxy for the SI point along the range of sure amounts.
1The preference reversal phenomenon was already established for these parameters by Loomes
and Pogrebna (2016).
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Figure 5.2: Straight Choice in the SI Task (Task 1)
Since a logistic regression needs to be fitted for each participant and is more sus-
ceptible to noise, the counting method was used, following Loomes and Pogrebna
(2016):
If, e.g., a lottery was chosen over sure amounts {2; 4; 6; 8; 10} 10 out of 25
times, the cut-o↵ point will be inferred to be “ten steps” towards the highest sure
amount at £10. The steps are determined by dividing the range from the mini-
mum to the maximum sure amount by the total number of choices, in this case
25. Regardless of the precise sure amounts over which the lottery was preferred,
these steps are added to the lowest amount, resulting in an inferred SI point of
£2 + (£10-£2)*10/25 = £5.20.
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5.2.2 Task 2: CEIA through Adjustment Tasks following Choices
On some occasions, an adjustment task (IA Task, see figure 5.3) was added on to a
choice task (SI Task). Participants were prompted right after their binary choice to
adjust the sure amount so that they find it equally as attractive as the lottery. This
adjustment provides another CE through an immediate adjustment of a sure amount
CEIA, that can be compared to CESI . In combination with the sure amount of the
binary choice it also provides an MSoP value: |CEIA SureAmount| =MSoP . In
order to be consistent with their choice, a participant will need to decrease the sure
amount after having chosen it or increase it if they had instead chosen the lottery.
Note that the adjustment is di↵erent to the design of Butler et al. (2014a),
where participants needed to only state positive adjustments to all outcomes of the
rejected option. This money amount was their MSoP that made both choices equally
as attractive to them. Their design did not always allow for the calculation of a
CE that logically followed from the task: In the case of a binary choice between
two lotteries, both the preferred and the improved lottery would still involve risky
payo↵s. In addition, there is a risk that participants only focussed their attention
on one of the payo↵s when stating their MSoP. The design of this experiment avoids
these issues because it generates a clearly displayed CE with each task that is also
visible to participants as they give their responses.
In addition, participants had the option to state a CE that logically contra-
dicts their past choice, thereby showing that they changed their preference. E.g., if a
participant has chosen £6 over the P-Bet but has changed their preference, they can
reconsider their choice and state a CE above £6 by adjusting the sure amount again.
This logically contradicts their past choice since a CE of more than £6 implies that
they do prefer the P-Bet over £6.
Adjustment tasks were randomly predetermined for two out of five repeti-
tions. Therefore, 2 repetitions of the binary choice SI tasks between a specific
lottery and a specific sure amount were followed by an IA task. Note that in figure
5.3, information about a chosen option is displayed. This option is the immediately
previous choice. As soon as the bar was clicked, a slider appeared and was being
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moved with the cursor while the sure amount was changed to the respective slider
value.
Figure 5.3: Immediate Adjustment in the IA Task (Task 2)
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5.2.3 Task 3: CELA through Adjustment Tasks following Choice
Displays
After the binary choice trials were completed in Part 1, the program identified for
which of the binary choices the participant did not show a 100% preference. Since
each trial is repeated 5 times, there is always either a minority and majority choice
in those cases.
In Part 2, the IA task (Task 2) was replaced by a LA task (Task 3), which
instead featured a later adjustment. Participants saw a display of one of their
past minority choices for each of the trials with no “unanimous” preference. They
were then prompted to state their MSoP of that specific choice. As in the IA Task,
participants had the option to state a CE that logically contradicts their past choice.
No information was given to the participant whether or not the past choice
was atypical, e.g. 1 out of 5 times. So no problem of deception arose when showing
a choice that was inconsistent with the participant’s average preference.
The same was repeated for all majority choices, including unanimous major-
ity choices. Therefore, the number of trials of IA Tasks lies between the maximum
of 22 (no choice repetitions show unanimous preference) and the minimum of 12
(all choice repetitions show unanimous preference, therefore 12 majority choice dis-
plays). If the display of a trial was prevented because of a lack of a minority choice,
a distractor task was displayed instead.
As in the IA Task, the CE value in combination with the sure amount
provides an MSoP but through a later adjustment, |CELA SureAmount| =MSoP .
This design allows us to discern between adjustments in which participants still were
aware of their previous choice (IA Task) and adjustments in which participants only
have information about one of their past choices (LA Task). LA Tasks thereby rule
out any spill-over e↵ects.
Note that in the LA Task, shown in figure 5.4, information about only a
single choice is displayed. This information does depend on a previous choice, but
unlike in the IA Task, the adjustment prompt does not immediately follow the
choice. As soon as the slider is being moved, the sure amount is changed to the
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respective slider value.
Figure 5.4: Later Adjustment (of a past sure amount) in the IA Task (Task 3)
5.2.4 Task 4: CEDV through Direct Valuations
Task 4, the DV Task, involved standard CE elicitations for both the P-Bet and the
$-Bet. These tasks were repeated 5 times, totalling 10 valuation tasks. The repeti-
tion of valuations is not only necessary to achieve a better estimate of a participant’s
average valuation but also to allow an estimation of the valuations’ variance. Par-
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ticipants were prompted to choose a sure amount that they perceived to be equally
as attractive as the lottery. This is the classic CE through direct valuation, CEDV .
Note that in theDV Task, shown in figure 5.5, no information about previous
choices is displayed. Participants only stated their preference by moving the slider.
As soon as the slider was moved, the respective amount would appear in the second
box instead of the question mark. Apart from this, the DV Task does not di↵er
from the IA or LA Task. This is a deliberate design so all tasks appear as similar
as possible.
Figure 5.5: Direct Valuation in DV Task (Task 4)
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5.3 Predictions
Based on the simulation results in chapters 3 and 4, the experiment’s data allows us
to test a number of qualitative predictions. First, we test whether we can replicate
a classic preference reversal and if this preference reversal also systematically occurs
when using participants’ SI points instead of direct choices between P-Bet and $-
Bet. Second, we test whether the positive MSoP mismatch can be replicated for
adjustments of sure amounts. Third, we test whether MSoP mismatches can be
attributed to spill-over e↵ects, consistency-seeking behaviour, or both.
Given the variability in preferences across participants, all generated vari-
ables will be tested on a within-individual basis and on accumulated information,
i.e. means and medians, whenever possible. Since violations of procedure invariance
are of interest in this experiment, within-individual data is compared across tasks.
The preference reversal occurs when comparing choice tasks with valuation
tasks, therefore involving a between-task comparison of within-individual data, i.e
the average preference in choices vs. median preference in valuations. Data on
MSoP mismatches is generated by a between-task comparison of individual data as
well: the valuation from an MSoP task is compared to the participant’s SI point.
And for comparing MSoP mismatches across trials, the extent of di↵erences between
participants’ MSoP and SI points are compared between IA and LA Tasks.
5.3.1 Preference Reversal Replication
The experiment presupposes the classic preference reversal of preferring the P-Bet
over the $-Bet in direct choices while also valuing it lower than the $-Bet in direct
valuations (CEDV from the DV Task) to establish that we are replicating the classic
phenomenon. This reversal is also related to the SI points of each participant in the
experiment.
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5.3.1.1 Measures of Central Tendency
The predicted choices are probabilistic and an experiment can only feature a limited
number of choices. Therefore, some participants might choose a P-Bet over a $-Bet
more often in the experiment even though they prefer the $-Bet on average. If
their valuations then reflect their underlying preference for the $-Bet, this would
result in a false positive for a preference reversal. It follows that we can only judge
the likelihood of a preference reversal from the experimental data. But we predict
that the results of Bostic et al. (1990) in the likelihood of preference reversals will
be replicated. I.e., the likelihood of a preference reversal is higher when comparing
reversals from direct choices to valuations than when comparing reversals from direct
choices to SI points. In order to reduce noise in the analysis, we will compare the
average preference in choices, i.e. the majority choice for either lottery, the median
valuation, and the SI point separately for each participant.
Hypothesis 1:
Preference Reversals are more likely when comparing median CEDV (DV Task
Valuations) to average choice preference than when comparing CESI (SI Task SI
points) to average choice preference.
5.3.2 MSoP Mismatch Replication
We will test if we replicate Butler et al.’s (2014a) findings for MSoP values following
choices between lotteries and sure amounts. I.e., that participants’ adjustments
of sure amounts towards their SI points overshoot the SI point on average. This
constitutes a positive MSoP mismatch. This means that for the average participant
i, CEIA,i will be larger (smaller) than CESI,i following sure amounts smaller (larger)
than CESI,i.
We predict that both spill-over and consistency-seeking behaviour e↵ects
exist, resulting in a positive MSoP mismatch in IA Tasks (CEIA) and LA Tasks
(CELA).
Hypothesis 2:
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(CEIA   CESI)i > 0 for sure amount < CESI,i
and
(CEIA   CESI)i < 0 for sure amount > CESI,i
Hypothesis 3:
(CELA   CESI)i > 0 for sure amount < CESI,i
and
(CELA   CESI)i < 0 for sure amount > CESI,i
Note that hypothesis 3 only implies consistency-seeking behaviour, which
results in a positive MSoP mismatch.
As explained in Section 5.1.1, consistency-seeking behaviour will have a sim-
ilarly positive e↵ect on MSoP as spill-over e↵ects, only that it will occur in both
immediate as well as delayed adjustment tasks. So if hypotheses 2 and/or 3 are
rejected, consistency-seeking behaviour is ruled out as well.
5.3.3 Separating Spill-over E↵ects and Consistency-Seeking Be-
haviour by comparing between IA and LA Tasks (Tasks 2
and 4)
If hypotheses 2 and 3 are both true, the possibility still remains that spill-over e↵ects
do not exist and only consistency-seeking behaviour causes MSoP mismatches. The
LA Task, which elicits CELA, is isolated from the previous choice over the lottery-
sure amount pair. So the participant will not be influenced in their valuation by a
readily available sample of mental evidence. If spill-over e↵ects do exist, this mental
sample will be available in the IA Task, which elicits CEIA. If spill-over e↵ects
cause a mismatch in CEIA values, the same mismatch will not be present in CELA
values. Therefore, we assume that spill-over e↵ects are only possible in an IA Task
but not in a LA Task while e↵ects from consistency-seeking behaviour occur in both.
As both e↵ects positively influence the MSoP mismatch but are only both
present in the IA Task, MSoP values in IA Tasks should show a stronger mismatch
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than in LA Tasks. Therefore, we predict that the (positive) MSoP mismatch is
larger in IA Tasks than in LA Tasks.
Hypothesis 4:
(CEIA   CESI)i > (CELA   CESI)i > 0
for sure amount < CESI,i
and
(CEIA   CESI)i < (CELA   CESI)i < 0
for sure amount > CESI,i
The combination of possible hypotheses o↵ers a number of di↵erent interpre-
tations based on the data. Some evidence from previous experiments already exists.
Hypothesis 1 has already been established in the literature: The classic preference
reversal phenomenon exists and is stronger between choices and valuations than
between SI points and valuations (Bostic et al., 1990). Evidence for Hypothesis 2
has been documented by Butler et al. (2014a) for positive adjustments of a lottery’s
payo↵s.
If no evidence in support of hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 is found, neither spill-over
e↵ects nor e↵ects from consistency-seeking behaviour exist in measurable strength
because no MSoP mismatch is found at all. But if an MSoP mismatch does exist,
this mismatch could then be attributed either to spill-over e↵ects or consistency-
seeking behaviour. If the MSoP mismatch only exists in the IA Task (Hypothesis
2 only), only spill-over e↵ects can be causal to the MSoP mismatch. If the MSoP
mismatch has the same strength in IA and LA Tasks, only consistency-seeking
behaviour can be causal to the MSoP mismatch (Hypothesis 2 and 3, but not 4).
And if the MSoP mismatch exists across IA and LA Tasks but is strongest in IA
Tasks, both spill-over e↵ects as well as consistency-seeking behaviour are causal to
the MSoP mismatch (Hypothesis 2, 3, and 4).
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5.4 Results
5.4.1 Preference Reversals
As observed in the literature, average preferences switch from the P-Bet in choices
to the $-Bet in valuations. 70% of participants chose the P-Bet over the $-Bet in a
direct binary choice in the majority of cases. But 81% of participants’ median DV
Task valuations for the $-Bet were higher than those for the P-Bet2, documenting
the classic preference reversal.
Table 5.1 compares SI points (CESI from SI Tasks) to direct choices be-
tween lotteries. Table 5.2 compares medians of the direct valuations (CEDV from
DV Tasks) to these choices. Both comparisons show a number of preference rever-
sals from preferring the P-Bet in direct choices to preferring the $-Bet in inferred
CEs. These occur in 12% of cases, when using SI Tasks. But in case of DV Task
valuations, these are much more frequent: 53% of cases and 25 percentage points
of the increase are due to participants that unanimously prefer the P-Bet in direct
choices. Table 5.3 lists these observations. Comparing the likelihood of a prefer-
ence reversal with a simple binomial test, H0 of equal probabilities of a preference
reversal across SI and DV Tasks is rejected with p<0.001 in favour of hypothesis
1.
By comparing direct choices from SI Tasks with CEDV values from DV
Tasks, we established that 39 out of 74 participants showed the classic preference
reversal. SI points for the P-Bet (mean = £7.07, median = £7.16, sd. = 1.51)
and the $-Bet (mean = £7.00, median = £7.16, sd. = 1.63) do not statistically
significantly di↵er (Wilcoxon signed rank test: V=17; p=0.21). But Valuation
medians of participants in DV Tasks do statistically significantly di↵er between the
P-Bet (mean = £8.08, median = £8.60, sd. = 1.68) and the $-Bet (mean = £15.87,
median = £13.70, sd. = 9.04), according to a Wilcoxon signed rank test (V=2,555;
p<0.001).
Note that 64.9% of participants show a unanimous preferences in repeated
2H0 of similar probabilities of preferring the P-Bet is rejected by a binomial test with p < 0.001.
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Table 5.1: Cross Tabulation of Preference through Direct Choice (SI Tasks) and SI
Points (SI Tasks)
Di↵erence in CE Values inferred from Choices (SI Task)
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et CESI(P )>CESI($) CESI(P ) = CESI($) CESI(P )<CESI($) count
5P / 0$ 30 1 2 33
4P / 1$ 5 4 5 14
3P / 2$ 3 0 2 5
2P / 3$ 0 0 4 4
1P / 4$ 0 0 3 3
0P / 5$ 0 1 14 15
count 38 6 30 74
Preference reversals shaded in red. Consistent preference relations shaded in green.
P vs. $ choices (44.5% for the P-Bet and 18.9% for the $-Bet). But only 35%
of participants have a unanimous choice preference that is both reflected in direct
choices as well as SI points. This is similar to the results observed by Bostic et al.
(1990) and Butler and Loomes (2007).
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Table 5.2: Cross Tabulation of Preference through Direct Choice (SI Tasks) and
Direct Valuation (DV Tasks)
Di↵erence in median CE Values (DV Task)
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med(CEDV (P )) med(CEDV (P )) med(CEDV (P )) count
> med(CEDV ($)) = med(CEDV ($)) < med(CEDV ($))
5P / 0$ 11 2 20 33
4P / 1$ 0 0 14 14
3P / 2$ 0 0 5 5
2P / 3$ 0 0 4 4
1P / 4$ 0 0 3 3
0P / 5$ 0 0 15 15
count 11 2 61 74
Preference reversals shaded in red. Consistent preference relations shaded in green.
Table 5.3: Cross-Tabulation of Preference Reversals between direct Choices and SI
points (SI Tasks) vs. direct Choices and Valuations (DV Tasks)
CE Elicitation Method
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E SI Task: SI Point DV Task: Direct Valuation count
P ! $ 9 39 48
$! P 0 0 0
count 9 39 48
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5.4.2 MSoP Mismatches
5.4.2.1 IA Tasks: Choose&Adjust
Average valuations in IA Tasks also exceed the SI points of both lotteries (see figure
5.8). This already shows that any aggregate MSoP mismatch is not negative. But
this data does not take into account the individual level. As participants di↵er in
their SI points, we will need to compare their valuations from IA Tasks to their
individual SI points. Comparing CEIA values to CESI SI points from SI Tasks
then allows us to identify MSoP mismatches.
If a participant has an SI point CESI of £10 for a lottery and has rejected a
sure amount of £2 in favour of the lottery in the SI Task, the participants’ choices
would suggest that the participant values the lottery £8 higher than the sure amount
on average. This can be checked by comparing the CEIA values from IA Tasks to
the same participant’s SI point. If the example shows on average CEIA > CESI ,
the participant will have a positive MSoP mismatch.
But adjustments can also be negative, when a participant has chosen a sure
amount over a lottery. If in that case on average CEIA > CESI , the participant
shows a negative MSoP mismatch since the adjustment is not large enough for the
sure amount to be equal to the participant’s SI point.
To make these values comparable, we will need to measure the “excess”
MSoP. I.e., how much a participant’s CEIA value overshoots their respective CESI
value, contingent on the participant’s adjustment being positive or negative. There-
fore, a consistently positive excess in MSoP is equivalent to a positive MSoP mis-
match and a consistently negative excess MSoP in equivalent to a negative MSoP
mismatch.
See figures 5.6 and 5.7 for box plots of the di↵erences in participants’ mean
di↵erence between SI points and MSoP values for the P-Bet and the $-Bet, separated
by upward and downward adjustments as well as IA and LA Task types. Similarly
for the P-Bet as well as the $-Bet, these values di↵er in their sign dependent on
the direction of the adjustment. Sure amounts are consistently adjusted upwards
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too strongly and adjusted downwards too weakly to be consistent with the SI point.
While the majority of positive adjustments overshoots the SI point, the majority of
negative adjustments undershoots it.
For both lotteries, this results in a positive MSoP mismatch for positive ad-
justments and in a negative MSoP mismatch for negative adjustments. Mismatches
in all four cases are highly significant. A Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects H0
of no MSoP mismatch in the positive adjustment (P-Bet: V=84,475; p<0.001; $-
Bet: V=105,340; p<0.001) and in the negative adjustment case (P-Bet: V=6,802;
p<0.001; $-Bet: V=5604.5; p<0.001)3.
Since MSoP mismatches are positive for upward adjustments, the data can-
not reject the corresponding null hypothesis to hypothesis 2, finding no evidence for
an MSoP mismatch that is always positive. However, the MSoP mismatch is repli-
cated for positive adjustments and a previously unknown negative MSoP mismatch
is found for negative adjustments.
This data replicates the positive MSoP mismatch documented in upward
lottery adjustments by Butler et al. (2014a) for sure amounts. As Butler et al. only
measured positive adjustments in lotteries, it remains unclear if negative lottery
adjustments also result in a negative MSoP mismatch.
3Note that a particularly high Wilcoxon test statistic can occur with higher sample sizes because
a test statistic that rejects H0 rises exponentially in sample size (Agresti, 2003; p.301). The
experiment features 2 main lotteries, 5 non-zero sure amounts, and 2 adjustments per lottery/non-
zero sure amount pair. Given 74 participants, this produces 1,480 MSoP observations, which makes
such high test statistics more likely.
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Figure 5.6: IA and LA Tasks: Box plots of excess MSoP values for the P-Bet
Figure 5.7: IA and LA Tasks: Box plots of excess MSoP values for the $-Bet
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5.4.2.2 LA Tasks: Choose&Adjust
With the same method, we can also calculate possible MSoP mismatches in CELA
in LA Tasks, also displayed in the box plots in figures 5.6 and 5.7. As in IA
Tasks, the same pattern of a positive MSoP mismatch for upward adjustments
and a negative MSoP mismatch for downward adjustments emerges. Again, all
mismatches are highly significant and a Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects H0 of
no MSoP mismatch in the positive adjustment (P-Bet: V=28,588; p<0.001; $-
Bet: V=28,662; p<0.001) and in the negative adjustment case (P-Bet: V=2,166;
p<0.001; $-Bet: V=3,574; p<0.001). Similar to IA Tasks, the data cannot reject
the corresponding null hypothesis to hypothesis 3. Therefore, evidence for MSoP
mismatches does exist but it does not support the exact specification of hypothesis
3.
5.4.2.3 Possible Anchoring E↵ects and SI Point E↵ects
In the experiment, IA Tasks display a variety of starting values to be adjusted by
participants for a valuation. Since a specific sure amount is displayed just before
a participant’s valuation and was also featured in a choice process, it might be
possible that this sure amount serves as an anchor in the subsequent valuation
process. A su ciently high anchor might then cause valuations to be too high.
For upward adjustments, this would mean that valuations are consistently too high
and overshoot the SI point, resulting in a positive MSoP mismatch. Similarly for
downward adjustments, valuations would undershoot and not be low enough to
match the SI point, resulting in a negative MSoP mismatch.
While the pattern of MSoP mismatches is the same, there is only limited
evidence for anchoring e↵ects (see figure 5.8, with bars denoting 95% confidence
intervals). If an anchoring e↵ect exists that prevents valuations from reaching the
SI point, these valuations should on average appear between the SI point and sure
amount that needed to be adjusted. But a large majority of CEIA valuations that
were elicited in the experiment are above the SI point (shown by the dotted lines in
the figure) even though initial sure amounts were below it.
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Figure 5.8: IA Task: Mean Valuations dependent on o↵ered Sure Amount
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There is a highly statistically significant anchoring e↵ect of starting values on
P-Bet valuations but it is not su ciently strong to explain the MSoP mismatches.
If MSoP mismatches result from this e↵ect, average valuations should be below the
SI point for sure amounts below the SI point.
A linear regression does report an increase of the dependent variable valua-
tion of £0.17 with a £1 increase in the independent starting value sure amount.
In the case of the P-Bet, the regression has an intercept at £7.13, already above the
P-Bet’s average SI point of £7.07 (See table 5.4). Any valuation for any starting
value is therefore an overvaluation relative to the P-Bet’s SI point. Therefore, if a
starting value for the P-Bet is £1 closer to the participant’s SI point, final valua-
tions increase by £0.17 in the model. But this means that only sure amounts below
zero could result in subsequent positive adjustments that undershoot the SI point.
Consequently, if an anchoring e↵ect exists in IA Tasks for the P-Bet, the positive
MSoP mismatch would exist even without the anchor.
Similarly, $-Bets are always overvalued in relation to the SI point of £7.00
since the lowest predicted valuation is at £14.69 for a starting value of £0 (See table
5.5). The anchoring e↵ect of starting values on $-Bet valuations is even weaker. For
a £1 increase in the starting value sure amount, the dependent variable valua-
tion only increases by £0.01 and this e↵ect does not reach statistical significance.
Therefore, we cannot reject H0 and conclude that there is no su cient evidence for
anchoring e↵ects on $-Bet valuations in IA Tasks.
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Table 5.4: Linear regression model of sure amounts on final P-Bet valuations in IA
Tasks
Table 5.5: Linear regression model of sure amounts on final $-Bet valuations in IA
Tasks
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5.4.3 Spill-over E↵ects and Consistency-Seeking Behaviour
5.4.3.1 Comparison of IA and LA Tasks
Valuations in LA Tasks are not immediately preceded by a choice between the
displayed lottery and starting value. The fact that MSoP mismatches were detected
in CELA values in LA Tasks shows that spill-over e↵ects from a preceding choice
cannot be the sole driver of these mismatches.
Any di↵erence in MSoP mismatches between IA and LA Tasks can only be
explained by the di↵erence between the nature of the task. This di↵erence is the
length of delay between choice and adjustment, resulting in the possibility of spill-
over e↵ects in the IA Task. So we assume that any di↵erence in MSoP mismatches
between these task types exists because of a spill-over of mental evidence. If there is
no di↵erence, we will reject the conclusion that a spill-over of mental evidence causes
MSoP mismatches. Since anchoring e↵ects cannot explain MSoP mismatches either,
this would then leave consistency-seeking behaviour as the remaining explanation for
MSoP mismatches without altering the assumptions made for a sequential sampling
process of accumulating mental evidence.
The number of MSoP observations in LA Tasks di↵ers across participants.
For participants who showed a unanimous preference towards a sure amount / lot-
tery pair, the display of a minority choice was not possible and a distractor task
was displayed instead. Therefore, weighing all MSoP observations the same for a
comparison would overcount observations from participants with higher variance in
their choices. The same applies to only comparing IA Tasks to LA Tasks where
sure amount / lottery pairs and participants were the same.
MSoP observations in IA Tasks are unbalanced as well. Since only 2 out of 5
binary choices were randomly followed by an IA Task, only a minority of MSoP data
covered both positive IA Task adjustments as well as negative IA Task adjustments
for the same sure amount / lottery pair for the same participant.
Section 5.4.2 also shows that a di↵erence exists between MSoP mismatches
depending on the direction of adjustment. Not accounting for an uneven occurrence
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of positive / negative adjustments could then attribute any di↵erence between IA
Tasks and LA Tasks to the direction of adjustment and not the task.
Therefore, we compare within-individual mean MSoP mismatches separately
for positive and negative adjustments, solving the described issues in overcounting.
Furthermore, these comparisons will also be separate for the P-Bet and the $-Bet,
yielding 2⇥ 2 = 4 comparisons in total.
As we are testing for di↵erences repeatedly, the probability of falsely identify-
ing a statistically significant di↵erence is increased4. Nonetheless, a Wilcoxon signed
rank test does not report a statistically significant di↵erence in any of the compar-
isons between IA Tasks and LA tasks. The e↵ect in di↵erences is strongest and
almost significant when comparing positive IA and LA adjustments for the P-Bet
(V=2,255; p=0.06), with the di↵erence between positive IA and LA adjustments
for the $-Bet being the second-strongest (V=2,977; p=0.12). The same pattern of
a stronger e↵ect for P-Bet MSoPs also occurs when comparing negative IA and LA
adjustments for the P-Bet (V=2,374; p=0.32), with the di↵erence between negative
IA and LA adjustments for the $-Bet (V=1,620; p=0.44).
It follows that the corresponding H0 of equality of distributions to hypothesis
4 cannot be rejected. This leaves the account of consistency-seeking behaviour as
the only explanation for the MSoP mismatches. But since hypotheses 2 and 3 were
only accepted for positive adjustments, we cannot conclude with a clear explanation
of the MSoP mismatch from existing theory. Specifically, the BREUT valuation
model strictly rules out a negative MSoP mismatch in the case of consistency-seeking
behaviour.
5.5 Contribution and Discussion
In a controlled experiment, Butler et al.’s (2014a) observation of a positive MSoP
mismatch in contingent valuations was replicated for positive adjustments of sure
amounts only. Negative adjustments of sure amounts were associated with a negative
4E.g., at a significance level of ↵ = 5%, the probability of a false positive occurring after 4
repeated tests equals
P4
i=1
(1  ↵)i 1↵ = 17.6%.
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MSoP mismatch.
By computing SI points for participants, we also established that initial sure
amounts for the valuation of a P-Bet and a $-Bet did not control a preference reversal
between valuations and choices. Both the SVM mechanism as well as the SP model
predict a preference reversal by assuming that DMs are subject to an anchoring
e↵ect. These models assume that an initial sure amount is incompletely adjusted
from an anchor value towards the SI point. P-Bets are anchored below their SI point
while $-Bets are anchored above it. This results in an undervaluation of the P-Bet
and an overvaluation of the $-Bet (relative to their SI points), which can result in
a preference reversal. But in our experiment both the P-Bet and the $-Bet were
systematically valued above their respective SI points in the experiment, even when
being anchored below them.
The experiment rules out spill-over e↵ects as a cause of the MSoP mismatch.
No di↵erence in MSoP values was found between immediate and delayed MSoP val-
ues. Therefore, we conclude that consistency-seeking behaviour in the form of cog-
nitive dissonance is the remaining explanation for the described patterns in MSoP
mismatches. But consistency-seeking behaviour does not provide a full explana-
tion of the observed e↵ects either. Downward adjustments of sure amounts consis-
tently undershoot participants’ SI points while upward adjustments overshoot it. If
consistency-seeking behaviour introduces a positive e↵ect on MSoP size for negative
adjustments, at the very least this e↵ect must have been outweighed by a tendency
to overvalue a lottery relative to the SI point.
There is also no formal lottery valuation model that can make quantitative
predictions of lottery valuations which could explain the preference reversal along
with this two-fold pattern of MSoP mismatches. Explaining this interplay between
choice and valuation will require a model that can explain not only the preference re-
versal but also the counterintuitive e↵ect of consistency-seeking behaviour in MSoP
valuations.
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Chapter 6
Reaction Time E↵ects in
Valuation Tasks
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 described how in an experiment, participants stated CE values for lotteries
that were consistently above their SI points. The BREUT valuation model did not
predict the correct e↵ect directions for MSoP values and underpredicted the e↵ect
strength of the preference reversal phenomenon. But the qualitative prediction of
direct lottery valuations above the respective SI points as the driving force of the
preference reversal was correct. This chapter will investigate at the individual level
what e↵ect longer reaction times can have on direct valuations and how this relates
to the preference reversal phenomenon.
Chapters 3 and 4 describe how the preference reversal phenomenon can be
explained by DMs being boundedly rational: With unlimited deliberation time for
their decisions, they will behave perfectly consistently across di↵erent procedures
but constraints in mental resources and time keep them from achieving this. Their
behaviour remains probabilistic and procedure-dependent but with longer delib-
eration times, inconsistencies between procedures decrease. That is to say, when
everything else is equal, a DM that takes longer for a valuation will report a lottery
CE that is less likely to be inconsistent with her underlying distribution of prefer-
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ences. Do note, however, that this only applies if the process converges towards a
core model that does not di↵er across procedures.
Some indicative evidence has already been generated. As explained in the
literature review, Braga et al. (2009) that the number of preference reversals de-
creases when participants experience losses from playing out lotteries. But this
need not imply that the same is the case when participants do not experience feed-
back and only deliberate for longer about lotteries. And failures to reduce biases
in individually-longer reaction times have already been measured in an experiment
using a di↵erent valuation task: Ashby et al. (2012) imposed time limits on par-
ticipants’ WTA/WTP elicitations for lotteries and found that endowment e↵ects
increase when allowing participants more time to deliberate.
So it would make sense to test whether participants’ valuations actually con-
verge towards a value that corresponds to an underlying preference. Blavatskyy
and Ko¨hler (2009a) show that convergence can occur in a valuation task. They
incentivised participants to state their minimum selling price for a lottery at every
moment throughout a valuation process. This was done by randomly terminating
the pricing task and paying nothing in cases where an initial valuation was not
reported. If a price was stated, they determined the payo↵ through the BDM pro-
cedure. Therefore, participants were incentivised to quickly state and subsequently
update their reported price throughout their deliberation time. Blavatskyy and
Ko¨hler found that prices did not change randomly but instead converged towards
a final valuation in the majority of cases (in accordance with their SP model). But
they did not measure participants’ SI points of the lotteries. Therefore, it is impos-
sible to say from their experiment whether prices converged towards SI points.
The experiment in chapter 5 collected participants’ valuations and also al-
lowed us to infer SI points. So the data enables us to test if di↵erences between
valuations and SI points decrease in size and/or frequency for longer deliberation
times. This gives rise to two questions:
1) How can this di↵erence be measured? and
2) How can e↵ects of longer deliberation times on this di↵erence be measured?
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Chapter 5 already addressed the first question of measuring di↵erences between
valuations and SI points, suggesting that valuations systematically di↵er from SI
points. If we assume that something like a “true preference” manifests itself in the
SI point, we can define this discrepancy as the absolute di↵erence between a direct
valuation and the participant’s SI point (see section 6.2.2 for the calculation logic
of the SI point).
But how can an experiment measure the e↵ect of deliberation time on this
valuation distance? In the SVM mechanism and the BREUT valuation model,
deliberation times of a DM are endogenous and vary across repetitions of the same
decision task. Factoring out any other sources of noise in an experiment, this would
predict that individually-longer reaction times can then be attributed to a longer
mental process.
When combined with CE values, the marginal e↵ect of an increase (i.e.,
a positive deviation) in deliberation time then becomes observable. And if these
marginal e↵ects on valuations are not in line with sequential sampling predictions
from chapters 3 and 4, the fundamental sequential sampling assumption of the
described models must be rejected for valuation tasks.
Section 6.1.1 provides a motivation for testing the hypothesis, section 6.2
describes the data from the experiment and the methods used, section 6.3 describes
the predictions, and section 6.4 shows the results. Section 6.5 concludes with a
discussion.
6.1.1 The Sequential Sampling Paradigm applied to Valuation
As explained in more detail in chapter 2, Mo↵att (2005) already established that
participants in an experiment took relatively longer for choice tasks that were esti-
mated to be similar in attractiveness to them. This suggests that as their underlying
preference between lotteries becomes harder to identify, participants invest more cog-
nitive e↵ort into their choice. Note that this still requires an upper limit to avoid
an infinite amount of e↵ort in case of identical alternatives.
The common theme in a majority of sequential sampling models is that DMs
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satisfice. I.e., they will sample just long enough to reach a “good enough” set of
evidence that suggests which decision to make (Busemeyer, 2014). This reflects a
speed-accuracy trade-o↵: As they are unwilling to invest too much time and e↵ort
into their decision, they are willing to accept a less precise estimate of which option
is truly more attractive to them.
These models share the common component that a DM samples mental ev-
idence that is distributed around her average preference, generating samples that
also exhibit variance. This ensures that more sampling tends to lead to a more ac-
curate estimation of an option’s attractiveness to the DM. But at the same time, an
accumulated sample will never be su ciently large to represent underlying prefer-
ences with complete accuracy. As all samples are subject to noise, some variability
will always remain. But despite this, the representativeness of the sample increases
in sample size.
6.1.1.1 The BREUT Valuation Model
Chapter 4 (section 4.3.3.3) concludes with a qualitative prediction of the BREUT
valuation model: Everything else equal, a DM reports average valuations that are
closer to the SI point when the DM’s mental sample is larger. While some valuations
lie above the SI point and some lie below it. But the dispersion of valuations around
the SI point is greater for smaller samples. This e↵ect is also stronger for the $-Bet.
Valuations are also more likely to be above the SI point for smaller samples, leading
to overvaluation that results in the preference reversal phenomenon. So if SI points
between the lotteries do not di↵er, average $-Bet valuations are more likely to be
above P-Bet valuations for small samples.
If more sampling is associated with individually-longer reaction times, this
line of reasoning would predict that individually-longer reaction times would lead
to smaller di↵erences between valuations and SI points. So the BREUT valuation
model predicts larger valuation di↵erences for quicker responses and lower valuation
di↵erences for longer responses. When P-Bets are chosen over $-Bets more than
50% of times as in the experiment reported in chapter 5, BREUT predicts that the
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P-Bet’s SI point is greater than the $-Bet’s SI point. In that case, the model also
predicts that $-Bet valuations are more likely to be smaller than P-Bet valuations
for longer deliberation times because both lotteries’ valuations. Average lottery
valuations both start o↵ above the SI point and converge downwards. But as the
e↵ect is stronger for the $-Bet and the $-Bet’s SI point is also below the P-Bet’s SI
point, the reduction of $-Bet valuations is stronger and “overtakes” the reduction
in P-Bet valuations.
But how can we measure if a process goes on “for longer”? The solution
to this lies at the level of participants. We assume that participants’ characteris-
tics, which are represented by the underlying BREUT parameters, do not change
throughout the experiment. Although we cannot observe these parameters, we can
observe the e↵ects of di↵erences in reaction time on participant behaviour. Also, as
explained in chapter 2 (section 2.5.1), we assume that within-individual di↵erences
in reaction times of experimental tasks can be used as a proxy for di↵erences in
deliberation time of the participant. So we observe how participants di↵er in their
preference when reaction times are longer or shorter than usual.
6.1.1.2 The SVM Mechanism
Chapter 3 (section 3.3.5) explains how the SVM mechanism predicts that candi-
date values converge towards the SI point throughout the valuation process for all
lotteries. As the process randomly stops and settles on candidate values as final val-
uations, the marginal e↵ect is that all lottery valuations are closer to the respective
SI point for longer deliberation times. Again, we assume that longer deliberation
times are reflected in longer reaction times in the experiment.
The SVM mechanism assumes that starting values are below the SI point for
the P-Bet and above the SI point for the $-Bet. But in the case of average responses
in the experiment, starting values must have been above the SI points both for the
P-Bet and the $-Bet because final valuations were above the SI points. So in order to
assume that the SVM mechanism is correct, we need to alter this assumption so that
starting values are above SI points for both lotteries. This then resembles Tversky
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and Kahneman’s (1974) “Anchoring and Adjustment” approach. Then, the SVM
mechanism prediction of marginal e↵ects is the same as for the BREUT valuation
model: Lottery valuations start o↵ above the SI point and then converge towards it
for longer reaction times. Therefore, absolute di↵erences between valuations and SI
points decrease for longer reaction times.
6.2 Data
6.2.1 Direct Lottery Valuations
We use the data from the experiment described in chapter 5. Again, the 3 of the 77
participants that showed non-compliance with the incentivisation procedure were
excluded from the analysis (see section A.2 in the appendix).
Each participant completed 5 repetitions of direct valuation tasks, both for
the P-Bet and the $-Bet (see figure 5.5 in chapter 5 for the task display). The P-Bet
featured an 80% chance of winning £12 and the $-Bet featured a 25% chance of
winning £50. Every task provides a valuation V aluationit for participant i in trial
t. In combination with the SI point, this also provides an estimated deviation from
the SI point: |V aluationit   SI Pointi|.
6.2.2 Measuring Preferences through Choices
The choice part of the experiment involved binary choices between a lottery and
a sure amount (see figure 5.2 in chapter 5 for the task display). From this data,
individual SI points were inferred through the same counting method described in
section 5.2.1 in chapter 5. Participants chose between playing out the P-Bet and 6
di↵erent sure amounts with two groups either only facing even {0; 2; 4; ...; 10} or odd
{0; 3; 5; ...; 11} numbers (but both times including zero). Similarly, the $-Bet was
displayed alongside the same sure amounts. All trials but the single choices against
£0 were repeated 5 times, so SI points were based on 26 choices between a lottery
and a sure amount for each individual and lottery. In addition, each participant
faced 5 binary choices between the P-Bet and the $-Bet.
172
6.2.3 Reaction Times
The average reaction time over 740 direct valuation tasks was 9.13 seconds (me-
dian=9.01, sd=0.60). Of these, 370 tasks considered the P-Bet and the $-Bet each.
6.2.3.1 Within-Individual Reaction Times
Following Luce (1986), the reaction time in a trial is assumed to be equal to 1)
deliberation time plus 2) time to understand and subsequently respond to the task,
3) possible e↵ects of experience on the reaction time, and 4) experimental noise.
Deliberation Time Variations in deliberation time are the variable of interest,
being analysed for possible e↵ects on the di↵erence between valuation and SI point.
But participants might vary in their mental processing speed, which in theory cor-
responds to a speed of accumulating a mental sample. So one participant might
be a↵ected more by an increase in their deliberation time. We can avoid these
confounding e↵ects by only testing for individual marginal e↵ects of reaction times.
I.e., to estimate the statistical e↵ect of a one-unit increase in reaction time on the
size of the mismatch at the level of the individual.
Thereby, we limit ourselves to testing a qualitative hypothesis towards the
direction of a statistical e↵ect. This has the advantage that we filter out individual-
specific e↵ects that might a↵ect the results without the need to infer exact minimum
and maximum values for deliberation times.
Understanding and Executing a Task The time participants need to identify
a task and to subsequently execute their choice provides a lower bound for reaction
times. A crucial assumption for this analysis to work is that this individual-specific
lower bound does not change throughout the experiment (following Luce, 1986; and
Ratcli↵ and Tuerlinckx, 2002). Any additional time that the participant might need
and that changes throughout the experiment will be attributed to an experience
e↵ect.
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Experience In order to get a clearer estimate of the e↵ect of reaction times, we
also control for the e↵ect of experience on reaction times. Participants might get
quicker at stating their valuation as the experiment goes on because participants
will become more familiar with completing the task.
Reaction times are assumed to decrease exponentially towards a lower limit
throughout the experiment and this is modelled by adding a regressor equivalent to
the inverse of the task order. I.e., we assume that individuals take more time to
respond at the start of the experiment. Participants will on average respond quicker
with each subsequent trial but this e↵ect decreases in time and never moves below
an individual-specific lower bound.
Noise The remainder of reaction times will be attributed to idiosyncratic noise.
Lastly, we use a log10 transformation on reaction times to avoid issues with non-
normality and outliers. Reaction times in experiments are typically distributed
with a positive skew and a lower but no theoretical upper bound (for a fundamental
discussion of this, see e.g. Luce, 1986). Transforming reaction time data this way
will approximate a normal distribution, resulting in symmetrical estimation errors,
and lessens the impact of outliers without the need to exclude parts of the data
(Whelan, 2008; Ratcli↵, 1993). See figure A.4 in the appendix for histograms of
reaction times before and after the log-transformation.
6.2.3.2 Exogenous E↵ects on Reaction Times
The direct valuation tasks require participants to move a slider until they find a
value that makes the sure amount as attractive as the displayed lottery to them.
The nature of this elicitation might make valuations more or less precise because of
di↵erent levels of di culty. This could be the lottery range, which a↵ects the range
of the possible slider values (the P-Bet ranges from £0 to £12 while the $-Bet ranges
from £0 to £50). Sliders have the same absolute size on the interface for all tasks.
So a larger range makes it more di cult for the participant to select their CE via
the slider. So to avoid confounding e↵ects, analyses are carried out separately for
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the P-Bet and the $-Bet.
In short, we compare direct valuation tasks where the only di↵erence between
them was the trial order in the experiment. Since the tasks are identical and the
participants are the same, the only remaining non-idiosyncratic noise will be the
level of experience of the individual, which is covered by the regressor for experience
e↵ects.
6.2.3.3 Replicating Mo↵att’s (2005) Results
The choice data also allows us to test whether Mo↵att’s (2005) results are replicated
for choices between lotteries and sure amounts in this experiment. Mo↵att found
that participants’ reaction times increased for binary choices when the estimated
di↵erence in attractiveness between options was smaller. We can test if this also
applies to choices closer to the SI point. If reaction times are distributed in line
with Mo↵att’s findings, this suggests that other reaction times in the experiment
are less likely the result of external sources of noise.
While Mo↵att estimated di↵erence in attractiveness through a utility dif-
ference between options, we can use a simpler approach. We can use the absolute
di↵erence between a lottery’s SI point and the o↵ered sure amount as a measure for
the di↵erence in attractiveness. As we only run the regression separately for P-Bets
and $-Bets, we also do not need regressors for lottery complexity, and expected lot-
tery payo↵ di↵erence. Also, we only test for a potential non-linear e↵ect direction
to keep the number of regressors low because there are only 26 observations per
participant. So we only use this simplified regression equation for each participant
i:
RTit =  i0 +  i1SI Distanceit + SI Distance2it +  i2Trial Index
 1
it + "it
for individuals i = 1, . . . , 74 and trials t = 1, . . . , 26,
with an intercept  0i,
where RTit is the log10-transformed reaction time of individual i in trial t,
where SIDistanceit is the absolute di↵erence between individual i’s SI point
and the o↵ered sure amount in trial t,
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where SI Distance2it is this value squared to capture non-linear e↵ects,
where Trial Index 1it is the inverse of the trial index,
and error term "it.
The average reaction time over 1924 choice tasks was 8.34 seconds for the P-
Bet (median=8.26, sd=0.52) and 8.39 seconds for the $-Bet (median=8.28, sd=0.56).
Mean SI points were £7.07 for the P-Bet (median=£7.16, sd=1.51) and £7.00 for
the $-Bet (median=7.16, sd=1.63). Table 6.1 shows the regression results for the
P-Bet and the $-Bet. Note that all e↵ects sizes apply to log10-transformed reaction
times.
For the P-Bet, SIDistance has a small negative e↵ect on reaction times. To-
gether with the smaller positive SIDistance2it regressor, distance to the SI point has
negative non-linear e↵ect on reaction time and becomes weaker for greater distance.
Together, for a £1 increase at the SI point in di↵erence between the sure amount
and the lottery, the mean reaction time of 8.34 seconds decreases by 0.11 seconds.
In the most extreme case of £0 as sure amount, the non-linear e↵ect results in a
predicted reaction time of 7.91 seconds. trial 1 also shows an e↵ect of experience:
An average choice in the first trial is 2.81 seconds longer due to experience e↵ects
that subsequently decrease throughout the experiment.
For the $-Bet, SI Distance also has a negative e↵ect on reaction times, with
a smaller positive SIDistance2it regressor: For a £1 increase, the mean reaction time
of 8.39 seconds decreases by 0.02 seconds. In the case against £0, the non-linear
e↵ect results in a predicted reaction time of 8.27 seconds. trial 1 shows a similar
e↵ect: An average choice in the first trial is 1.52 seconds longer due to experience
e↵ects.
Despite the small e↵ect sizes, a likelihood-ratio test shows that the SIDistance2
regressor significantly improves predictions for both lotteries over the simpler model
with only SI Distance (P-Bet:  27=33.72, p<0.0001; $-Bet:  27=14.40, p=0.04).
Therefore, we conclude that our data fits in with Mo↵att’s (2005) more general
finding that reaction time increases for choices between options that are more simi-
lar in attractiveness.
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Table 6.1: Regression Outputs for Choices with P-Bets or $-Bets against Sure
Amounts with log10 of Reaction Time as Dependent Variable
(Note that reaction time is measured in log10 seconds)
6.3 Predictions
All BREUT valuation model predictions in this chapter depend on e↵ects due to
longer deliberation times. But they can be separated by e↵ects of reaction time on
the di↵erences between valuations and SI points, e↵ects on di↵erences between P-Bet
and $-Bet valuations, and e↵ects on the number of observed preference reversals.
Di↵erences between Valuations and SI Points
As explained in section 6.1.1.1, the BREUT valuation model predicts that longer
deliberation times lead to smaller di↵erences between valuations and SI points. Also,
the SVM mechanism predicts that candidate values converge towards the SI point
the longer a valuation process goes on (as explained in section 6.1.1.2). This simple
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proposition is already enough to generate the same testable prediction. Therefore,
both models predict that valuations closer to the SI point correlate with individually-
longer reaction times. The resulting absolute di↵erence between valuations and
respective SI points should therefore decrease for individually-longer reaction times.
However, the BREUT valuation model also predicts that direct valuations fall
below the SI point more frequently for longer deliberation times. Even though the
average distance between valuations and SI points decreases, fewer valuations will
be above and more valuations will be below the SI point. The resulting prediction is
that direct valuations are more frequently below the SI point for individually-longer
reaction times. Note that all predictions have the same e↵ect direction for the P-Bet
as well as the $-Bet.
Di↵erences between P-Bet and $-Bet Valuations
Since BREUT obeys weak stochastic transitivity in choices, a choice preference be-
tween lotteries also implies a corresponding di↵erence in SI points. The experiment
in chapter 5 showed that the majority of participants chooses the P-Bet over the
$-Bet the majority of times. Therefore, if we infer the BREUT preference from these
direct choices, the average P-Bet SI point must lie above the average $-Bet SI point.
So a BREUT DM with a choice preference for the P-bet will have a $-Bet SI point
that is already below the P-Bet’s SI point. And as explained earlier, average direct
valuations of all lotteries decrease towards the respective SI points. The BREUT
valuation model also predicts that longer deliberation times reduce $-Bet valuations
more strongly than P-Bet valuations (see section 4.3.3.3). The resulting prediction is
that for longer reaction times, the share of $-Bet valuations above P-Bet valuations
decreases because $-Bet valuations decrease more strongly in the direction of the
$-Bet SI point, which is lower than the P-Bet SI point. So for individually-longer
reaction times, BREUT predicts fewer $-Bet valuations that are higher than P-Bet
valuations.
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Preference Reversals: Number of Observed Preference Reversals
If a BREUT valuation DM has a choice preference for the P-Bet, longer delibera-
tion times will lead to more $-Bet valuations below P-Bet valuations. This implies
a preference relationship that is consistent across procedures. Conversely, lottery
valuations from shorter deliberation times are more dispersed and further from the
respective SI points and result in more preference reversals. The resulting predic-
tion is that for individually-longer reaction times, valuations are more likely to be
consistent with preferences in choices. Therefore, the number of observed preference
reversals decreases for individually-longer reaction times.
Figure 6.1 shows BREUT valuation model predictions set against scatter-
plots of di↵erences between valuations and SI points: |V aluationit   SI Pointi|,
where V aluationit is the direct valuation by individual i in trial t and SI Pointi
their SI point. This is done separately for P-Bets and $-Bets. Whereas BREUT
valuation predictions in the graphs depend on sample sizes, the valuation data de-
pend on reaction times that are adjusted for experience e↵ects. This is done for each
participant i by a simple regression of RTit =  0i +  1itrial
 1
it + ✏it where trial
 1
it
accounts for experience e↵ects (as explained in section 6.2.3.1).  1i has a positive
e↵ect on reaction times for early trials, which decreases exponentially throughout
the experiment. This reflects longer reaction times due to a lack of experience at the
start of the experiment. This e↵ect of  1itrial
 1
it is then subtracted from individual
reaction times RTit for adjusted reaction times.
Two issues are of interest in figure 6.1. First, as in the BREUT valuation
model prediction, average valuations are above the SI point for shorter adjusted
reaction times in the scatterplot data and the e↵ect is stronger for the $-Bet (as
shown in section 5.4, chapter 5). Second, there is no clear relationship that shows
valuations below the SI point in longer adjusted reaction times, neither for the P-
Bet nor for the $-Bet. Section 6.4 analyses whether the predictions are supported
by the data.
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6.4 Results
6.4.1 E↵ects of Reaction Time on absolute Di↵erences between
Valuations and SI Points
Absolute Di↵erences between Valuations and SI Points
To measure individual reaction time e↵ects on absolute di↵erences between valua-
tions and SI points, we fit a simple model separately for P-Bet and $-Bet valuations
and each participant i:
|V aluationit   SI Pointi| =  0i +  RTiRTit +  2iTrial Index 1it + "it
for individuals i = 1, . . . , 74 and trials t = 1, . . . , 5,
where |V aluationit   SI Pointi| is the absolute di↵erence between
the valuation by individual i in trial t and individual i’s SI point,
with an intercept  0i,
where RTit is the log10-transformed reaction time of individual i in trial t,
where Trial Index 1it is the inverse of the trial index,
and error term "it.
As explained in the previous section, the prediction is that |V aluation  
SI Point| decreases in log-transformed reaction times. So H1 implies that  RT < 0.
This average absolute di↵erence over 5 direct valuation tasks was £1.69 for the P-Bet
(median=1.59, sd=1.23) and £9.05 for the $-Bet (median=6.34, sd=8.13). Table
6.1 shows the regression results for the P-Bet and the $-Bet. Note that reaction
times have been log10-transformed.
For the P-Bet,  RT estimates are positive but the  RT coe cient estimates
do not reach significance. So H0 of no reduction in absolute valuation di↵erence
for longer reaction times cannot be rejected. A one-unit increase in log-transformed
reaction time statistically increases the absolute valuation di↵erence by £0.17. At
the mean P-Bet reaction time of 8.89 seconds, this equates to only a £0.002 increase
in absolute valuation di↵erence for a 1 second increase in reaction time.
For the $-Bet,  RT estimates are negative and reach significance. A likelihood-
181
ratio test shows that the RT regressor statistically significantly improves predictions
over a simpler model without it ( 21=9.27, p<0.001). A one-unit increase in log-
transformed reaction time statistically decreases absolute valuation di↵erence by
£14.79. At the mean $-Bet reaction time of 9.134 seconds, this equates to a £0.18
decrease in absolute valuation di↵erence for a 1 second increase in reaction time.
Even though this e↵ect is significant, theoretically a 1 second increase in reaction
time only reduces the mean di↵erence by 2%. But average $-Bet valuations are
£8.71 above the SI point. Therefore, this e↵ect is unlikely to result in any valua-
tions below the SI point due to longer reaction times. So while the regression for the
$-Bet rejects H0 and shows a reduction of absolute valuation di↵erence in line with
the predictions, the e↵ect size appears to be too small to compensate the preference
reversal in longer reaction times.
Table 6.2: Regression Output of Individual E↵ects on Absolute Di↵erence between
Valuation and SI point
(Note that reaction time is measured in log10 seconds)
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E↵ects of Reaction Time on the Di↵erence between Valuation and SI
Point
The BREUT valuation model predicts that individually-longer reaction times result
in valuations that are more frequently below the SI point. On a qualitative level,
we can test for this by observing the share of direct valuations CEDV below the SI
point CESI for shorter reaction times versus this share for longer reaction times.
Separately for P-Bets and $-Bets, we adjust reaction times to experience
e↵ects as described in section 6.3. Then, we assign a rank to each reaction time on a
per-individual basis, with rank 1 for the shortest and rank 5 for the longest adjusted
reaction time. That way, we separate elicited valuations into 5 groups according to
the length of the reaction time on an individual basis. For each group, we can then
observe how many CEDV valuations were above, at, or below the SI point CESI .
Table 6.3 shows this cross-tabulation for P-Bet valuations. In total, 261 P-
Bet valuations were above the respective participant’s SI point and 107 below (with
another 2 valuations exactly at the SI point). But from the shortest individual
reaction time (rank 1) to the longest reaction time (rank 5), the number of valuations
below the SI point even decreases. This reflects the positive e↵ect of individually-
longer reaction times, which was reported in the regression of reaction times on
the absolute di↵erence between valuations and SI points. Therefore, H0 cannot be
rejected.
We can test if this increase in P-Bet valuations above the SI point is statis-
tically significant. As rank categories are ordinal, we need to test our hypotheses
with an ordinal  2 test1, which is more likely to correctly reject H0 (Agresti, 2013).
This test reports no statistically significant e↵ect2 ( 22=0.70, p=0.703).
1Agresti (2013) also refers to the special case of one ordinal variable and another non-ordinal
variable with two categories as “extended Cochran–Armitage test”. The general m ⇥ n version of
this (with m,n✏N) is referred to as a “linear-by-linear association model” Agresti (2013).
2This result also holds when the column with P-Bet valuations equal to the SI point is removed
(Cochran–Armitage test: z2=0.654, p=0.513).
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Table 6.3: P-Bet: Cross Tabulation of Reaction Time Ranks and Di↵erences be-
tween Direct Valuations and SI Points
Di↵erence between participants’ CEDV Values and CESI Values
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k
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st
,
5-
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n
ge
st
)
CEDV>CESI CEDV=CESI CEDV<CESI count
1 52 0 22 74
2 50 1 23 74
3 50 1 23 74
4 55 0 19 74
5 54 0 20 74
count 261 2 107 370
Table 6.4 shows the same cross-tabulation for $-Bet valuations. In total, 334
$-Bet valuations were above the SI point and 35 below (with 1 valuation exactly
at the SI point). Despite the negative e↵ect of individually-longer reaction times
on absolute di↵erences between valuations and SI point, valuations above the SI
point only decrease from 69 to 67 from rank 1 to 5. An ordinal  2 test reports no
statistically significant e↵ect3 ( 22=2.01, p=0.367) and H0 cannot be rejected.
Therefore, there is no evidence for the BREUT valuation model’s prediction
that the number of valuations above SI points decreases in individually-longer re-
action times, neither for P-Bets nor for $-Bets. In addition, the decrease in $-Bet
valuations is not su ciently strong to result in a statistically significant reduction
of preference reversals (when comparing direct valuations to SI points).
3This result also holds when the column with $-Bet valuations equal to the SI point is removed
(Cochran–Armitage test: z2=0.024, p=0.981).
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Table 6.4: $-Bet: Cross Tabulation of Reaction Time Ranks and Di↵erences be-
tween Direct Valuations and SI Points
Di↵erence between participants’ CEDV Values and CESI Values
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n
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)
CEDV>CESI CEDV=CESI CEDV<CESI count
1 69 0 5 74
2 65 0 9 74
3 66 0 8 74
4 67 0 7 74
5 67 1 6 74
count 334 1 35 370
6.4.2 E↵ects of Reaction Time on Di↵erences between P-Bet and
$-Bet valuations
An additional prediction of the BREUT valuation model is that for longer reaction
times, the stronger reduction in $-Bet valuations results in more $-Bet valuations
below P-Bet valuations of the same individual. We can test for this with a simi-
lar cross tabulation as in the last section. But this time, we match P-Bet valua-
tions (CEDV (P )) to $-Bet valuations (CEDV ($)) of the same rank and individual.
Thereby, we count at the individual level how many P-Bet valuations were above,
equal to, or below $-Bet valuations of the same adjusted reaction time rank.
The corresponding prediction is that we observe more P-Bet valuations above
$-Bet valuations (CEDV (P ) > CEDV ($)) for higher reaction time ranks. Table 6.5
lists the results. But again, we actually observe a weak opposite e↵ect: Higher $-Bet
valuations occur 59 out of 74 times for shortest reaction times and 60 out of 74 times
for longest reaction times. And an ordinal  2 test reports no statistically significant
e↵ect4 ( 22=4.07, p=0.131).
Section 6.4.1 showed that in fact, individually-longer reaction times have a
weak positive e↵ect on P-Bet valuations and a negative e↵ect on $-Bet valuations.
4This result also holds when the column with equal valuations is removed (Cochran–Armitage
test: z2=0.651, p=0.513).
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But despite this, these combined e↵ects appear to be insu cient to lead to fewer $-
Bet valuations above P-Bet valuations for higher adjusted reaction times. Therefore
again, H0 cannot be rejected.
Table 6.5: Cross Tabulation of Reaction Time Ranks and Di↵erences between Direct
P-Bet and $-Bet Valuations
Di↵erence between participants’ CEDV Values for P-Bet and $-Bet
R
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)
CEDV (P )>CEDV ($) CEDV (P )=CEDV ($) CEDV (P )<CEDV ($) count
1 15 0 59 74
2 11 2 61 74
3 13 1 60 74
4 13 2 59 74
5 10 4 60 74
count 62 9 299 370
6.4.3 E↵ects of Reaction Time on the Number of Observed Pref-
erence Reversals
In a final step, we can also test a prediction of the BREUT valuation model that is
also shared with the SVM mechanism: that two lottery valuations are more likely
to reflect a choice preference for longer reaction times. I.e., individually-longer
valuation processes are more likely to produce CEs that are consistent with the
participant’s average choice preference between lotteries. Thereby, the number of
observed preference reversals decreases for individually-longer reaction times.
In order to analyse this, we have to separate between 4 possible cases per
reaction time rank: 2 instances where preferences are consistent and 2 instances
where preferences are inconsistent:
1. Prefer P over $ and value P higher than $: Consistent Preference
2. Prefer P over $ but value $ higher than P: Preference Reversal
3. Prefer $ over P and value $ higher than P: Consistent Preference
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4. Prefer $ over P but value P higher than $: Preference Reversal
Table 6.6 lists matched valuations from the same participant and adjusted reaction
time rank according to these characteristics. Choice preference is defined as the
majority direct choice between P-Bet and $-Bet across the five repetitions in the
experiment. The preference in valuations results from comparing the P-Bet and
$-Bet valuation of the same adjusted reaction time rank from the same participant.
Table 6.6 lists 199 observations of the classic preference reversal, where the P-Bet
is chosen more often (P   $) but $-Bet valuations are higher than or equal to
P-Bet valuations (CEDV (P )<CEDV ($)). The table also lists 170 observations of
consistent preferences, 61 for the P-Bet and 109 for the $-Bet.
The prediction is that the number of preference reversals will decrease for
higher reaction time ranks. But the number of classic preference reversals actually
increases from 37 at rank 1 to 43 at rank 5. An ordinal  2 test reports no statistically
significant e↵ect5 ( 23=3.09, p=0.378) and H0 cannot be rejected.
5This result also holds when we consolidate the columns so that one column lists valuation
preferences that match with choice preferences and a second column lists valuation preferences that
do not match with choice preferences. I.e., when we only compare the number of preference reversals
to the number of consistent preference relations per reaction time rank (Cochran–Armitage test:
z2=0.885, p=0.376).
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6.5 Contribution and Discussion
A large body of literature exists on sequential sampling models, which assumes
that reaction times in experiments do at least partly reflect the extent to which
participants deliberate for a decision. The computational models that are discussed
in chapter 3 and the BREUT valuation model developed in chapter 4 also reflect the
assumption that “more sampling is more precise”: In theory, a longer deliberation
time leads to valuations that are closer to individuals’ preferences as represented
by their underlying core functions. These underlying preferences are assumed to be
more consistent with individuals’ choices than with their valuations.
This rough criterion predicts that discrepancies between valuations and choices
decrease in individually-longer reaction times. We repeatedly tested for evidence
that di↵erences between valuations and SI points decrease in individually-longer
reaction times in direct valuation tasks with three di↵erent approaches: 1) By mea-
suring the absolute di↵erence between direct valuations and SI points as well as the
frequency of valuations above SI points, 2) by measuring the frequencies of implied
preference relations between P-Bet and $-Bet valuations with the same adjusted re-
action time rank, and 3) by measuring the frequency of observed preference reversals
per adjusted reaction time rank.
Note that repeated testing also increases the likelihood of detecting the pre-
dicted e↵ect on at least one occasion. But in all cases, there was no su cient
evidence that preference reversals decrease in reaction time at the individual level.
Section A.4 in the Appendix also shows that outlier removal does not alter results.
The phenomenon that reaction times reflect a speed-accuracy trade-o↵ in
decision making has been documented across a range of decision tasks. This makes
reaction times as an explanatory factor of the preference reversal phenomenon es-
pecially interesting. The BREUT valuation model, SP model, and SVM mechanism
predict that too high lottery valuations will decrease throughout a valuation process
and converge towards a value that is more likely to be consistent with participants’
preferences in choices. But our analysis suggests that this is not the case when we
compare valuations to individual SI points and choice data. Therefore, this evidence
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shows that a di↵erent approach is necessary to adequately capture how discrepan-
cies between valuations, SI points, and choice behaviour arise and when they are
reduced.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis reviewed existing research applicable to the preference reversal phe-
nomenon and the MSoP mismatch with a focus on bounded rationality. Existing
research only produced sequential sampling models of valuation that use a “choose
and adjust” approach, which does not predict lottery overvaluations relative to SI
points as observed by Loomes and Pogrebna (2016).
It was possible to extend the BREUT choice model to also predict valua-
tions and MSoP values. The BREUT valuation model samples from a distribution
of mental evidence, which generates CE values from utility functions that satisfy the
conventional economic concept of rationality. Even though it fully predicts choices
and valuations by sampling from the same distribution of mental evidence, it system-
atically predicts the preference reversal phenomenon. The model is stochastically
transitive but violates procedure invariance: Lotteries tend to be overvalued relative
to their SI points. This tendency is stronger for $-Bets than for P-Bets, leading to
systematic preference reversals. The valuation model can also predict a positive
MSoP mismatch by incorporating spill-over e↵ects from choice onto valuations. In
addition, it is possible to impose e↵ects from consistency-seeking behaviour on the
model, which can provide an added positive e↵ect to the MSoP mismatch.
We conducted an experiment that estimates CEs through di↵erent elicita-
tion methods. This quantifies the extent of the preference reversal and MSoP mis-
matches in relation to individual SI points. Measuring SI points also allowed us
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to test whether anchoring e↵ects as specified by the SVM mechanism and the SP
model can explain preference reversals. In addition, the experiment also controlled
for the delay between choices and MSoP elicitations, thereby distinguishing be-
tween spill-over e↵ects and consistency-seeking behaviour. The experiment shows
that lotteries are overvalued relative to their SI points, contrary to the “choose
and adjust” explanation via anchoring e↵ects. This e↵ect is stronger for the $-Bet,
leading to the preference reversal phenomenon. The positive MSoP mismatch is
replicated when participants report MSoP values through upward adjustments of
sure amounts. But a previously unknown negative MSoP mismatch emerges for
downward adjustments. There is no di↵erence in MSoP mismatches between imme-
diate and delayed adjustments, suggesting that spill-over e↵ects are not causal to
the MSoP mismatch. However, consistency-seeking behaviour alone cannot explain
a negative MSoP mismatch either.
We also tested for e↵ects of individually-longer reaction times on direct val-
uations. But although the distance between valuations and SI points decreases for
individually-longer reaction times for $-Bets, this e↵ect is not strong enough to
have an e↵ect on observed preference reversals. This result also applies to rever-
sals between valuations and SI points, between P-Bet and $-Bet valuations, and to
reversals from choices to valuations.
An interesting future direction of research would be to explore if other exten-
sions of the BREUT model as well as other sequential sampling models can produce
predictions of valuations that are entirely based on sampling. While the BREUT
valuation model does predict preference reversals, it underpredicts the strong ef-
fects frequently reported in the literature. The phenomenon that longer deliber-
ation times might not lead to fewer preference reversals also poses a challenge to
approaches based on sequential sampling. There is no sequential sampling model
using a core utility function that can predict all results from the experiment. CE
elicitations that are a↵ected by the procedure pose a fundamental problem at the
basis of economic research. For economic theory to accurately capture behaviour,
valuation models need to be improved to explain the source of these inconsistencies.
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The valuation experiment was also designed to minimise the risk of endow-
ment e↵ects that might influence MSoP tasks. And MSoP values did not di↵er
when the MSoP elicitation was delayed after the choice, suggesting that no such
e↵ect occurred. But an interesting extension would be to check how the MSoP phe-
nomenon could relate to an endowment e↵ect. E.g., MSoP values could be elicited
after choices between non-monetary alternatives. And instead of classic WTA and
WTP elicitations, participants could be asked for the MSoP equivalent. Depend-
ing on participants actually obtaining a good, an MSoP elicitation method might
generate mismatches with choices or WTA/WTP elicitations independent of any
endowment e↵ect or modulate its strength.
The reaction times analysis suggests that longer deliberation times do not
lead participants to adjust their valuations in a way that they become more consis-
tent with their preference in choices. But the sequential sampling models discussed
in this thesis do predict such an e↵ect. In a first step to inform theory, it could
be useful to check if participants in valuation experiments are generally hesitant
to adjust any money amount downwards. Building a model that accounts for this
behaviour might provide a better approach than a DM updating a sample mean as
used in the BREUT valuation model.
While behavioural regularities that violate EUT are well-documented, as-if
models such as the one developed in chapter 4 are far from catching up in predicting
these regularities. Studying actual mechanisms in the human brain might lead
modelling e↵orts in the proper direction. A number of brain regions have been
successfully identified to be linked to mental processes that are used for utility
optimisation processes (Louie et al., 2015). These processes depend on a neural
representation of value information, where a choice is influenced by a process more
akin to perception instead of a construction of preference. E.g., where a choice
depends on identifying an option with a higher value instead of relying on a notion
of preference, which is fundamental to completing preference elicitation tasks. As
these process are subject to the constraints of the human brain, this again mirrors
the satisficing condition of bounded rationality.
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These processes are also modulated by context e↵ects because valuation be-
haviour appears to be comparative instead of absolute, e.g. leading to loss aversion,
violations of the independence axiom, and e↵ects of expectations on reference points
that can also be shaped by learning (Louie et al., 2013; Tymula and Plassmann,
2016). Tymula and Glimcher (2018) develop a model to more accurately represent
neurological processes in the human brain. The model has a novel functional form
that incorporates cardinal instead of ordinal representations of utility and a bounded
and finite value function with limited precision, which can adjust to changes in a
reference point. Di↵erent preference estimations across participants arise due to
heterogeneity in their parameters for calculating value, not because of di↵erent es-
timations of preference. Also, previous experiences shape behaviour through their
influence on reference points. But this leads back to the initial problem in a straight
valuation task: How will a model describe a lottery valuation when there is no other
alternative to compare the lottery to? This will require additional research to ex-
plore how such models might overcome this problem in predicting choice-matching
discrepancies.
In conclusion, there is both a lot of evidence and a lot of theoretical work
on valuation behaviour. But there is still no model using a core utility function
that can reconcile all phenomena observed in the experiment, let alone for choice-
matching discrepancies in general. If existing theory is already limited in capturing
these results, predictions in more complicated contexts could be a↵ected as well. So
further theoretical work on building models that can explain these phenomena may
have implications for economic theory in general.
194
Appendix A
A.1 Chapter 3 and 4: Certainty Equivalents of P-Bet
and $-Bet dependent on r
Consider the following utility function with random risk-aversion parameter r:
u(x) = x1 r where r is randomly distributed
See figure A.1 for such a CE distribution: With r ⇠ uniform[ 0.3; 0.7], a
mean risk-averse DM is facing a 80% chance of £12 (P-Bet) vs. a 25% chance of £50
($-Bet). Note that some CE values are higher than the lotteries’ expected values
as the minority of r parameters below zero generate risk-seeking CEs. Even though
the uniform distribution is symmetric, the resulting distribution of CE values is not.
See figure A.2 for a graph how CE values of the P-Bet and the $-Bet depend
on r and the exponent in u(x) = x1 r = xs where s = (1  r). A change in r results
in a non-linear change in the CE values of the lotteries.
195
Figure A.1: CE distribution of a “mean risk-averse” DM with a uniform distribution
of risk aversion parameters with r 2 [ 0.3; 0.7]
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Figure A.2: CE values of the utility function u(x) = x1 r dependent on the risk
aversion parameter r 2 ( 1; 1) and its result s = (1  r) 2 (0; 2)
Note: The interval ( 1; 1) for r excludes r = 1, therefore CE(s = 0) is not plotted
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A.2 Chapter 5 and 6: Data Exclusion
For each participant, a score was calculated for each task involving a valuation via
slider (IA, DV , and LA Tasks). This score was 0 in case of the valuation being
higher than 95% or lower than 5% of the winning payo↵ of the lottery, 1 otherwise. A
participant’s mean score across the entire experiment corresponds to the percentage
of tasks in which they stated a preference that was not particularly extreme as only
outliers generate a score of 0. As soon as a participant’s mean score is below 0.5,
their data would be excluded.
Mean valuation scores for each participant were calculated and are shown in
figure A.3. Three participants with a mean valuation score below 0.25 were excluded
from the analysis to avoid using data from participants that did not understand the
BDM procedure. After excluding these participants, the remaining sample had a
collective valuation score of 0.99 (min=0.91; max=1).
Figure A.3: Mean Valuation Scores for all participants
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A.3 Chapter 6: Figures
Figure A.4: Histograms of Reaction Times and log10 transformed Reaction Times
of MSoP tasks
A.4 Chapter 6: Outlier Removal
In addition to the main lotteries, the data also covers a range of lotteries that were
used as distractor tasks (in a randomised order within distractors). Participants were
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randomly assigned to two di↵erent groups with di↵erent distractor tasks. Table A.1
details the lotteries. The main P-Bet and $-Bet were the same for group A (38
participants) and group B (36 participants). Distractor lotteries are divided into
P-type lotteries with winning probabilities above 50% and $-type lotteries with
winning probabilities below 50%.
Separately for P-type and $-type lotteries, mean adjusted reaction times were
computed as described in chapter 6 (section 6.2). Following a method described by
Ratcli↵ (1993), outliers were removed by computing the mean adjusted reaction
time as well as the corresponding standard deviation for each individual across all
direct valuation tasks. Note that including distractor lotteries reduces the standard
deviation because a larger sample is used. This makes the outlier removal method
more conservative.
All valuation tasks where participants took longer than their mean adjusted
reaction time plus two standard deviations to respond, were designated as outliers
and removed. This occurred for 17 P-Bet tasks and 14 $-Bet tasks. There was no
participant for whom more than 1 valuation task was removed per P-Bet or $-Bet
lottery. The following tables list the results from chapter 6 with removed outliers:
• Table A.2: Individual E↵ects of Reaction Time on Overvaluation
– For the P-Bet, the RT regressor does not statistically significantly im-
prove predictions over a simpler model without it (likelihood-ratio test:
 2=0.01, p=0.944)
– For the $-Bet, the RT regressor statistically significantly improves pre-
dictions over a simpler model without it (likelihood-ratio test:  2=34.66,
p<0.001)
• Table A.3: Individual E↵ects of Reaction Time on the Di↵erence between
P-Bet Valuation and SI Point
– An ordinal  2 test reports no statistically significant e↵ect ( 22=0.983,
p=0.612)
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– This result also holds when the column with P-Bet valuations equal to
the SI point is removed (Cochran–Armitage test: z2=0.898, p=0.369)
• Table A.4: Individual E↵ects of Reaction Time on the Di↵erence between
$-Bet Valuation and SI Point
– An ordinal  2 test reports no statistically significant e↵ect ( 22=2.457,
p=0.293)
– This result also holds when the column with P-Bet valuations equal to
the SI point is removed (Cochran–Armitage test: z2=0.442, p=0.658)
• Table A.5: Individual E↵ects of Reaction Time on Di↵erences between P-Bet
and $-Bet valuations
– An ordinal  2 test reports no statistically significant e↵ect ( 22=3.185,
p=0.203)
– This result also holds when the column with equal valuations is removed
(Cochran–Armitage test: z2=0.301, p=0.764)
• Table A.6: Individual E↵ects of Reaction Time on the Number of Observed
Preference Reversals
– An ordinal  2 test reports no statistically significant e↵ect ( 23=2.934,
p=0.402)
– This result also holds when comparing the number of preference reversals
to the number of consistent preference relations per reaction time rank
(Cochran–Armitage test: z2=0.799, p=0.424)
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Table A.1: Lotteries that were displayed to Participants for Direct Valuation Tasks
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Table A.2: Regression Output of log10 Reaction Time E↵ects on Overvaluation
(Note that reaction time is measured in log10 seconds)
Table A.3: P-Bet: Cross Tabulation of Reaction Time Ranks and Di↵erences be-
tween Direct Valuations and SI Points
Di↵erence between participants’ CEDV Values and CESI Values
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)
CEDV>CESI CEDV=CESI CEDV<CESI count
1 52 0 22 74
2 50 1 23 74
3 50 1 23 74
4 55 0 19 74
5 43 0 14 57
count 250 2 101 353
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Table A.4: $-Bet: Cross Tabulation of Reaction Time Ranks and Di↵erences be-
tween Direct Valuations and SI Points
Di↵erence between participants’ CEDV Values and CESI Values
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)
CEDV>CESI CEDV=CESI CEDV<CESI count
1 69 0 5 74
2 65 0 9 74
3 66 0 8 74
4 67 0 7 74
5 56 1 3 60
count 323 1 32 356
Table A.5: Cross Tabulation of Reaction Time Ranks and Di↵erences between Direct
P-Bet and $-Bet Valuations
Di↵erence between participants’ CEDV Values for P-Bet and $-Bet
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)
CEDV (P )>CEDV ($) CEDV (P )=CEDV ($) CEDV (P )<CEDV ($) count
1 15 0 59 74
2 11 2 61 74
3 13 1 60 74
4 13 2 59 74
5 9 3 45 57
count 61 8 284 353
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